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TOWARD A BIOCRITICAL SOCIOLOGY

John Neuhaus, Ph.D.
Western Michigan University, 1995
This dissertation is a critical discourse with three prominent
trends in contemporary sociology.

It is a critique of Emile Durk-

heim's admonition that sociological analysis, by definition, requires
the exclusion of biological and psychological data.

It shows, in

contrast, that the exclusion of biosocial data removes vast sources
of information which are useful and necessary in any interpretation
of human behavior.

This work also demonstrates that a biosocial

perspective facilitates the development of a transcultural theory of
human needs, which, if utilized, would enable sociologists to clarify
a number of unproductive disciplinary conflicts concerning the
definition and extent of social problems.
Secondly, in developing an original biocritical perspective,
this dissertation indicates that there is no necessary relationship
between biosocial or evolutionary arguments and political conserva
tism.

This is made clear with an historical and textual analysis of

the works of Edward Wilson, the leading contemporary sociobiologist,
and Robert Richards, the leading contemporary proponent of evolu
tionary ethics.

The examination of Wilson and Richards also makes

clear that the evaluative and indicative modes cannot be separated
in sociological analysis, but that each cannot, therefore, be reduced
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to the other.

All evaluation presupposes empirical referents.

Finally, this dissertation demonstrates the sociological util
ity of the biocritical approach by a re-reading of the works of Ro
bert Bellah and others in the communitarian tradition.

It esta

blishes, contrary to Bellah, that an individualistic analysis need
not embrace the self-centered political and social attitudes criti
cized by Bellan and other communitarians.

A biocritical perspective

shows that communitarian analyses would be strengthened by an
individualistic theory of human needs.
In conclusion, this dissertation shows that there are warranted
reasons for sociologists to utilize biosocial data.

It shows that

there is no necessary connection between political conservatism and
evolutionary reasoning and evidence.

In demonstrates that sociolo

gists should make use of relevant data, no matter the source, and
that Durkheim was fundamentally mistaken in his categorical exclusion
of all biological and psychological data and categories of analysis.
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CHAPTER I
TOWARD A BIOCRITICAL SOCIOLOGY
Introduction

This dissertation is a critical discourse with three prominent
trends within contemporary sociology.

Elaborating on what I term a

biocritical perspective, I carry on a critical conversation with
Emile Durkheim over his philosophy of dualism and his insistence that
sociology foundationally requires absence of concern with psycholog
ical or biological individual characteristics.

Secondly, I provide

a critical or Left reading of current biosocial and sociobiological
research.

Contrary to the prevailing orthodoxy in sociology that a

biosocial or evolutionary perspective is inherently conservative or
Social Darwinist in its implications, I show that the possibilities
for a critical sociobiology have been woefully undertheorized and
misunderstood by mainstream sociology.
After demonstrating the relevance of a biocritical approach for
sociological analysis, I will then demonstrate its utility in a re
reading of the communitarian works of Bellah, Madsen, Sulliven, Swidler and Tipton (1985, 1991).

The utilization of a biocritical per

spective expands the possibility of discourse and spirit of community
that Bellah and other communitarians seek (Etzioni, 1993).

Unfor

tunately, the ghost of Durkheim haunts Habits of the Heart (1985).
Broadening the range of privileged sociological data would enable
1
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the communitarians to more adequately respond to their critics
(Phillips, 1993).

Sociology most certainly doesn't need an updated,

foundationalist version of Newtonian physics.

But a contemporary

understanding of evolutionary psychology and biology would do wonders
for our hubristic myopia.
This dissertation demonstrates the necessity of expanding the
boundaries of what is normal or taken-for-granted within sociology.
It demonstrates the importance of utilizing what William Durham
(1991) terms a coevolutionary perspective.

It shows that one

aspect of major importance in this perspective for sociology is its
relevance for any discussion of human needs.

Including the concept

of human needs in sociological discourse enables me to develop a
biocritical approach to sociological analysis.
I will show that biocritique is one potentially helpful way
of approaching--not resolving--some of the major conflicts which seem
to have paralyzed much of sociology.

I emphasize approach as opposed

to resolution because I believe, along with John Dewey and the prag
matists, that knowledge is best viewed as a process which is emergent
over time.

It is never complete and should be linguistically under

stood as both a verb and a noun (Diggins, 1994; West, 1989).

I

assume that there are no eternal, a priori verities and that socio
logy should develop a pragmatic, biosocial approach to knowledge
which takes into account a wide range of material neglected or ig
nored by many social scientists.
In Robert Trivers' seminal article The Evolution of Reciprocal

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

Altruism (1971), one discovers a wide range of interdisciplinary
references.

Presumably Trivers, even though he is a biologist and

the article was published in the Quarterly Review of Biology, feels
free to refer to whatever source he believes has merit.

Included in

this classic piece of biosocial theorizing are references to Alvin
Gouldner, Robert Friedrichs (sociology), Gabriel Almond (political
science), Albert Bandura, Fritz Heider, Lawrence Kohlberg (psycho
logy), Richard Lee, Ivan DeVore, Ashley Montagu (anthropology), Anatol Rapoport (game theory), Jean Jacques Rousseau (philosophy), as
well as the expected references to biologists and ethologists.

It

is a singularly catholic list.
Sociologists, however, have often felt that one could, with
impunity, ignore the biological.

In what authors Stephen Sanderson

and Lee Ellis (1992) say is the only study of "theroetical prefer
ences of sociologists undertaken since the onset of the present state
of threoretical fragmentation in the mid-1960s," we find that 1.9% of
the respondents listed sociobiology as their primary theoretical
perspective and none listed evolutionism (p. 31).

As a secondary

theoretical perspective, 1.2% indicated evolutionism and one addi
tional person answered sociobiology.

Altogether, the percentage of

sociogists indicating either a primary or secondary preference for
sociobiology was 2.5% and for evolutionism 1.2% (Sanderson
1992, pp. 32-33).

6c

Ellis,

Very few sociologists have seriously considered

the kinds of information I analyze in this dissertation.
Indeed the suggestion has often been made that sociology as a
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discipline requires a kind of intellectual bifurcation: nature/
nurture, innate/learned or biological/social.

Durkheim (1895/1966),

for example, argued that social facts "should not be confused with
biological phenomena" and that "if we begin with the individual, we
shall be able to understand nothing of what takes place in the group"
(pp. 3, 104).
Leslie White (1959) argued in The Evolution of Culture that
social analysis would not "be aided in the slightest degree by taking
the biological organism into consideration," and that, furthermore
"the biological factor is irrelevant, and consequently, it should be
disregarded" (p. 14).

William Ogbum (1964) presented the crux of

the sociological argument with his seemingly irrefutable statement
that "a change cannot be explained by a constant" (p. 22).

That is,

since the basic physiology/predispositions of Homo sapiens as a
species--what sociobiologists call our biogram--changes very slowly
compared to cultural change, one cannot explain a change (i.e., cul
tural evolution) by a constant (i.e., genetic inheritance).
could be more obvious?

What

Dennis Wrong's (1961) suggestion that "in the

beginning there is the bodv" is either ignored or considered socio
logically trivial (p. 190, emphasis in original).
It has been over seventy years since John Dewey argued in
Reconstruction in Philosophy (1920), that one should always be sus
picious of apodictic pronouncements.1 I will argue in this disser
tation that the current sociological rejection of the bio-social-a kind of aversive ideological tropism towards any biological
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consideration--is not intellectually warranted.

Durkheim's insist

ence on the dualism of human nature (Durkheim, 1914/1960) is un
thinkingly imbibed by sociological neophytes and has contributed to
the contemporary intellectual isolation of sociology.

As indicated

by his references to Anatol Rapoport (1965, 1967), Robert Trivers
was able to quickly determine the relevance of game theory and pro
bability theory for his discussion of reciprocal altruism.

Trivers'

reasoning was later extended and popularized by Robert Axelrod
(1984).

One wonders how quicklysociologists would perceive the

sociological relevance of research carried out in such divergent
disciplines.
In The Sociology of Knowledee (1958, p. 156) Werner Stark re
fers to
whole."

"the fallacy of pars pro toto." of "taking the part for the
The same phenomenon has also been termed "the synechdochaic

fallacy" or "the error of nothing but" (Griffin, 1992, p. 118).

This

suggests that knowledge is always obtained in a fallible and incre
mental fashion.
truths.

Different perspectives provide different (temporary)

Knowledge is emergent and not predetermined or teleologi-

cally foreordained.

The necessary result, as Dewey pointed out in

The Quest for Certainty (1929), is that the accumulation of war
ranted knowledge is an unending process.

By its knee-jerk rejection

of the biosocial, however, sociology inso facto excludes potentially
relevant information.

What we are left with is taking the part for

the whole or theory by way of presuppositional fiat.
Advocates of a biosocial perspective are aware of what might be
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termed Ogbum's Theorem (i.e., You can't explain a change with a
constant).

Edward Wilson (1978), who is unquestionably the best-

known (or perhaps notorious) of the sociobiologists noted in 1978
that it was "demonstrably not the case that contemporary huntergatherers differed genetically in any significant way from people in
advanced industrial nations" (p. 35).

One could not, therefore, ex

plain differences between the primitive and the modem on the basis
of genetic evolution.
to do?

Wilson knows this.

What, then, is he trying

As he clearly states in On Human Nature (1978), "the socio-

biological hypothesis does not therefore account for differences
among societies, but it can explain why human beings differ from
other mammals" (p. 160).

Wilson is trying to get at what ethologists

call species-specific characteristics.

What, in other words, do hu

mans have in common? A great deal of the mutual incomprehension be
tween sociology and biology relates to this simple difference in
objectives.

Sociologists and cultural anthropologists are normally

looking for differences between groups and cultures.

A bioevolu-

tionary perspective looks for commonalities (Brown, 1991).

The

differing logics and paradigms produce distrust and what might be
termed a kind of out-of-sight-out-of-mind sociological autarky.
I argue throughout this dissertation that the results of a
presumed biological/social binary in the explanation of behavior has
produced many negative results for sociological theory and analysis.
If one wants an empirical science, one should look at things empiri
cally, as well as with a useful and adequate theoretical perspective.
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According to Robert Merton (1967), a theoretical framework
indicates "types of variables which are taken into account" (p. 142).
The chief function of a theoretical framework "is to provide a gen
eral context for inquiry" (p. 142).

Merton, for example, refers

specifically to Durkheim's admonition to only use

social facts to

explain other social facts, as a kind of macro-methodological state
ment at the highest level of generalization.

In this dissertation I

argue that a theoretical framework which excludes all biological
evidence is limiting itself unnecessarily in several fundamental ways
with respect to its taken-for-granted assumptions concerning the
etiology of social facts.
Referring to a familiar dispute in sociobiology, Philip
Kitcher (1993) suggests that the two theoretical extremes in the
"nature/nurture controversy are a genetic iron grip on behavior and
no genetic constraints at all" (p. 164).

He suggests that "As soon

as the extreme positions are articulated, they are quickly disavowed:
everybody agrees that there are two important determinants" (p. 164).
Everybody, however, most certainly does not agree that "there
are two important determinants" of social action.

In particular, as

suggested above, Durkheim believed sociologists should feel free to
ignore all biological considerations as irrelevant to social facts
by definition.

I maintain

that the consideration of biological

evidence by sociologists will lead to what Kitcher terms "conceptual
and explanatory progress" (Kitcher, 1993, pp. 95-112).

Durkheim's

insistence that sociology is a discipline or an approach to knowledge
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sui generis leads to a theoretical and empirical

cul-de-sac.

What difference does it make if we actually accept Wrong's
(1961) idea that sociology should take into account individual
biological and psychological characteristics?

What sociological

difference does it make, as Edward Wilson (1978) argues in

On Human

Nature. that people as a soecies do not accept slavery, that "slaves
under great stress insist on behaving like human beings instead of
slave ants, gibbons, mandrills, or any other species?" (p. 84).

What

difference does it make if, in our research, we look for commonal
ities as opposed to differences?

In the discussion which follows, I

will show the importance and relevance of these questions and issues
for sociological analysis.
I also argue that the utilization of biological evidence pro
vides one way of moving forward on such seemingly intractable pro
blems in sociology as the question of values or the fact/value dich
otomy and the debate in social problems over social constructionism.
One of the virtues of a biocritical approach to sociological analysis
is a rejection of simplistic binary reasoning.

Part of the problem

with the a priori rejection of biological reasoning by sociologists
is the resulting Cartesian split between nature and nurture or fact
and value.

One of the principal objectives of this dissertation is a

demonstration that the utilization of biosocial evidence provides a
potentially useful way of moving beyond current theoretical and
empirical controversies.
There have been a number of works which have stressed the
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desirability of a more naturalistic approach for social science.
In my initial chapter I will look at the logic of a biosocial ap
proach to sociology.

What is the face validity of biological or

evolutionary considerations?
biosocial?
area?

Why should we be concerned with the

What types of research have been carried out in this

What has the most potential for utilization by sociologists?

Looking at specific areas of prior research, what do they suggest
with respect to potential sociological applications?
Having established the potential, if generally unexploited,
relevance of the biosocial for sociology, I will then examine two
works by Edward Wilson which might be taken as exemplars (Kuhn,
1970) for the field of sociobiology (Wilson, 1975, 1978).

It is

important to examine the work of Wilson in detail, because the
politically correct reaction to his work within social science ob
scures both its positive and negative aspects.

Any examination

of sociobiology needs to take Wilson into account.

I will then

critically examine the supposedly invariant relationship between
a biosocial approach and political conservatism (Hubbard & Wald,
1993; Lerner, 1992).
One sociologist who has examined the work of Wilson suggests
that Wilson's sociobiology should be seen as natural theology
(Kaye, 1986).

Wilson, for example, argues that, assuming the truth

of sociobiology "challenges the traditional belief that we cannot
deduce values from facts or moral prescriptions from scientific
information" (Kaye, 1986, p. 99).

Accepting the accuracy of this
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10
position clearly challenges the positivistic shibboleth that there
is an absolute or qualitative distinction between facts and values
(Bryant, 1985) and suggests that there is an important relationship
between sociobiology and what has been termed evolutionary ethics
(Nitecki & Nitecki, 1993).
In his definitive study Darwin and the Emergence of Evolu
tionary Theories of Mind and Behavior (1987), Robert Richards out
lines "a sophisticated case for evolutionary ethics” (pp. 595-627).
His arguments have received extensive examination and debate (Hughes,
1986; Nitecki & Nitecki, 1993; Williams, 1990;), as well as commen
tary on the commentary by Richards (1986a, 1986b, 1989, 1993).

If

his argument is valid, it would seem to have extremely significant
implications for sociology and serve as a validation of the import
ance of evolutionary and biological considerations for the social
sciences.

I will therefore look at the strengths and weaknesses of

Richards' evolutionary perspective in some detail.
Lacking in almost all sociological discourse, as well as not
being adequately elaborated by Richards, is any consideration of
specific human needs.

Basing the discussion primarily on the works

of Braybrooke (1987), Nussbaum (1992, 1993), and Midgley (1978,
1983a, 1983b, 1985),

I argue that this is the key theoretical move

if sociology is to advance beyond senseless polemics and develop a
comprehensive biosocial, empirically-warranted perspective.

Adding

the concept of human needs to the biosocial perspective provides
the opportunity of a theoretical site or space for my development
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of biocritique.
I also argue that a biocritical perspective based on a bio
social elaboration of human needs enables us to usefully analyze cur
rent controversies over social constructionism and the definition
of social problems.

While it appears from a review of the social

problems literature that opposing viewpoints are at a theoretical
dead end, I will demonstrate that a biocritical perspective allows
us to think about and examine these issues and go beyond approaches
that now give the impression of being irreconcilable polar opposites
(Miller & Holstein, 1993).
Having analyzed the basic elements of a biocritical per
spective, I will then put it to use with a detailed re-reading of
the well-known work of Robert Bellah and his co-authors in Habits of
the Heart (1985).

Bellah is a major proponent of the communitarian

approach to social theory (Etzioni, 1993; MacIntyre, 1984).

It is my

contention that biocritique provides a much-needed theoretical and
analytical extension of the kinds of criticisms of individualism and
contemporary society made by Bellah et al.

The re-reading of Bellah

will provide a case study of the utility of the biocritical approach
and its relationship to a specific sociological tradition.
The biocritical perspective usefully extends the analysis of
the authors of Habits of the Heart. It helps to concretize, and, as
I will demonstrate, to further elaborate and justify their criti
cisms (i.e., their critique of individualistic self-absorption;
their discussions of our lack of commonality and/or communities of
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memory).

The complementarity of Bellah's and the biocritical ap

proach is in itself a useful example of extending the boundaries of
the permissible with respect to presumed disciplinary territories
or research techniques.

A broader and more flexible orientation to

wards the explanation of human behavior is warranted.

A fresh re

examination of biosocial evidence by sociology is long overdue.
Sociology, like all other academic disciplines, will continue
to develop and change.

The kind of disciplinary pessimism evident

in current works on the sociology of sociology is not justified
(Faia, 1993; Horowitz, 1993).2 I will show in this dissertation
that the utilization of a naturalistic, biosocial, and biocritical
perspective is one way of proceeding which offers much hope for the
reduction of our current intellectual ethnocentrism.
The use of biological and evolutionary reasoning need not im
ply an atavistic or misogynistic ideology which should be summarily
dismissed by all proper sociologists.

There is no necessary rela

tionship between political conservatism and biological or evolu
tionary arguments.

Sociologists, however, often assume the opposite.

This precludes bv definition the sociological consideration of bio
social data.

In a recent survey of the "theoretical and political

perspectives of American sociologists in the 1990s," over threefourths of the respondents identified themselves as "liberal, rad
ical, or somewhere in between.

Only 3% of the sample identified

themselves as conservatives" (Sanderson & Ellis, 1992, p. 34).
If all biological reasoning is labeled as ipso facto
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conservative, it is easy to understand why sociology as a discipline
has almost entirely ignored biosocial perspectives.

A basic ob

jective of this dissertation is to demonstrate that biological and
evolutionary reasoning are by no means necessarily reactionary.
Disconnecting the supposedly inevitable biological/conservative
political relationship would allow sociologists to more adequately
consider the importance of biosocial logic and evidence.

I argue

throughout this dissertation that we need to move in that direction.
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CHAPTER II
THE THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL UTILITY OF A BIOSOCIAL PERSPECTIVE
The Biosocial Perspective
In her extended discussion on the roots of human nature,
philosopher Mary Midgley (1978) has argued that "what counts as a
fact depends on the concepts you use. on the questions you ask"
(p.

5, emphasis in original).

biosocial

By ignoring what hasbeen termed a

or a coevolutionary perspective (Durham, 1991; Fox,1989),

sociology excludes by definition areas of research which need to be
taken into account in any adequate explanation of human behavior.
Pierre L. van den Berghe (1990) has suggested that the sociological
aversion to biology
is in large part trained incompetence and that socio
logists are not merely oblivious towards biology but
that they are militantly and proudly ignorant. They
know biology to be irrelevant to their interests, so
they are determined not to make the effort to learn
about it. (p. 177, emphasis in original).
Sociologists know about the presumed irrelevance of biology to
sociology for several major reasons which have historically been
taken-for-granted assumptions of the discipline:
1.

Sociologists and anthropologists study culture as a reality

sui generis.
2.

Each culture is distinct.

Cultural evolution causes and

explains each culture's differences and unique qualities.
14
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3.

Biological explanations of behavior have been proposed in

the past and have resulted in political conservatism, Social Darwin
ism, and, ultimately, genocide.
4.

Any critical sociology should, therefore, exclude a bio

social level of analysis for both theoretical and political (i.e.,
politically correct) reasons.
Beginning with Durkheim, sociology has viewed the cultural
level of analysis as its exclusive domain.

In carving out a distinct

space for sociological discourse, the discipline justified its own
existence:

We are, claimed Durkheim, dealing with a qualitatively

distinct method of structuring reality which no one else employs.
Sociology should be a separate and epistemologically distinct aca
demic discipline (Durkheim, 1895/1966).

Its special emphasis was to

analyze and understand what William Graham Sumner called our folkways
and mores: all our taken-for-granted cultural traditions and habits
(Sumner, 1906/1960).
It seemed self-evident to Sumner (1906/1960), for example, that
cultural differences are what distinguished every society from each
other and that the subject matter of sociology consisted of crosscultural comparisons of these differing characteristics.

Sumner also

proposed a tautological definition of what was later to be called
cultural relativism.

"Everything in the mores of a time and place

must be regarded as justified with regard to that time and place"
(p. 65).

Due to the fact that "the standards of good and right are

in the mores," it follows that "for the people of a time and place,
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their own mores are always good" (p. 65).
Sumner (1906/1960), however, found it difficult to consistently
follow his own definitions.

In what was a typical example of Social

Darwinist rhetoric, he proclaimed that
so long as we do not know whether acquired modifications
are inheritable or not, we are not prepared to elaborate
a policy of marriage which can be dogmatically taught or
civilly enforced. This much, however, is certain--the
interests of society are more at stake in these things
than in anything else. All other projects of reform and
amelioration are trivial compared with the interests
which lie in the propagation of the species, if these
can be so treated as to breed out predispositions to
evils of body and mind, and to breed in vigor of mind
and body. (p. 414)
So much for their own mores are always good.

It appeared to

Sumner that our breeding mores were significantly deficient.
tural relativism evidently did not begin at home.

Cul

Some projects of

reform are trivial and others are absolutely necessary, no matter
whatever the current mores of those involved.

Sumner's words also

demonstrate the Social Darwinist implications of his presumably
biological approach to social reform.

He was clearly advocating a

kind of eugenics policy to cure social problems.

We see here an

early example of why a biosocial orientation is considered so
undesirable today.

Many contemporary sociologists seem to feel

that Sumner's political positions are necessarily reflected in any
consideration of biological evidence.

They are mistaken.

By ignor

ing contemporary developments in the biological sciences we are
unnecessarily distorting and limiting our sociological analyses and,
most importantly, trivializing or ignoring cross-cultural
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similarities.

By concentrating on the particular, we ignore what

Roland Robertson (1992) has termed global culture or globalization.
Perhaps it is no longer true, as Ruth Benedict (1934) argued in
Patterns of Culture, that "social thinking has no more important task
before it than that of taking adequate account of cultural relati
vity" (p. 239).

In a time of increasingly violent ultra-nationalism

and ethnic cleansing,

the political implications of biosocial ap

proaches which stress human commonalities are not the Social Darwin
ist shibboleths of William Graham Sumner but a new appreciation of
transcultural similarities and common concerns.
Anthropologist John Tooby and psychologist Leda Cosmides (1992)
maintain that recent research in evolutionary psychology and other
disciplines has strengthened arguments for commonalities.
There are strong reasons to believe that selection usual
ly tends to make complex adaptations universal or nearly
universal, so humans must share a complex, species-typical
and species-specific architecture of adaptations, however
much variation there might be in minor, superficial traits.
As long-lived sexual reproducers, complex adaptations would
be destroyed by the random process of sexual recombination
every generation if the genes that underlie our complex
adaptations varied from individual to individual, (p. 38)
This logic of the biosocial is lacking in most current socio
logy.

Its implications are contrary to much current thinking.

Things are not as they seem.

Sociology has acted as a kind of

theoretical flashlight illuminating one small area and ignoring what
ever was outside its "cultural beam of light" (Degler, 1991, pp. 187211).

If, as a popular introductory text tells us, sociology is de

fined as "the systematic study of human social interaction"
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(Brinkerhoff & White, 1991, p. 4), one should be prepared to take
into account whatever influences that interaction.
istically argue that it's time to broaden the beam.

One may real
As Donald

Griffin (1992) argues in Animal Minds, "recognizing our ignorance is
a necessary first step toward reducing it" (p. 5).
There have been several kinds of research which have stressed
the importance of biological considerations for reaching any adequate
understanding of human behavior.

There are, for example, the entire

range of ethological studies which suggest that naturally occurring
animal behavior may offer analogies or insights into human social
interaction (Darwin, 1871/1981; 1872/1965).

By the 1950s, the work

of Nikolaus Tinbergen and Karl Lorenz gained a popular audience
(Evans, 1975; Lorenz, 1952).

By 1973, their work, along with Karl

von Frish's studies of the language of the honeybee, resulted in
Nobel Prizes for all three men, even though "ethology was not a
recognized category for awards" (Degler, 1991, p. 227).

A number

of popular best-sellers using the ethological perspective appeared
during the same time period (Ardrey, 1966; Morris, 1967; Tiger,
1969).
More recent ethological work avoids some of the simplistic and
unsupported generalizations made by writers like Ardrey (Dawkins,
1993; Kuper, 1994).

There is, for example, the remarkable volume by

Dorthey Cheney and Robert Seyfarth called How Monkeys See the World
(1990).

While this book contains a great deal of information about

other ethological research, it is principally a recounting of their
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thirteen-year study of vervet monkeys in Kenya.

Cheney and Seyfarth

discovered that vervets have specific vocalizations indicating the
approach of different predators (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990, pp. 13974).

An encounter with a leopard produces a loud bark and the mon

keys run up trees.

Sighting an eagle results in short coughs and the

monkeys man into bushes.

A snake produces another distinct call and

the monkeys stand on their legs and look down towards the ground.
Tape recorded playback of the different sounds produced similar
responses compared to naturally occurring behaviors (i.e., the leo
pard call caused the monkeys to run up trees). Cheney and Seyfarth
(1990) also varied a number of their experiments chronologically and
concluded that "vocal developments in primates exhibit many parallels
with the early stages of speech development in young children"
(p. 138).
Language, of course, is one of the principal attributes which
has historically been viewed as an inviolate difference in kind be
tween humans and all other forms of life. Cheney and Seyfarths' work
suggests that the distinction may be more gradualistic or part of a
continuum.

Sue Savage-Rumbaugh's recently successful attempt at

teaching a pygmy chimp to make stone tools strongly suggests the same
(Savage-Rumbaugh & Lewin, 1994).

If that is in fact the case, it is

clear that ethological research may have more utility in suggesting
analogies or homologies than most sociologists recognize.
the problem, as Griffin notes, is simple ignorance.

Part of

Sociologists

simply don't know what is being done in current ethological research.
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We know we don't need to know because humankind is presumably defined
solely by its cultural activities.
Anthropologist Donald Brown has suggested that our reluctance
to accept the potential usefulness of ethological work for the social
sciences is ultimately due to a profound historical and cultural
bias.

He argues that the nature/nurture dichotomy is related to the

flesh/spirit distinction which has been a feature of Western thought
for millennia (Brown, 1991, p. 86).

The idealization of the spirit

and the denigration of the flesh suggests that we have little to
learn from mere brutes.

Brown believes that this material denigra

tion shapes Western thought to this day.

As Joseph Wood Krutch

(1954) has observed, however, "a continuum between humans and other
species may just as easily be viewed as conferring a more impressive
status on other beings as opposed to necessarily denigrating humans”
(pp. 98-99).
Sociology needs to incorporate a new reading of the work of
such writers as Griffin (1992), Dawkins, M. (1993), and Patterson and
Linden (1981).

One of the reasons for the lack of biosocial evidence

in sociology is a taken-for-granted assumption that the differences
between us and them are without question differences in kind. It
does no good, according to this line of reasoning, to utilize etho
logical data because the differences between species are so great
that any comparison is thereby invalid.

As Leslie White (1969)

argued, a necessary and sufficient social science is always and only
the science of culture.

What I am suggesting, however, is that many
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such differences, as they are enumerated by social scientists, are
merely the result of unexamined, taken-for-granted assumptions and
total ignorance of developments in such fields as ethology, biology,
and genetics (Cavalieri & Singer, 1993).

Mary Midgley (1983a, p. 11)

traces such reasoning back to Descartes "who identified the human
soul or consciousness so completely with reason as to conclude that
animals could not be conscious at all, and were in fact just autom
ata."

Many social scientists believe that a similar Cartesian Gap

still obtains today.

Such a gap also helps to define a avowedly

distinct subject matter for sociology, thereby providing yet another
example of Marx's insistence that ideologies inevitably serve one's
own self-interest.
Sociologists might ponder the significance of recent research
in molecular biology and DNA hybridization which has shown that the
genetic distance between humans and both the common and pygmy chimp
anzee is 1.6% (Diamond, 1992, pp. 20-24).

As Diamond notes, "the

remaining 98.4% of DNA is just normal chimp DNA.

For example, our

principal hemoglobin is identical in all of its 287 units with chimp
hemoglobin" (p. 23).

As measured by genetic similarity or distance

from a common ancestor, "there is a closer relationship between
chimpanzees and humans than between chimpanzees and gorillas" (pp.
23-24).

As Dawkins (1993) and Dunbar (1993) have argued, it is

clear that our taxonomic classifications are not based solely on
logic, but also on anthropocentric considerations and what Dawkins
terms the "discontinuous mind" (Dawkins, 1993, pp. 81-82).

We
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exaggerate the gaps and refuse to see obvious shared characteristics.
One of the principal achievements of anthropologists earlier in this
century was the description of ethnocentrism and the valuation of all
cultural differences (Degler, pp. 59-104).

Today sociology and

anthropology demonstrate an opposite kind of bias which might be
termed commonophobia or the fear of identifying the common transultural similarities of diverse peoples.
Given the degree of genetic similarity between humans and other
species, the ethological perspective has, I believe, more face valid
ity than many sociologists recognize.

In their history of evolution,

Edey and Johanson (1989) note that
the interior of the cell revealed a wonderful unity in all
living things; all use the same four bases to make the same
20 amino acids. The triplet code is the same. That unity
speaks with a thundering voice for the validity of evolu
tion theory, (p. 277)
It seemed obvious to Joseph Wood Krutch (1956) that
if our consciousness 'evolved' it must have evolved from
something in some degree like it. If we have thoughts
and feelings, it seems at least probable that something
analogous exists in those from whom we are descended.
(pp. x-xi).
Current research on our closest relatives certainly suggests as much.
We have already seen the remarkable genetic similarities be
tween the chimpanzee and what Diamond calls the third chimpanzee or
the human animal (Diamond, 1992).

For example, a number of research

ers have made impressive, longitudinal efforts to teach various apes
American Sign Language or ASL (Griffin, 1992).

These have included

chimpanzees (Fouts & Fouts, 1993), gorillas (Patterson & Gordon,
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1993; Patterson & Lindsen, 1981) and orangutans (Miles, 1993).

The

results have called into question the linguistic Cartesian split as
sumed to be self-evident for so many years in the Western intel
lectual tradition.
It is true that much controversy surrounds this research and
some of those working in the field have tempered their original
enthusiasm and questioned their earlier results (Terrace, 1979).
Controversy surrounds interpretations of the results and the similar
ity or dissimilarity of ASL used by other species compared to human
speech.

It is clear, however, that apes are capable of doing some

thing which is more complex and indicates in some sense more intel
ligence than what they have been given credit for in the past.

As

Mary Midgley (1978) has remarked, "if they are not talking, what
are they doing" (p. 216, emphasis in original).

That is, even if

there are obvious differences between written/spoken languages as
used by human beings and ASL as used by chimps/gorillas/orangutans,
what is it that these apes are doing when they use sign language if
not in some sense communicating?
Perhaps the best-known example of this research is that of
Francine Patterson with the female gorilla Koko (Patterson & Linden,
1981).

Since 1972 she has worked constantly with Koko.

From Septem

ber 1972, to May 1977 she administered various IQ tests to Koko
including the Cattell Infant Intelligence Scale, the Peabody Picture
Vocabulary Test, and the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Test (Patterson
& Gordon, 1993, pp. 58-62; Patterson & Linden, 1981, pp. 126-130).
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Koko has consistently scored between 70 and 90 on different IQ
scales.

She has a working vocabulary of about 500 signs which she

combines in statements of three to six signs in length (Patterson &
Gordon, 1993, p. 59).

She engages in "self-directed behavior in

front of a mirror, lies to avoid the consequences of her own misbe
havior, and becomes fidgety and uncomfortable when asked to discuss
her own death" (Patterson & Gordon, 1993, pp. 58-59).
Washoe, the famous chimp raised by R.A. and B.T. Gardner,
spontaneously taught ASL to young chimps and used signs to communi
cate with other adult chimpanzees (Fouts & Fouts, 1993, pp. 31-32).
The Fouts, who succeeded the Gardners in their work with Washoe, in
one study "recorded over 5,200 instances of chimpanzee to chimpanzee
signing" (Fouts & Fouts, 1993, p. 33).

The videos were categorized

by category and it was found that food was not a prevalent topic,
accounting for only 5% of the conversations.

Eighty-eight percent

were in the categories of "play, social interaction, and reassurance"
(Fouts & Fouts, 1993, p. 33).
After not seeing the Gardners for a period of eleven years,
Washoe, when they finally did visit, looked at the Gardners and
signed their name signs.

Then Washoe signed "'COME MRS G' to Bea

trice Gardner and led her into an adjoining room and began to play
a game with her that she had not been observed to play since she was
a five-year-old" (Fouts & Fouts, 1993, pp. 37-38).

A lack of re

tained memory images was seen as part of the essential distinction
between man and

animals in the Western intellectual tradition
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(Fouts & Fouts, 1993, pp. 37-38).

Washoe is clearly an outstanding

counter-example.
H. Lyn White Miles (1993) has carried out another long-range
project with orangutans.

Her work is particularly interesting inso

far as this ape is believed to be "less closely related to vis gene
tically than gorillas or chimpanzees" (p. 44).

Miles argues, how

ever, that orangutans in "gestation period, brain hemispheric asym
metry, characteristics of dentition, sexual physiology, copulatory
behavior, hormonal levels, hair pattern, mammary gland placement and
insightful style of cognition" are closer to humans than are the
other apes (pp. 44-45).

The orangutan Chantek eventually used 150

different signs "forming a vocabulary similar to that of a very
young child" (p. 47).

He learned to be deceptive, to use a mirror

for grooming, to paint, and to sign for things which were not pre
sent.

He developed "sign-speech correspondences without intentional

training" (pp. 46-50).

Additional research has recorded altruistic

behavior in rhesus monkeys (Masserman, Wechkin & Terris, 1964), "co
operative communication between chimpanzees required to achieve a
common task" (Griffin, 1992, pp. 227-230), and pygmy chimpanzees
(bonobos) at the Yerkes Laboratory in Atlanta "who have learned to
use a combination of gestures and the Yerkes keyboard to achieve a
fluent two-way communication with their human companions" (Griffin,
1992, p. 231).
The presumed line of demarcation between us and them grows
weaker by the moment.

Indeed, like the Maginot Line in France, it
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represents the illusion of collective human security--safe from
infestation from the beasts from below.

Although the arguments

against a biosocial perspective are, I believe, as ineffective as
the Maginot Line proved to be in wartime, they still linger and
hinder our ability to understand and explain human interaction.

To

the extent that current research demonstrates similar capabilities
and commonalities between species, the argument against using inter
species analogies in social science is weakened.

If, for example,

the great apes are much closer to us in certain abilities than was
previously recognized, it is more difficult logically and theoretic
ally to exclude all research on apes as being inherently useless for
the explanation of human behavior.
studies is enhanced.

The face validity of ethological

Perhaps, as Midgley argues (1978, 1985, 1992),

we still need to learn to ask relevant questions when conducting
social science research.
The biosocial approach to social analysis assumes that human
beings, as is the case with all other species, have an evolutionary
past (Darwin, 1871; Leakey and Lewin, 1977; Lloyd, 1994; Mayr, 1991;
Willis, 1989).

The principal force behind evolutionary change is

natural selection which Mayr (1991) defines as the argument that
change comes about through the abundant
genetic variation in every generation.
few individuals who survive, owing to a
well-adapted combination of inheritable
rise to the next generation, (p. 37)

production of
The relatively
particularly
characters, give

The result, in the famous phrase coined by Herbert Spencer, is
"the survival of the fittest" (Rachels, 1990, p. 30).

According to
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Darwin (1876/1969) in his Autobiography, the final inspiration for
his theory came from social science, not biology.
In October 1838, that is fifteen months after I had begun
my systematic enquiry, I happened to read for amusement
Malthus on Population, and being well prepared to appre
ciate the struggle for existence which everywhere goes on
from long-continued observation of the habits of animals
and plants, it at once struck me that under these circum
stances favorable variations would tend to be preserved,
and unfavorable ones to be destroyed. The result of this
would be the formulation of new species, (p. 120)
Although there has been considerable debate over the real ori
gins of Darwin's theories (Eiseley, 1961; Gruber, 1974; Himmelfarb,
1968; Richards, 1987), let us, to some extent, accept his own ac
count.

Surely it would be difficult to find a more momentous example

in modern intellectual history of the utility of interdisciplinary
study.

The Theory of Natural Selection, which, while endlessly de

bated in its details (Eldredge, 1985; Gould, 1977), is the foundation
of modem biological theory, was, at least in part, inspired by
Malthus's early version of The Population Bomb (Ehrlich, 1971).
Those who argue that sociology needs to broaden its traditional or
cultural boundaries are in very good company.

The ability to think

the unthinkable was clearly instrumental in Darwin's success.

For

example, he was able to accept the possibility that the common earth
worm showed signs of intelligence and carried out experiments to test
"the mental powers of worms" (Rachels, 1991, p. 134).

Sociologists

are not inclined to demonstrate such presuppositional flexibility.
What is defined as hard-headed or realistic is often merely narrow
ness of vision.
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A number of social scientists have argued that a more natural
istic or biosocial approach to social science is absolutely essen
tial for any realistic explanation of human behavior (Brown, 1991;
Crippin, 1992, 1994; Degler, 1991; Eaton, Shostak & Konner, 1988;
Konner, 1982; Mazur & Robertson, 1972; Van den Berghe, 1975; Wilson,
1990).

They argue that sociology should take seriously the implica

tions of evolutionary history with respect to Homo sapiens. Con
sider, for example, the fact that "100,000 generations of humans have
been hunters and gatherers; 500 generations have been agricultur
alists; ten have lived in the industrial age; and only one has been
exposed to the world of computers" (Eaton et al., 1988, p. 26).
Using an evolutionary time frame implies that whatever adaptations
developed throughout our evolutionary history may have little
relationship to the situations we encounter today.
The rate and magnitude of technological/social change is
exceptionally rapid compared to changes in the human genotype.
This implies the possibility of what has been termed "the discord
ance hypothesis," which suggests "that nearly all our biochemistry
and physiology are fine-tuned to conditions of life that existed be
fore 10,000 years ago" (Eaton et al., 1988. pp. 38-68).

The bio

social perspective suggests that within contemporary society our
wants may have very little relationships to our needs (Fox, 1989,
pp. 46-47).

As I will show later in the chapter on human needs and

social constructionism, recognition of this possibility allows us to
approach the area of social problems with something other than a
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a more complete cultural relativism (Edel, 1955, 1980; Midgley,
1993).
The biosocial perspective argues for the similarity of human
cultures.

Robin Fox (1989) believes that social scientists have been

stiffering from "ethnographic dazzle" (p. 18).

We have been taught to

always look for differences between cultures and tend to ignore sim
ilarities or take them for granted.

Having earned an M.A. in Latin

American Studies, I know about the differences between Latin American
countries and between all of them and the United States.
mies are different.
different.

The religions are different.

The customs are different.

The econo

The languages are

The histories are different.

Master/servant relationships are different.

What Edward Hall (1959)

made famous as the silent language or the taken-for-granted assump
tions of each country are different (1959).

And yet we tend to see

only what we are looking for.
Marriage customs differ cross-culturally, and yet every culture
has some system of marriage. "Biology cannot explain the differ
ences," says the cultural anthropologist.
able with a constant.

One cannot explain a vari

But perhaps sex and our biology help to ex

plain why every culture experiences marriage, as well as adultery.
As Fox argues, "are societies and cultures really so different at the
level of forms and processes?" (Fox, 1989, p. 18).

Don't people

everywhere live in families, raise children, and try to make a liv
ing?

If we look for cross-cultural similarities, won't they too be

obvious?
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The biosocial perspective suggests that such similarities are
indeed obvious and that they are ultimately a result of our specific
evolutionary history.

Writers like Fox argue that the presumed

culture/nature binary in social science has caused a great deal of
harm and misunderstanding. Culture is constitutive of our evolu
tionary background and species-specific characteristics.

It is the

name for a process or behavior which ultimately depends on our
specialized brain (Fox, 1989, p. 28; Restak, 1984, 1991; Wills,
1993).

For human beings, separating nature and culture is like

separating dog and barking or fish and swimming.

The fundamental

reason human beings share similarities is that they share a similar
biosocial evolutionary history.

Perhaps it would be more obvious if

biosocial was always written--like Foucault's knowledge/power binary
--as bio/social (Foucault, 1979).
other and are inseparable.

The terms are constitutive of each

Humankind shares this condition.

We are

therefore capable of recognition of our common characteristics.

We

perceive similarities along with differences.
As was originally stated by Franklin Giddings (1896), "the
original and elementary subjective fact in society is the conscious
ness of kind" (p. 17, emphasis in original).

This occurs when an

individual "recognizes another conscious being of like kind with it
self" (p. 17).

Giddings also assumed that "human nature is the

preeminently social nature" and "the cycle of social causation begins
and ends in the physical process" (pp. 20, 225).

In spite of all the

prevailing ethnocentrism, racism, and sexism, we all may potentially
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recognize each other because we are all members of the same species.
In a phenomenological sense, it is ultimately the biological simil
arities of the other which lead to a consciousness of kind.
If the other is considered more and more divergent--for what
ever reasons--"consciousness of kind decreases.

For example, Michael

Root (1993) has made the interesting observation that "functional
analysis in social science is related to the strangeness of the group
being observed" (pp. 78-99).

If the other is similar to ourselves,

we tend to accept their own version of their motives and actions (an
emic explanation).

If the group is much different--the proverbial

Trobriand Islanders--we use a functional or etic approach.

They give

explanations, but not the real or right explanations for their beha
vior.

Hence the real reasons are supplied by the anthropologist.

As

the degree of cultural differences increase, the less likely we are
to develop a consciousness of kind or accept an emic explanation.
On the other hand, circumstances sometimes force recognition.
An extension or transcultural expansion of consciousness of kind is
brought about by unusual conditions.

In emergency situations, our

perceptions of otherness dramatically decrease and our recognition of
common characteristics grow exponentially.

Consider, for example,

the French during World War II who hid downed American flyers.
Discovery of this crime was punishable by death during the Nazi
regime.

Consider the Quakers in 19th century American who hid run

away slaves (the slave being, perhaps, the classic example of the
other). Consider the casual bystander who dives into a river to

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

32
rescue a drowning stranger.

Consider the African-Americans who came

to the rescue of seriously injured and beaten white truck driver
Reginel Denney during the recent riots in Los Angeles. Consider
people who donate blood for complete strangers year after year.
Ultimately, such actions are based on a recognition of transcultural
human characteristics and needs.

One does not jump in a lake to res

cue a drowning chicken.
The Logic of Biosocial Research

Proponents of biosocial approaches to social science have util
ized a number of arguments to advance their position. One principal
method is to suggest the possibility of analogous behavior between
Homo sapiens and other species.

For example, given the close genetic

similarities between humankind and the apes, ethologists have argued
that similarities exist between various species (Cheney & Seyfarth,
1990; Griffin, 1992).

Activities of free-ranging chimpanzees, for

example, manifest some similarities or analogies compared to our own
behavior (Goodall, 1986).

By examining the activities of other spe-

ies we are given clues as to the possible evolutionary development of
our own species.
Arguments concerning analogies between humans and other species
have been the subject of much debate and criticism (Kitcher, 1985;
Ruse, 1978).

Sociobiologists, as I will show in the next chapter,

have often made unwarranted analogies between their own favorite
species, or area of research interest, and human beings.

As Carl
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Sagan has argued in his history of evolution, "chimps are not rats"
(Sagan & Druyan, 1992, p. 302).

Under conditions of crowding and

overpopulation, for example, rats and chimps react very differently.
"Rats become exceedingly aggressive and exhibit other abnormal beha
vior" (pp. 1 84-187).

Chimps, on the other hand, "make extraordinary

efforts to be more friendly, to be slower to anger" (p. 302).
Ceteris paribus, it is reasonable to assume that the closer the gen
etic relationships between humans and other species, the more likely
any analogy is valid.

What Kitcher (1985) terms pop sociobiology has

often ignored this proposition.

Sociobiologist David Barash, for

example, has been heavily criticized for his discussion of "rape in
mallard ducks" (Kitcher, 1985, pp. 184-201).

The presumption of the

critics is that this is a clearly false analogy.
indeed persuasive.

Their arguments are

As Kitcher rightly observes, Barash's specula

tions on rape among humans "are not fit for serious discussion"
(p. 186).

One cannot make analogies between completely dissimilar

circumstances when one totally misunderstands both of them.
Let us look more closely at the evidence presented by those
arguing for a biosocial perspective.

The argument that is reasonable

to assume that the closer the genetic relationship between species
the more likely the validity of analogies between the species, pre
supposes some behavioral consequences are the results of genetic
background and evolutionary history.
tion.

One need not make this assump

Behaviorists such as Skinner (1971) or cultural materialists

such as Harris (1989) certainly do not. They claim that the argument
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from analogy is tautological: One assumes some genetic analogy and
forces empirical evidence into preconceived categories.

Culturolo-

gists, such as Leslie White (1969), argue that we need go no further
than culture to explain all behavior.

Where is the empirical evi

dence, they wonder, which supports the importance of the biosocial?
What does social science gain from the utilization of biological or
ethological investigations?
One of the intriguing areas of investigation in biosocial re
search which provides some nrima facie evidence supporting genetic
influence is the study of identical twins (Cummings, 1991, pp. 348356).

Interviewing twins raised separately, for example, suggests a

possible approach to research on the nature/nurture controversy.
There are two classifications of twins: monozygotic (identical) or
dizygotic (fraternal). The genetic relatedness of identical twins
is 100%.

Francis Galton, the father of eugenics, expressed these

relationships in correlation coefficients so that "the correlation
coefficient of identical twins is 1.0" (Cummings, pp. 350-352).
Dizygotic twins, on the other hand, have on the average 50% of their
genes in common, or have a correlation coefficient of 50%.

These

relationships have been used to explore the interactions and influ
ences of heredity and environment.
An alternative but related approach is to compare adopted
children with biological siblings.

Even Richard Lewontin, (1991) who

is exceptionally critical of nearly all efforts to relate heredity to
behavior, notes that "the practice of adoption makes possible, at
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least in theory, a separation of genetic from environmental trans
mission" (Lewontin, Rose & Kamin, 1984, p. 110).

For example, a

researcher can make comparisons of IQ correlations between biological
parents and their children and stepparents and their adoptive child
ren.

One study reported by Lewontin showed a correlation of .15 be

tween adoptive parents and their stepchildren as opposed to a corre
lation of .48 between a "matched control group of ordinary families"
(Lewontin et al., 1984, p. 110).

Other studies have suggested that

"the risk of schizophrenia is greater in an adopted child if a bio
logical parent also has been diagnosed as schizophrenic" (Sutton &
Wagner, 1985, p. 351).
In spite of the criticism directed towards almost any attempt
to connect genetics and specific areas of human behavior (Levins &
Lewontin, 1985), it is possible to see the logic behind this approach
to research.

Lewontin, for example, suggests another possibility:

One could compare the IQ of an adopted child and of a biological
child who lives in the same family with a parent's IQ.

The two

children have lived in the same house with the same parents.

As

Lewontin states, "to the extent that genes determine IQ, the corre
lation between parent and biological child should obviously be larger
than that between parent and adoptive child" (Lewontin et al., 1984,
p. 112).

The important point to note is that even one of the harsh

est critics of such things as the Human Genome Project (Lewontin,
1991, pp. 61-83) and "genetic determinism" has in this case outlined
a logical possibility with respect to determining the influence of
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genetics on behavior.
One of the most extensive studies of this type has been carried
out by Thomas Bouchard and David Lykken at the Minnesota Center for
Twin and Adoption Research (Bouchard, Lykken, McGue, Segal et al.,
1990, pp. 223-228).

Bouchard and his colleagues believe they have

conclusively demonstrated the significance of "heritability--that
proportion of total variance caused by genetic differences" (Cum
mings, 1991, p. 348)--for behavior and have answered the usual com
plaints against the methods utilized in twin and adoption studies.
Their work, I believe, is one of the most suggestive and coherent
empirical studies now available arguing for the significance of gen
etic influences on behavior.

If their conclusions are even partially

correct, they demonstrate the shortsightedness and lack of realism in
ail sociological studies which implicitly asstime that environmental
conditions are all that need concern sociologists.
The Minnesota Center has worked with 348 sets of twins, includ
ing 44 pairs of identical twins raised separately, since 1979 (Well
born, 1987, p. 58).

One way of determining heritability is to look

at the average correlation within a twin pair raised apart, "where
all similarities are presumed genetic since the environment they
share is no more similar than that of two individuals selected at
random" (Holden, 1987, p. 599).

Another method is to compare "the

average correlation of a group of fraternal twin pairs to that ob
tained from identical twins" (Holden, 1987, p. 599).
The Minnesota studies resulted in a median correlation for nine
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classes of variables of .49 for identical twins raised apart and
.52 for those raised together.3 The results for fraternal twins
raised apart was about .23, or approximately half the correlation of
identical twins.

As Holden (1987) notes, this is "about what would be

predicted if calculations were based solely on the proportions of
genes shared by the twin pairs" (p. 599).

Bouchard and Lykken also

argue that the small differences in correlation between identical
twins raised separately and together, answer the arguments of critics
like Lewontin (Lewontin et al., 1984, pp. 214-220) who suggest that
environmental influences are confounding the results of twin studies.
Lewontin, for example, argues that being reared together increases
similarity in twins.

They are treated similarly and thereby exper

ience similar environmental influences than other siblings.

Certain

ly this seems a likely and common-sense observation.
Bouchard and his co-workers, however, have found similarities
in traits "regardless of rearing status" (Bouchard et al., 1990,
p. 226).

This significant finding has major importance for advocates

of a biosocial approach to social science.

One assumes that the

environmental influences on identical twins raised apart are differ
ent from those raised together.

Why the similarity in test results

regardless of being reared apart or together?

Bouchard counters the

obvious objection that the families that adopted the twins are more
similar to each other than what might be expected at random with the
results of surveys of the "Moos Family Environment Scale" which gives
each twin's "retrospective impression of treatment and rearing during
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childhood and adolescence" (p. 225).

In addition, he developed a

"checklist of available household facilities" which provided an
"index of cultural and intellectual resources in the adoptive home"
(p. 225).

The result was "the absence of any significant effect due

to SES or other environmental influences on the I.Q. scores of these
adult adopted twins" (p. 225).

One must entertain the possibility

that the similarity in identical twins raised together or separately,
as well as the average difference in correlation of traits between
identical and fraternal twins--a correlation of traits approximately
twice as great for identical twins--is due to interaction between
genetic and environmental factors.

This is a conclusion which is

unpalatable to much current sociology.
It should be noted that Bouchard et al., (1990) speak of
interaction, not determination. They suggest the possibility that
"MZA twins (monozygotic twins raised apart) are so similar because
their identical genomes make it probable that their effective
environments are similar" (p. 227).

That is, our perceptions of

differences among children causes us to react differently to them,
as was demonstrated by Rosenthal and Jacobson in their study of late
bloomers (1968).

Bouchard argues that it is "a plausible conjecture"

that the influence of genes on behavior is "indirect" (p. 227).

That

is, what we are looking at in these studies at what William Durham
calls coevolution (1991), or the mingling of diverse environmental
and genetic influences.

Durham convincingly shows that it is impos

sible to understand such things as the epidemiology of sickle-cell
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anemia in West Africa without taking into account both cultural and
genetic influences.

Both factors influence each other.

Culture also

influences genotypes (Durham, 1991, pp. 103-153; Duster and Garrett,
1984).
That we still talk in the Cartesian language of either/or is
simply an unwarranted and unfortunate result of our Western intel
lectual heritage.

A social scientist who suggests any biological or

genetic influences on behavior is viewed with politically-correct
suspicion.

Sociologists engage in "sociological gerrymandering" sim

ilar to the process of "religious gerrymandering" described by Walter
Kaufmann (1978, pp. 219-227).

We pick out the weakest of our oppo

nents' arguments and declare them representative
can offer.

or the best they

No one should be surprised that it takes such a small

breath to blow away the resulting straw men.
Taking Evolution Into Account
If we accept the foregoing argument that biosocial interaction
is at least a possibility, we will discover that this supposition can
make a considerable difference in the way we carry out research.

An

impressive example--indeed almost an exemplar (Kuhn, 1970)--of the
biosocial perspective is the article by anthropologists Rodseth,
Wrangham, Harrigan and Smuts (1991) The Human Community as a Primate
Society (pp. 221-241).

Rodseth and his co-authors argue that cross-

cultural studies of diverse societies have "no independent measures of
variation without considering nonhuman organisms" (Rodseth et al.,
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1991, p. 241).

That is, if we only look at divergent cultural pat

terns of Homo sapiens. we "are likely to see only enormous differ
ences across the range of human societies, never noticing the common
themes" (Rodseth et al., 1991, p. 241).
For example, if one makes comparisons between humans and other
primates, one notices that humans are the only species "to maintain
lifelong consanguinial relationships, despite sex-biased dispersal
from their natal groups" (Rodseth et al., 1991, p. 223).

Ideally we

keep in touch with our children, no matter what sex or wherever their
location.

As is true of all primates, "Sex and kinship are encom

passing dimensions of sociality" (p. 223).

Unlike all other primate

species, however, humans have developed a "release from proximity" in
their family relationships (Rodseth et al., 1991, p. 240).

Our pri

mary group relationships, in other words, are not determined by spa
tial proximity.
we keep in touch.

No matter what the sex or location of our children,
This sets us apart from all other primates, as

shown in Figures 1 and 2:
Social relationships clearly have added dimensions of impor
tance and complexity for humans compared to our closest genetic
relatives.

What is especially significant in Rodseth's presentation,

however, is the recognition that not all the possible categories are
utilized bv humans. As can be seen in Figures 1 and 2, we have
adopted specific forms.

Homo sapiens have species-specific

characteristics.
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Rodseth, L., Wrangham, R. W., Harrigan, A. M., & Smuts,
B. B. (1991). The Human Community as a Primate Group,
Current Anthropology. 32(3):226. Reproduced with per
mission (See Appendix A). Copyright by The Wenner-Gren
Foundation for Anthropological Research, 1991. All rights
reserved.

The analysis provided by Rodseth et al. suggests that we should
view intergenerational communication, irrespective of spatial propin
quity, as an area of unique significance for human beings. Its sig
nificance is accentuated by the kind of comparative perspective they
present. We are the only species which has developed in this fashion.
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B. B. (1991). The Human Community as a Primate Group,
Current Anthropology. 32(3):228. Reproduced with per
mission (See Appendix A). Copyright by The Wenner-Gren
Foundation for Anthropological Research, 1991. All rights
reserved.

We also see in this example the coevolutionary perspective fav
ored by Durham (1991).

Clearly what allows us to keep in touch are

cultural instruments of communication.

That is, it is only because

of our technology/culture that the release from proximity is able to
occur.

What has been viewed as the nature/culture duality cannot be

coherently separated as if they were two antithetical essences.
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Fox argues, "culture is an aspect of man's [sic] biological differ
ences from other species.

It is the name for a kind of behavior

found in the human species that ultimately depends on the brain"
(Fox, 1989, p. 28).

In naturalistic terms, we have not somehow

overcome our primate nature, but we are "a different kind of primate
with a different kind of nature" (Fox, 1989, p. 28). That one can
make ultimate or qualitative distinctions between nature and culture
is simply an unjustified and self-serving presumption of a social
science determined to carve out its own ecological niche.

Each im

plies, supports, and is constitutive of the other.
As I am suggesting, the reasoning behind the presumed biolo
gical/social chasm is ideological and political.
these connections in more detail later.

We will explore

I might simply note at

this point that the presumed necessary political connections be
tween biology and politics are not somehow etched in stone.

A soc

iologist, for example, may include some awareness of evolutionary
processes in his or her discussion without adopting a conservative
or reactionary political stance.

Even the scientific conclusions

presented by Rodseth and others are not what social scientists might
presume they would be.

For example, after their review of the

ethological evidence concerning violence and aggression in other pri
mate species, they wonder why "males seem to monopolize violence in
human societies and not in those of most other primates" (Rodseth et
al., 1991, p. 232, emphasis in original).

They note that "females in

these other primate groups regularly engage in violent competition
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with females" (Rodseth et al., 1991, p. 232).

This at least suggests

the possibility that the disparity in violent acts in human society
between males and females is influenced by processes very broadly
defined as cultural.

Thus the ethological evidence itself suggests

the plausibility of cultural influences on violent behavior.

If we

have trained males to be violent and females to resist violent
solutions, we may clearly alter that training in the future.

A

consideration of genetic/evolutionary influences does not necessitate
simplistic genetic determinism.

The use of glasses or insulin does

not determine one's political position, even if it does indicate
biosocial influence.
Leda Cosmides has made the interesting observation that "An
evolutionary perspective can help eliminate biases against women"
(Cosmides, quoted in Allman, 1994, p. 46).

She notes that male

scientists have generally proposed that gender-based differences
in some fashion indicated female inferiority. In contrast, evolu
tionary psychology suggests that you would expect to find some dif
ferences if the problems and tasks that the two sexes dealt with over
time were in any way distinct, but "you would not find sex differ
ences, when their problems were the same" (Cosmides, quoted in Allman, 1994, p. 47).

The point is that any differences are exactly

that: differences--not better or worse qualities.
I am arguing that a consideration of biological and evolu
tionary evidence may cause

fundamental alterations in viewpoints

and that such alterations are long overdue in the work of most

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

45
sociologists.

Suppose, for instance, that we took Rodseth et al.

seriously and we were inclined to look for the commonalities we see
among differing lifestyles.

Assume we wanted to outline the common

features of Homo sapiens as a species, as contrasted to other spe
cies.

Using the comparative framework of Rodseth allows us to per

ceive what "may appear to a narrower perspective as enormous differ
ences" as, in fact, "variations on a theme" (Rodseth et al., 1991, p.
241).
Part of the difficulty in perceiving variations on a theme is
the result of the kind of training typically provided by academic
sociology.

One can sympathize with Pierre L. van den Berghe's (1975)

complaint that "sociologists, individually and collectively, spend
an astonishingly small proportion of their professional activities
learning about the real world" (p. 14).
den Berghe, live our sociology.
ticipant observation.

We don't, in general, do much par

We don't necessarily learn other languages

or spend time in foreign cultures.
ed as the other.
tinderstood.

We do not, according to van

Of course the foreigner is view

We consider strange what we have never seen or

We are instantly aware of differences and unaware of

common themes.
If we more easily shared and perceived our commonalities, we
might be less inclined in our research to develop us vs. them kinds
of categories of analysis.

In The Truly Disadvantaged (1987), for

example, William Julius Wilson presents a cogent analysis of recent
economic trends in inner-city areas.

He argues in his chapter on
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"Race-specific Policies and the Disadvantaged" that only a "universal
program of social change and reform offers any real hope for changing
current conditions" (Wilson, 1987, pp. 109-124).

According to Wil

son an emphasis on race per se limits the attractiveness of re
form programs for other segments of the population whose support
Wilson views as essential to their success.

What we need, Wilson

suggests, is a kind of Marshall Plan for the cities which people may
universally view as helpful to their common situations.

He believes

that one minimal required change is a "national AFDC benefit standard
adjusted yearly for inflation" (Wilson, 1987, p. 152, emphasis
added). Clearly Wilson seems prepared to argue that in some sense
all people are affected by what happens in central cities and share a
common interest in their city's improvement and prosperity.

His

approach is universalistic: We are all in this together.
How is it possible, however, to truly share a concern with
someone who is qualitatively distinct?

I suggest that this is the

problem with the term underclass which Wilson has made famous.
Furthermore, the use of biosocial perspectives which emphasize human
commonalities would--contrary to much of the platitudinous assump
tions of social science--make one less likely to draw such qualita
tive distinctions between the good guys (us) and the bad guys (them).
Wilson (1987) states that he uses the term underclass for
individuals who lack training and skills and either exper
ience long-term unemployment or are not members of the
labor force, individuals who are engaged in street crime
and other forms of aberrant behavior, and families that
experience long-term effects of poverty fsic! and/or wel
fare dependency, (p. 8)

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

47
Wilson argues that his use of underclass suggests that "groups
that have been left behind are collectively different from those that
lived in these inner-city neighborhoods in earlier years” (Wilson,
1987, p . 8, emphasis added). He heatedly criticizes liberals who
"relate these characteristics of the underclass to the broader pro
blems of society" (p. 8).

Wilson claims that "one cannot deny that

the behavior of the underclass contrasts sharply with that of main
stream America" (p. 9).

By "eschewing the term underclass" we simply

"obscure these differences" (87, p. 9, emphasis in original).
Under, of course, suggests someone less valuable or even sub
human compared with those over.
relationship.

It suggests a master/servant

It implies that those who are left behind are indeed

collectively different compared with those who are part of the
overclass.

It implies the us. vs. them distinction that can be

ultimately traced to the dualism of Descartes.

It, as opposed to a

biosocial perception of species commonalities, implies that the
underclass is so much the other that concentrating on the broader
problems of society obscures the qualitative distinctions between the
underclass and mainstream America.

Wilson's classifacatory distinc

tions in this case distort and contradict his general political
orientation--which is clearly universalistic.
about people in different circumstances.

One could simply talk

One could talk about people

who experience wildly different conditions, incomes, or status.
do we need a specific, emotive, Cartesian label at all?

Why

Why assume

those on welfare belong to a qualitatively distinct taxonomic
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category?

People as a species, as demonstrated, for example, in the

work of Rodseth et al., all share a multitude of commonalities.
A concern with commonalities and ethological comparisons would
also enhance the work that has been done on adolescence.

As an exam

ple, consider the classic work by Edgar Friedenberg The Vanishing
Adolescent (1959).

David Riesman (1959) claimed in his Introduction

that "of all the wide-ranging diagnoses of our time, it is one of the
most profound grounded in the social-psychological studies of adol
escent character" (p. 7).

I am interested, however, not so much in

its specific prescriptions, but in its taken-for-granted social
science assumptions. Postmodernists have argued that what is left
out of an argument is often as significant as what is being said.
That is, "we need to examine the aporias or material gaps in any
text" (Pfohl, 1994, p. 477).

What does this kind of analysis sug

gest about Friedenberg's classic best-seller?
A glaring omission is that there is very little discussion of
adolescent sex.

This appears not to be due to any reluctance to dis

cuss the topic of sex in general, insofar as there is an extensive
analysis of the possibility of adolescents serving as a "nomoerotic
threat to adults" (Friedenberg, 1959, pp. 181-190).

Presumably this

was even more shocking to his readers than any discussion of adoles
cent sexuality per se might have been at the time.

From the first

paragraph of the work, however, we are informed that "Adolescence is
not simply a physical process; there is more to it than sexual
maturation.

It is also--and primarily--a social process, whose
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fundamental task is clear and stable self-identification" (Frieden
berg, 1959, p. 17, emphasis added).
Friedenberg (1959) provides a clear statement of the putative
culture/nature dualism:

Adolescence must be viewed as either a

physical or a social process and, in this case, is primarily a social
event. He argues that adolescent sexuality "must be regarded in some
what the same light as photosynthesis in the study of ecology"
(p. 52).

Friedenberg suggests that for photosynthesis/adolescent

sexuality "the process is benign, and it seems fortunate that it can
be carried on successfully under so wide a variety of circumstances"
(p. 52).

One conjures up images of leisurely, sun-drenched tran

quility, a kind of botanical/sexual Garden of Eden.

It is not sur

prising when Friedenberg develops a forty-three question sentencecompletion test to give to adolescents that the only question which-decorously--refers to sex begins "Love is" (1959, pp. 150-155).

If

one assumes that culture-higher and sex-lower, one naturally tends to
concentrate on the more positive of the two evaluations.

Who wants

to be accused of writing pornography?
If, however, sexual/family relationships are, as Rodseth et
al. (1991) argue, "encompassing dimensions of sociality" in all
other primates (p. 223), perhaps we should begin at that point in
any analysis of adolescence.

Perhaps we should assume that sexual

relationships are of overwhelming importance for all adolescents and
that the five exemplary boys who Friedenberg analyzes as examples of
differing ideal-typical patterns of adolescent behavior share that
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particular distinction.
in his discussion.

We also note the absence of exemplary girls

He states that for the boys, the school was a

"source of difficulty," but "for the girls it was not one"
(Friedenberg, 1959, p. 147).

Lucky for the girls.

Schools, according to Friedenberg (1959), accomplish four
principal things.

They teach adolescents to be an American; they

serve to divide us by social class; they transmit "some of the know
ledge and some of the intellectual skills and attitudes" we need as
a culture; and each school "functions as an administrative and re
cords center" (pp. 72-75).
Schools, however, are also the places where adolescents learn
about, experience, and try to come to grips with sex.

The clear and

stable self-identification that Friedenberg discusses in his opening
paragraph is not somehow opposed to sexual relationships and exclu
sively cultural.

As any realistic description of high school life

in America would show, they are inextricably intertwined.
not achieve self-identification by ignoring hormones.

One does

They are, at

any rate, impossible to ignore and are part of the biosocial develop
ment of everv adolescent.
If we examine some of the popular literary works on adoles
cence, we obtain a vastly different perspective on growing up com
pared to the sanitized version of photosynthetic socialization pre
sented by Friedenberg.

Looking at well-known works such as The

Catcher in the Rye. Red Sky at Morning. Summer of '42. The Adrian
Mole Diaries, and the popular novels of Judy Blume, what stands out
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above all else is the omnipresent, demanding, overwhelming, pulsating
presence of sex.

It is the primary area of concern--the underpInning

upon which all other social and cultural relationships are based and
develop.

Certainly this would not be surprising to comparative

ethologists.
In The Adrian Mole Diaries, the principal character is a
fourteen-year-old British adolescent who records his overwhelming and
lengthy infatuation with his beloved Pandora in a series of rumina
tions in his diary.

There is no placid botanical garden here.

A

more typical reaction to Pandora's presence is that "My heart was
beating so loudly in my throat that I felt like a stereo loudspeaker,
so I left before she heard me" (Townsend, 1986, p. 38).

Also typical

(Townsend, 1986) is the constant poetic stream of musings inspired by
Pandora:
Saturday July 25
PANDORA!

PANDORA!

PANDORA!

Oh! my love,
My heart is yearning,
My mouth is dry,
My soul is burning.
You're in Tunisia,
I am here.
Remember me and shed a tear.
Come back tanned and brown and healthy.
You're lucky that your dad is wealthy.
She will be back in six days.

(p. 91)

It is, of course, easy to ridicule this type of material and
all the other poetic doggerel scattered throughout the book as
unrealistic or merely humorous. I suggest, however, that the dry
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and burning kinds of sensations mentioned are a more realistic
description of high school life than the more scientific descriptions
of Friedenberg.

One cannot simply exclude four or five million years

of evolutionary biology by ideological declaration.

Adrian Mole's

remark that "Pandora and I indulged in extremely heavy petting; so
heavy that I felt a weight fall from me.

If I don't pass my exams it

won't matter" (Townsend, 1986, p. 335) rings true to anyone who has
been involved in a high school romance:

What's important are the

social, sexual, and interpersonal aspects of high school.

One cannot

separate sex and culture into airtight, mutually-exclusive cate
gories .
Works like Catcher in the Rve and The Adrian Mole Diaries
bridge the gap between nature and culture and are therefore inherent
ly more accurate in their presentations than works of social scien
tists which ignore such fundamental human characteristics as the
overarching preoccupation with sex.

We respond to their work--

according to the dust jacket, The Journals of Adrian Mole sold five
million copies in England alone during its first three years of
publication--because we recognize ourselves in their descriptions and
dilemmas.

We know that we experienced similar things and that the

manifest or official purposes of high schools often have almost no
relationship to what is significant for the students who attend them.
If we refuse to recognize the obvious significance of such
biosocial preoccupations as sexual relationships, we will necessarily
produce studies lacking in verisimilitude.

Even in studies which are
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in some sense qualitative, such as Friedenberg's The Vanishing
Adolescent. the students involved would have a hard time recognizing
themselves.

And with reason.

As was the case with the term under

class , why is it essential to have a separate and implicitly deroga
tory classification (i.e., That's typical of adolescent behavior) at
all?

Aren't we merely talking about people of younger ages?

Does

the term adolescent imply a qualitative distinction which obscures
more than it illuminates?

Of course we need to develop separate

categories to talk about anything.
they imply.

But we should be aware of what

Why should social science embrace unnecessarily invid

ious and condescending comparisons?
I have argued throughout this chapter that a biosocial approach
to social science research is one way of overcoming a number of
shortcomings which are the result of an exclusive emphasis on cul
tural levels of analysis.

We have seen that current research on

monozygotic twins strongly supports biosocial explanations of beha
vior.

It is also evident that work being done in ethology has

demonstrated that many of the presumed absolutes or differences be
tween humans and other species do not represent rigid or qualitative
differences.
In the next chapter I will examine in some detail the theories
and sociological implications of the work of Edward Wilson, who is
the best-known--or most infamous and reviled--sociobiologist.

We

have seen, however, that an emphasis on human similarities may de
crease the likelihood of invidious comparisons.

Is the lack of
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sociological interest in Wilson justified?
new reading of social behavior?

Does his work offer a

Wilson strongly supports the argu

ment that the presumably qualitative distinctions between Homo
sapiens and other species have gradually disappeared as ethological
and sociobiological research has advanced over the past twenty-five
years.

Is Wilson therefore an implicit or explicit Social Darwinist?
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CHAPTER III
THE SOCIOBIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE OF E. 0. WILSON

Introduction
Edward Wilson, the author of the massive and authoritative
Sociobiologv: The New Synthesis (1975), is the central intellectual
figure in the development of sociobiology (Ritzer, 1983, p. 402).
In this chapter, I will look at the sociological implications of his
work and the controversies which it has generated.

Until the

publication of Sociobiologv: The New Synthesis E.O. Wilson was a
respected entomologist who was recognized as a leading expert on
ants (Ritzer, 1983, p. 402).

After 1975, however, Wilson was viewed

as the enfant terrible of a new and dangerous academic discipline.
The initial sociological reaction to his book was actually quite
positive.

Marion Blute (1976) called it an "exceptionally fine book"

(p. 731).

Allan Mazur (1976), while critical of aspects of Wilson's

work, suggested that he "has both the visibility and credibility to
legitimate the biological approach to sociology" (p. 700).

Edward

Tiryakian (1976) labeled it "an imposing attempt to update Darwinianderived evolutionary theory" (p. 701).

While all of the sociological

reviewers had specific criticisms of Wilson, none condemned him
outright.

All of them suggested that the book was important and

deserved to be taken seriously as "a stimulating prodding of the
sociological imagination" (p. 705).
55
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What Ritzer (1983) terms the "firestorm of criticism," Wilson
being "harangued and jeered at professional meetings, including at
least one professional sociological meeting," came later (p. 402.
An examination of Wilson's writing in Sociobiologv. as well as his
more popularized works On Human Nature (1978) and Promethean Fire
(1983), will demonstrate the complexity of what is often viewed in
simplistic, Manichean dualities.

Wilson is neither the proto-Nazi

pilloried by his most vehement critics (Alper, Beckwith & Miller,
1978) or the political innocent he sometimes seems to appear in his
own defense.4 Wilson raises important issues which should be taken
into account by contemporary sociology.
The secondary literature dealing with Wilson and sociobiology
is massive and detailed (Barlow & Silverberg, 1980; Caplan, 1978;
Gregory, Silvers & Sutch, 1978; Hubbard & Wald, 1993; Kitcher, 1985;
Lewontin, 1993; Lewontin et al., 1984; Sahlins, 1976; Singer, 1981).
Despite this outpouring of material, I agree with Walter Gove's
(1987) recent statement that "Most sociologists who are critical of
sociobiology lack a clear understanding of what sociobiology is and
how it relates to recent developments in biological theory and re
search" (p. 258).

As a result, according to Gove, "most have re

jected sociobiology largely on metaphysical grounds" (p. 258).

But

if critics are going to accuse a major intellectual figure of a sex
ist synthesis (Chasin, 1977) or of providing a theory which produces
"specific political consequences" (Alper et al., 1978, p. 5), they
should be able to offer coherent reasons for their criticism.

In
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this chapter I will examine some of Wilson's major themes and their
sociological significance.

There are indeed good reasons for soc

iologists to be critical of Wilson, but the issue is much more com
plex than the automatic and inevitable sociological rejection of
biological determinism would suggest.5
In Sociobiologv: The New Synthesis Wilson (1975) defines
sociobiology as "the systematic study of the biological basis of all
social behavior" (p. 4) . While Wilson claims that sociobiology for
the present deals with other species and ethological concerns, it is
clear throughout Sociobiologv that Wilson's agenda is broader and
includes humankind.

It has often been suggested that his magnum onus

is perfectly acceptable to sociology excluding the final chapter
which attempts to biologize sociology.

Bruce Eckland (1976), in a

review in the American Journal of Sociology, states that "only the
last of 27 chapters deals directly with man" (p. 693).
ment, however, is simply not true.

This state

Part of the explanation for the

adverse responses to Sociobiologv is due to Wilson's continual ex
tension of his ethnological descriptions onto Homo sapiens. Like
the waves of criticism which greeted Darwin's On the Origin of
Species (Himmelfarb, 1962, pp. 268-309), it was clear from the begin
ning that Wilson's book is of immense significance for our under
standings and images of the human.
Donna Haraway (1989) suggests in Primate Visions (1989) that
evolutionary discourse is highly narrative and that "story-telling
is central to its scientific project" (p. 188).

She believes that

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

58
evolutionary narratives deal with "ontological statuses and framing
myths about our origins" (p. 146).

In a more reflexive and complex

fashion, she agrees with Gove's statement that sociologists have
rejected Wilson largely on metaphysical grounds.

Haraway argues that

in order to understand metaphysical conflicts, one must look at the
kinds of evolutionary narratives and stories about human beings which
the various authors present.

If one wants to begin to understand

the negative reaction to Wilson's arguments, one must examine the
framing myths he provides and the tales he tells.
ine what is excluded as well as what is present.

We need to exam
Let us examine

three statements Wilson makes about man, all preceding his controver
sial final chapter, which provide some insight into his evolutionary
tales.
In Chapter 5 on "Group Selection and Altruism" Wilson (1975)
concludes by suggesting that
a science of sociobiology, if coupled with neurophysiology,
might transform the insights of ancient religions into a
precise account of the evolutionary origin of ethics and
hence explain the reasons why we make certain moral choices
instead of others at particular times. Whether such under
standing will then produce the Rule [sic] remains to be seen.
For the moment, perhaps it is enough to establish that a
single strong thread does indeed run from the conduct of ter
mite colonies and turkey brotherhoods to the social behavior
of man. (p. 129)
In Chapter 11 on "Aggression" he writes that "the lesson for
man" is
If we wish to reduce our own aggressive behavior, and lower
our cholamine and corticosteroid titers to levels that make
us all happier, we should design our population densities
and social systems in such a way as to make aggression
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inappropriate in most conceivable daily circumstances and,
hence, less adaptive, (p. 255)
In Chapter 14 on "Roles and Casts" he writes that
When too many human beings enter one occupation, their per
sonal cost-to-benefit ratios raise, and some individuals
transfer to less crowded fields for selfish reasons. Non
human vertebrates lack the basic machinery to achieve ad
vanced division of labor by either the insect or the human
methods. Human societies are therefore unique in a quali
tative sense. They have equaled and in many cultures far
exceeded insect societies in the amount of division of la
bor they contain, (p. 313)
In his comment on religion and ethics from Chapter 5, Wilson
makes absolutely clear that he is interested in examining broad
philosophical issues which are of major significance for human be
ings.

He wants to explain "the reasons why we make certain moral

choices instead of others at particular times." He suggests that we
need to examine "the evolutionary origin of ethics."

And he expli

citly argues that there is no qualitative distinction between Homo
sapiens and other species (i.e., "a single strong thread does indeed
run from the conduct of termite colonies to the social behavior of [
sic] man").6
In On Human Nature (1978) and Promethean Fire (1983) Wilson
made his attitude toward the significance of religion and mind much
clearer.

He begins his chapter on religion with the statement that

"The predisposition to religious belief is the most complex and pow
erful force in the human mind and in all probability is an ineradi
cable part of human nature" (Wilson, 1978, p. 176).

Wilson wants us

to understand what he terms "the material basis of moral feeling"
(Ruse & Wilson, 1986, p. 174).

He suggests that our religious
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sentiments, like all our other species characteristics, were formed
by natural selection and our evolutionary history (Wilson, 1978, 176201).

If we want to adequately explain our current religious feel

ings we need to understand how they originally developed.
Speaking of the nature and development of mind, Lumsden

and

Wilson (1983) state that
at the center of the neurophysiological recall and selfassembly, a maximally intense and coherent activity com
prises conscious thought. If and when we are able to
characterize the organization of these various processes
and identify their physical basis in some detail, it will
be possible to define in a declarative and unambiguous
manner the urgent but still elusive phenomenon of mind,
as well as self and consciousness, (p. 3)
In order to understand the development of mind and religion, we
must look at

the evolutionary sequences which lead to their forma

tion.These have formed what

Wilson terms epigenetic rules or "var

ious regularities of development" (Lumsden 6c Wilson, 1983, p. 70).
The mind is not a tabula rasa (Wilson, 1978, p. 69).

We are predis

posed towards certain kinds of mental activities and feelings.

Thus,

for example, with respect to classifying colors, "the epigenetic
rules of color vision and classification are stringent enough to
direct cultures around the world towards the central clusters of
color classification as revealed by the Berlin-Kay experiments"
(Lumsden

6c

Wilson, 1983, p. 71.7

Wilson
mind.

views epigenetic rules as a kind of Rosetta Stone of the

If we understand their origins and development, we willhave

unlocked the door to understanding all of nature.
duced what his quotation on ethics terms the Rule.

We will have pro
We will have
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demonstrated that it is "possible to proceed from a knowledge of the
material basis of moral feeling to generally accepted rules of con
duct.

To do so will be to escape--not a minute too soon--from the

debilitating absolute distinction between is and ought" (Ruse & Wil
son, 1986, p. 174, emphasis in original).
Human beings, according to Wilson (1983), really have no choice
in the matter.

If we ignore the epigenetic rules--assuming, for the

moment, their validity8--they will nevertheless navigate our beha
vior:

"A society that chooses to ignore the existence of innate

epigenetic rules will nevertheless continue to navigate by them and
at each moment of decision yield to their dictates by default" (Lums
den & Wilson, 1983, p. 184).
What Wilson (1978) terms "scientific materialism or scientific
naturalism will enable us to proceed in the fashion he proposes”
(pp. 200-201).

This results from the fact that "the final decisive

edge enjoyed by scientific naturalism will come from its capacity to
explain traditional religion, its chief competitor, as a wholly
material phenomenon" (Wilson, 1986, p. 201).

Scientific materialism

will allow us to sustain the "blind hopes that the journey on which
we are now embarked will be further and better than the one just
completed" (Wilson, 1978, p. 217).

All this depends, as suggested

above, on an evolutionary history of ethics and moral choices.
Sociobiology will finally allow us to overcome the Cartesian Gap be
tween is and ought.
In the second quotation from Wilson on aggression, we see a
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number of other themes which have driven critics of sociobiology to
distraction.

On the one hand, it is clear that Wilson assumes that

it is possible to alter environmental conditions and that the result
ing changes will influence behavior (We should design our own popula
tion densities and social systems [emphasis added]).

On the other

hand, the reason we need to change that environment is to reduce
hormonal levels and their negative effects (cholamine and cortico
steroid titers) which, according to Wilson, are the proximate causes
of aggression.

But is the individualistic level of analysis implied

in the cure of hormone reduction an adequate framing of the etiology
of aggression?

Surely more social or institutional factors need to

be considered.

At the least, the reasons for their exclusion need to

be explained and considered.

Perhaps the problem is that Wilson

(1978) defines mind as "an epiphenomenon of the neuronal machinery of
the brain" (p. 202).

How then is it possible to talk of a conscious

plan--designing social systems--at all?

A design presupposes an

architect capable of more than epiphenomenal thought.
Wilson (1975) assumes in his discussion of aggression that one
may legitimately make valid interspecies comparisons and analogies.
Immediately preceding the discussion of aggression quoted above,
Wilson concludes a detailed discussion of experiments on overcrowd
ing in cats and its bizarre effects with the statement that the
experimentally-induced feline behavior has "close parallels in cer
tain of the more dreadful aspects of human behavior" (p. 255).

The

assumption is that the effects on human behavior of overcrowding are
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directly analogous to what happens with cats.
case?

But why is that the

Why not birds? Or fish? Or prairie dogs?

Wilson doesn't pro

vide the criteria of selection for he uses for making valid compari
sons.

It is reasonable to assume that the closer the evolutionary or

genetic relationships and similarities, the more valid the comparison.
Sociobiologists should focus their attention on the Cercopithecoidea
(Old World monkeys) and the great apes.

Similarities abound.

In the third quotation from Chapter 14 of Sociobiologv. Wilson
reveals his entomological background.

One of the aspects of his

writings which has positively outraged critics is his tendency to
make comparisons between the insect order Hymenoptera--or eusocial
insects--and human beings.

Wilson actually admits in the quote that

human societies are "unique in a qualitative sense"--contrary to the
implied continuum in the quote on religion-- but then goes on to
assume that one may make meaningful comparisons between humans and
insect societies.

He states that the division of labor in human

societies "far exceeded insect societies in the amount of division of
labor they contain."

The point is that most social scientists would

challenge the validity of the comparison in the first place.

It is

not self-evident that one can make any valid comparisons between in
sect societies and human societies.

If one is going to make that

argument, one needs to at least offer reasons and arguments for
believing it is possible.

Wilson offers none and, in this case,

sociologists are not his only critics.
Wilson (1975) spends a considerable time in his Sociobiologv
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discussing communication (pp. 176-241).

He quotes with approval Nor-

bert Wiener, who, Wilson says, argued in his classic work on cyber
netics that sociology, including animal sociobiology could be under
stood as reciprocal exchanges of bits of information (p. 18, emphasis
added). According to Wilson, much of sociobiology can be similarly
defined as information exchange.

Hence the analogy between eusocial

insects and humans is certainly proper.

They both exchange informa

tion.
If, however, we examine Wiener's famous The Human Use of Human
Beings, we find that he spends a good part of his chapter on Cyber
netics and Society in an extended critique of exactly the kind of
comparison Wilson is trying to make.

It is Wiener's position that an

ant society is qualitatively distinct from human culture and that his
cybernetic system does not apply to the insect world.

He argues that

"a human state based on the model of the ant results from a profound
misapprehension both of the nature of the ant and of the nature of
man" (Wiener, 1954, p. 51).

Feedback between ants and between humans

are two very different things:
Thus the insect is rather like the kind of computing machine
whose instructions are all set forth in advance on the tapes,
and which has next to no feedback mechanism to see it through
the uncertain future. The behavior of an ant is much more a
matter of instinct than of intelligence. The physical strait
jacket in which an insect grows up is directly responsible for
the mental strait jacket which regulates its pattern of beha
vior. (p. 57)
The distinction between the "mechanical rigidity of the insect"
and the "mechanical fluidity of the human being" is, says Wiener,
"highly relevant to the point of view of this book" (Wiener, 1954,
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p. 57).
example.

In his selection of Wiener, Wilson picked an unfortunate
Wiener specifically states that the intellectual disci

pline which made Wilson justly famous has absolutely no bearing on
human affairs.

He was totally opposed to the point of view of

Sociobiology twenty years before it was written.
or anyone else,

A sociobiologist,

needs to take care when claiming intellectual soul

mates .
Edward Wilson as Objective Scientist
A positivistic sociologist would take Wilson to task for his
conflation of the indicative and prescriptive levels of analysis
(Bryant, 1985).

Positivists assume that any commingling of the is

and the ought inevitably produces what G.E. Moore called the
"naturalistic fallacy" (Midgley, 1978, pp. 177-199).

One cannot,

according to this view, say anything about what ought to be based on
naturalistic descriptions of what exists. Wilson (1978) clearly
assumes that Moore's argument is mistaken.

He assumes that "as we

start to elect a system of values on a more objective basis, our
minds at last align with our hearts" (p. 215).

As we come to ade

quately understand evolutionary history, we will understand what
needs to be done to reconcile the whisperings within (Barash, 1979)
with our systems of morality and ethics.

An informed and accurate

sociobiology leads toward an evolutionary/ethical Holy Grail.

Wilson

is in many respects a scientist/prophet attempting to arouse the
sociobiologically ignorant.
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Looking at the normative elements in Wilson's thought suggests
the possibility that one may utilize a biological perspective and not
embrace a conservative or reactionary political perspective.

Con

trary to much common sense, there is no inevitable conservative
connection between the use of biological data and one's political
perspective.

One sociologist who has examined E.O. Wilson's writings

in depth refers to "the potentially radical and transformative ele
ments in Wilson's thought" (Kaye, 1986, p. 100).

Even in the notor

ious final chapter in Sociobiology. there are nearly utopian project
ions of current social and ecological trends.

Wilson (1975) states,

for example, that "When mankind has achieved an ecological steady
state, probably at the end of the twenty-first century," the social
sciences will be "maturing rapidly" and "biology should be at its
peak" (p. 574).

He also writes of a "planned society--the creation

of which seems inevitable in the coming century" (p. 575, emphasis
added).

Whatever one's political persuasion, it seems unlikely that

most of us would predict an ecological steady state.

Surely such

things as population increases, resource depletion and environmental
pollution point in exactly the opposite direction.

Also,

the

increasing movement towards privatization doesn't auger will for
Wilson's inevitable planned society.
tainly in the opposite direction.

Once again, the trend is cer

Wilson's evolutionary optimism

seems singularly misplaced and naive.

(See Endnote 4.)

His

sociobiology clearly fulfills Mannheim's (1936) definition of a uto
pian wish as "all situationally transcendent ideas which in any
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way have a transforming effect
order" (p. 205).

on the existing historical-social

Wilson's writings articulate a desire for exten

sive social change.

As Kaye (1986) notes, Wilson "sees modem

societies as in a state of crisis" (1986, p. 100).
The biosocial perspective in general, and Wilson in particu
lar, have been perceived as necessarily conservative or worse because
of a mistaken belief that biological evidence inevitably results in
biological determinism and a consequent devaluation of the effects of
differing environments.

In its most simplistic form, the assumption

is that genetic considerations necessarily lead one to ignore such
obvious environmental conditions as poverty or violence in the ex
planation of human behavior.

Lemer (1992), for example, in his

discussion of sociobiology, constantly compares and suggests simi
larities between the Nazis and sociobiologists such as Wilson
(pp. 91-125).
If sociology as a discipline assumes differences in behavior
are explained by differing environmental conditions, and sociobio
logy, it is believed, assumes that genetics or the human biogram
explains behavior, it is easy to understand the resulting sociolog
ical hostility towards biologism.

Wilson (1975) increased the level

of sociological discomfort by suggesting that sociology was likely
to "merge with cultural anthropology, economics, and social psycho
logy and that the transition from purely phenomenological to funda
mental theory in sociology must await a full, neuronal explanation
of the human brain" (p. 575).

A self-interested sociology, of
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course, would not be ecstatic over either development.

No one likes

to be told that what they are doing is fundamentally mistaken or
that their academic discipline is about to vanish.
Sociologists, however, normally base their critiques of socio
biology on a mistaken notion of identity between biological and con
servative.

In my development and use of biocritique I will provide

an alternative to this point of view.

For the moment, with respect

to Wilson, I want to show why the assumption of a necessarily con
servatism with regard to all biological considerations or reasoning
is a kind of theoretical non seauitur. Sociologists rightly view
sociobiology as a threat to business as usual, but they wrongly
assume that their opposition necessarily reflects differences in
political philosophies.
As Mary Midgley (1978) has argued,
The notion that we ’have a nature,' far from threaten
ing the concept of freedom, is absolutely essential to
it. If we were genuinely plastic and indeterminate at
birth, there could be no reason why society should not
stamp us into any shape that might suit it. (p. xviii)
As she hasfurther noted, "Anyone who criticizes existing
must

customs

do soon the grounds that these customs fail to meet real hu

man needs" (Midgley, 1983b, p. 91, emphasis in original).

Wilson

(1978) argues along similar lines in On Human Nature when he anal
yzes the history of slavery (pp. 82-84).

Slaves, according to Wil

son, "insist on behaving like human beings instead of slave ants,
gibbons, mandrills, or any other species” (p. 84).

It is because we

are not genuinely plastic that slavery was ultimately defeated as a
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viable social arrangement.
Clearly, if any environmental condition is acceptable to human
beings, slavery would, by definition, be an acceptable, viable, and
contemporary reality in North and South America.

All social criti

cism or discussion of social problems assumes that particular human
needs are not being met.

Contrary to the sociological equating of

an exclusive emphasis on environmental conditions with liberal or
radical politics, only assumptions about some kinds of human needs
enable us to legitimately critique particular political arrangements
(Etzioni, 1968).
Sociobiological arguments do not necessitate a reactionary
political position.

As Robin Fox (1989) has pointed out, if a poli

tical reformer is confronted by conservative shibboleths such as
"You can't change human nature," a perfectly reasonable response is
to suggest that the prevailing theories of human nature are incor
rect.

One can maintain "on the basis of evidence and argument, that

the version of human nature put forward by the regime is faulty and
distorted" (p. 69).

Herbert Marcuse's arguments in Eros and Civil

ization (1955) and One-Dimensional Man (1964) presuppose a theory of
human needs which are not being met by the dominant one-dimensional
society.
(1955).

Erich Fromm makes the same argument in The Sane Society
In his recent study of critical theory, Douglas Kellner

(1989) argues that for "Max Horkheimer the concern for human suffer
ing was a principal determinant of his work" (p. 237).

Any analysis

of human suffering, however, presupposes that human needs are being
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adversely affected in some fashion by that suffering.

Whatever

their other deficiencies, most sociologists would not classify Mar
cuse, Fromm, or Horkheimer as conservative biological determinists.
There is no necessary connection between specific political positions
and the use of biological data per se.

The political consequences of

sociobiological characterizations depend on the specific character
istics being advanced.
Naturalistic arguments can be employed by all political per
suasions.

Geneticist Steve Jones (1994) has recently proposed

that, due to the harmful effects of inbreeding and recessive alleles,
someone concerned about congenital genetic defects should marry
another person as different genetically as possible, "since the
recessive gene for cystic fibrosis is unknown in Africans and that
for sickle-cell anemia unknown in whites, the child of a black-white
mating is safe from both diseases" (p. 74).

The principle is the

same, although the consequences are reversed, for harmful inbreeding.
Sociobiologists can logically argue that laws against miscegenation
are genetically absurd.

This is not a conservative political posi

tion.
Donna Haraway (1989) has argued that "sociobiological theory
can be, really must be, female centered in ways not true of previous
paradigms, where the mother-infant unit substituted for females"
(p. 178).

That is, Wilson's (1975) sociobiology posits an equal

genetic self-interest for both men and women.

According to the

sociobiological concepts of kin selection and inclusive fitness,
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"both males and females are equally interested in propagating and
extending their genotypes" (pp. 117-121, 415-418).

Thus the female

is defined as "the fully calculating maximizing machine that had de
fined males already.

The female ceases to be a dependent variable

when males and females both are defined as rational calculators"
(Haraway, 1989, pp. 178-179).

A similar argument is presented in

great detail by sociobiologist Sarah Blaffer Hrdy (1981).

Her

description of "genetic equality does not fit the popular notion of a
sociobiology which is necessarily misogynistic and ruled by man the
hunter" (Chasin, 1977).
Haraway (1991) also observes that sociobiologists may practice
a kind of "reverse rejection of the naturalistic fallacy" (p. 74).
Ethologists and sociobiologists are often excoriated for assuming
that whatever is. is right. It is clear, however, that Wilson does
not as a general rule subscribe to this belief.

Similar to what

Haraway writes of sociobiologist David Barash, "is is not ought for
him" (Haraway, 1991, p. 74, emphasis in original).

That is, there is

no logical necessity for a sociobiologist having to assume that
whatever s/he observes is somehow right or positive.

Once again,

we see that the political implications of sociobiolgical reasoning
are, at best, ambiguous.

As Melvin Konner (1991) notes, "a

alone does nothing; context is always important" (p. 34).

gene
This is

not to suggest that there are no political implications in Wilson's
work.

As Adam Kuper (1994)

argues in The Chosen Primate, "there are

no neutral theories about human beings" (p. 102).

Part of the reason
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Wilson has been attacked so bitterly is that he often seems to deny
what his own work so clearly represents: the obvious imbrication of
the indicative and the normative.

Thus in commenting on "the

sociobiology controversy," he argues that sociobiology is not a
"politically defined doctrine on human nature" and refers to "the
inherent neutrality of the discipline" (Lumsden & Wilson, 1983,
pp. 23 and 37).

And yet he makes statements such as "The genes hold

culture on a leash.

The leash is very long, but inevitably values

will be constrained in accordance with their effects on the human
gene pool" (Wilson, 1978, p. 175).

Or "Scientists and humanists

should consider the possibility that the time has come for ethics to
be removed temporarily from the hands of philosophers and biologized"
(Wilson, 1975, p. 562).

Or "Human beings are absurdly easy to

indoctrinate--they seek it" (Wilson, 1975, p. 562, emphasis in
original). Irrespective of the merits of his arguments, it is selfevident that such statements are

profoundly political.

The statement concerning a genetic leash clearly suggests a
conservative political orientation.

The statement about indoctrina

tion would seem to embrace the radical behaviorism he otherwise
disavows.

The statement about ethics is similar to Wilson's quota

tion on the significance of developing an evolutionary ethics and the
importance of explaining "why we make certain moral choices instead
of others" (Wilson, 1975, p. 129).

All of these statements are

political (i.e., may in some way influence
processes).

political ideologies or

Consider Wilson's discussion of the significance of
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religion.
In On Human Nature. Wilson (1975) argues that "self-deception
by shamans and priests perfects their own performance and enhances
the deception practiced on their constituents" (p. 183).

Wilson,

while stressing the importance and strength of the "predisposition
to religious belief," believes we would all be better off it were to
somehow disappear.

He asks "Does a way exist to divert the power of

religion into the services of the great new enterprise scientific
materialism] that lays bare the sources of that power?" (p. 201,
emphasis added).

Wilson, I believe, would like us to picture him

as a kind of contemporary Voltaire who possesses the positive doc
trine Voltaire's skepticism lacked (i.e., Sociobiology: The New
Synthesis’
). Anyone who seriously proposes the abolition of organ
ized religion in the United States is making a political statement.
Edward Wilson as Theorist and Storyteller
As we have seen in Wilson's discussion of religion, sociobio
logy is a discipline which presents various theories and narratives,
as well as providing ethological and biological comparisons between
species.

In this section I examine the kinds of stories and meta

theory Wilson presents.

Part of the reason for the lack of under

standing and hostility between sociobiologists and sociologists is
the result of differing goals being sought and different stories be
ing told in their separate disciplines.
Wilson (1975) makes an important distinction in Sociobiology
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between proximate and ultimate causation. Proximate causation is de
fined as
the conditions of the environment or internal physiology
that trigger the responses of an organism. They are to
be distinguished from the environmental forces, referred
to as the ultimate causation, that led to the evolution
of the response in the first place, (p. 593)
Wilson's (1975) formal definition of ultimate causation is:
"The conditions of the environment that render certain traits adap
tive and others nonadaptive; hence the adaptive traits tend to be
retained in the population and are caused in this this ultimate sense"
(p. 597).

He states at the beginning of Sociobiology that

ultimate causation consists of the necessities created by
the environment: the pressures imposed by weather, preda
tors, and other stressors, and such opportunities as are
presented by unfilled living space, new food sources, and
accessible mates. The species responds to environmental
exigencies by genetic evolution through natural selection,
inadvertently shaping the anatomy, physiology, and behavior
of the individual organisms. These prime movers of evolu
tion are the ultimate biological causes, but they operate
only over long spans of time. (p. 23).
Wilson (1975) believes that sociobiology should be concerned
with demonstrating ultimate causes.

His initial discussion of ulti

mate and proximate causation analyzes aggression and the pecking
order of chickens and argues that an earlier analysis is mistaken
because the ethologists confuse proximate with ultimate causes.
Wilson believes that dominance hierarchies evolve at the individual
level and that aggression and "dominance have not evolved as proxi
mate devices to provide an orderly society" (p. 23).

As Lumsden and

Wilson (1983) state in Promethean Fire: "Sociobiology concentrates
more on why questions.

The query why can be answered only by the
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study of history.

And the history of biological process is by

definition evolution" (p. 24).

Sociobiology is an evolutionary

science which provides diachronic explanations of the development of
particular species by natural selection.

According to Wilson,

sociobiologists should examine the evolutionary history of kin
selection,

reciprocal altruism, gene-culture evolution,9 and male

and female reproduction strategies.

Sociobiological reasoning is

based on evolutionary reconstructions.
In a critique of sociobiology, Stephen Jay Gould (1980) has
written that sociobiology provides a series of Just-So stories simi
lar to those of Kipling:

"Rudyard Kipling asked how the leopard got

its spots, the rhino its wrinkled skin.
so stories.

He called his answers just-

When evolutionists try to explain form and behavior,

they also tell just-so stories--and the agent is natural selection"
(p. 258).

Gould is pessimistic about the possibility of testing the

theories presented and states that "Virtuosity in invention replaces
testability as the criterion for acceptance" (p. 258).

More recently

Kitcher (1993) and Lloyd (1994) have made strong cases for what Lloyd
terms the "confirmation of evolutionary theory."

Lloyd (1994) advo

cates what she calls a "semantic view of theory to establish the
plausibility and importance in evolutionary biology of different
categories of empirical support and to facilitate detailed analysis
and comparison of empirical claims" (p. 159).
Irrespective of the technical controversies in evolutionary
theory, Gould's picture of evolutionary theorists as storytellers is
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important and worth considering in ways which he does not develop.
Even conceding, for the moment, the perceived distinction in what
Niles Eldredge has termed time frames (1985) between social scien
tists and sociobiologists, it is clear that both groups are engaged
in storytelling.
As current Secretary of Labor Robert Reich (1987) has written,
"Every culture has its own parables.
multitude of forms.

Cultural parables come in a

What gives them force is their capacity to make

sense of, and bring coherence to, common experience" (p. 7).

Both

the sociologist and the sociobiologist are attempting to make sense
of common experiences.
myths.

Both are producing what Haraway calls framing

While sociology operates on a more proximate time frame, and

sociobiology, as defined by Wilson, is primarily concerned with ulti
mate evolutionary history, both are engaged in the interpretation of
common experience.
cies" (p. 7).

We are, as Reich notes, a "meaning-seeking spe

Wilson clearly believes that his "systematic study

of the biological basis of all social behavior" will enable us to
understand and interpret our common experiences in ways that a more
proximate analysis misunderstands.

Sociologists generally assume

that biological factors are a constant and may be safely ignored in
any contemporary analysis of human behavior.

Both groups need to

realize that they are telling stories about the same species and, as
Wilson writes, "all of the natural sciences and social sciences form
a seamless whole" (Lumsden & Wilson, 1983, p. 171).
Much of the hostility which greeted the publication of Wilson's
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Sociobiology may be interpreted as hostility toward the kinds of
stories he told.

It was not that social scientists denied the exist

ence of an evolutionary past, but they challenged Wilson's inter
pretations of that past as well as its relevance for contemporary
society.

And it must be admitted that Wilson himself bears a good

deal of the responsibility for the controversies which developed.
The problem is that the stories Wilson tells drastically change over
time. The images presented fluctuate greatly. The human biogram
outlined by Wilson seems itself to be suffering from a wild case of
punctuated equilibrium.
Both Sociobiology and On Human Nature present a starkly mater
ialistic universe in which human happiness is of no consequence in a
Darwinian drama designed "to favor the maximum transmission of the
controlling genes" (Wilson, 1975, p. 4).
wind(1978) has pointed out, genetic

For Wilson, as J.B. Schnee-

behavior is "a mindless, limit

less, compulsive drive toward making copies of oneself" (p. 237).
Wilson's images of genes and genetic influences are similar to
Richard Dawkin's (1989) notion of the selfish gene:
Now they [genes] swarm in huge colonies, same inside gi
gantic lumbering robots, sealed off from the outside world,
communicating with it by tortuous indirect routes, manipu
lating it by remote control. They are in you and in me;
they created us, body and mind; and their preservation is
the ultimate rationale for our existence. They have come
a long way, those replicators. Now they go by the name of
genes, and we are their survival machines, (pp. 19-20)
In this passage there are a number of themes which are defined by
Philip Kitcher as "pop sociobiology" (Kitcher, 1985, pp. 14-16).
Kitcher classifies Wilson, Dawkins, and sociologist Pierre van den
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Berghe as pop sociobiologists.

He describes passages like the above

as "the iron hand [of genetic influence] meets the empty mind"
(p. 18).

Dawkins assumes a Cartesian split between genes and

environment (sealed off from the outside world).

Human beings,

according to this story, are slaves to molecular behavior.
preservation is the ultimate rationale for our existence.

Genetic
What is

lacking is in Dawkins is any concern with consciousness or mind.
Wilson (1978) states that as sociobiology progresses, "the mind will
be more precisely explained as an epiphenomenon of the neuronal
machinery of the brain" (p. 202).

If what is missing from an

author's concepts and data is as significant as what is present, it
is worth noting that the index for the entire 800-page sociobiologi
cal exemplar Sociobiology: The New Synthesis contains no references
to mind.
(p. 3).

Wilson refers instead to the "hypothalamic-limbic complex"
He suggests that in the case of ethical reasoning, "philo

sophers intuit the deontological canons of morality by consulting the
emotive centers of their own hypothalamic-limbic system" (p. 563).
That system, however, is, according to Wilson (1975), simply
the end result of genetic evolutionary history.

Human beings are

genetically programmed with "conformer genes" (p. 562) or "altru
istic genes" (p. 563).

If philosophy-intuition/emotion and the emo

tive centers consulted are genetically predetermined, it is obvious
that thought/sociology/philosophy/etc. can all be reduced to their
biological dimensions.

Biological considerations are all that is

necessary and sufficient to explain Locke, Rousseau or Kant.10
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Wilson's (1978) position on mind is a classic example of reductionism.

Different levels of analysis (e.g., mind, philosophy, ethics)

may be reduced or adequately understood and explained by a much
simpler factor, "our innate predispositions" (p. 154).

Wilson is

explicit in his reductionism in a sociological critique of Durkheim:
Despite the imposing holistic traditions of Durkheim in
sociology and Radcliffe-Brown in anthropology,, cultures
are not super-organisms that evolve by their own dynamics.
Rather, cultural change is the statistical product of the
separate behavioral responses of large numbers of human
beings who cope as best they can with social existence.
(p. 81)
If cultural change is only "the statistical product of the
separate behavioral responses of large numbers of human beings," it
is self-evident that individual levels of analysis are adequate for
understanding social phenomenon.

Furthermore, if "biology is the key

to human nature" (Wilson, 1978, p. 14, emphasis added), and genetic
or molecular analyses adequately explain human behavior, one need go
no further in explaining human action.
hold culture on a leash" (p. 175).

As Wilson states, "The genes

Dawkins' image of humans as

lumbering robots is essentially correct.

Human beings are composed

of molecular forces which are programmed to produce as many other
similar molecules as possible.

But as J.B. Schneewing (1978) pro

tests in his critique of Wilson, "this is not a state of affairs that
is intelligible as a goal of human striving" (1978, p. 238).

The

story that Wilson strives to tell suggests that conscious striving
is a neuronal epiphenomenon.

It is not clear within the terms of his

own theoretical system how he was able to break with his own
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evolutionary history in such a thorough fashion.11 Much of socio
biology appears counterintuitive.

Wilson suggests, for example, that

what he terms hard-core altruism simply doesn't exist (p. 162).

Even

"Mother Theresa is out to make a theological buck" (pp. 172-173).
There is no way for Wilson to explain stranger helping stranger.
There is no way, within the space provided in his own discourse,
that he can adequately explain the examples of consciousness of kind
and assistance to strangers in wartime or emergencies which I de
scribed in Chapter I.
If everyone else is fundamentally controlled by their genes,
why is the sociobiologist able to escape their impact to such an
extent?

It would seem to necessarily follow from Wilson's reduction-

ism that people with similar genetic backgrounds would experience the
same emotions and intuitions--based on their similar hypothalamiclimbic complexes and evolutionary history.
feel so differently?
to explain why

Why do people think and

The story that Wilson tells does not allow us

storytellers tell such different stories.

If we examine the works of Wilson himself over time, we dis
cover that he too tells different stories in different books and
articles.

There are a great many contradictory elements in his

published works.

As has been similarly claimed about Marx, there

seems to be a young Wilson and a mature Wilson and their two systems
often don't agree with each other.

If Wilson's Sociobiology: The New

Synthesis quickly became the bible of sociobiology, it has, since its
publication, been subjected to a great deal of contradictory exegesis
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by its own author.
He argues in Sociobiology that one should look at genetic
variation between cultures as a possible determinant of societal
differences.

Wilson (1975) further states that

although the genes have given .away most of their sover
eignty, they maintain a certain amount of influence in
at least the behavioral qualities that underlie varia
tions between cultures. Even a small portion of this
variance invested in population differences might pre
dispose societies toward cultural differences. In short
there is a need for a discipline of anthropological gen
etics. (p. 550)
In an article on the genetic foundation of human behavior,
Wilson (1980) considers three possible sociobiological alterna
tives.

One suggestion is that "natural selection exhausted the gen

etic variability of the species affecting social behavior.

"In

addition, the brain has been freed from these genes in the sense that
all outcomes are determined by culture" (p. 296).

A second possibi

lity, according to Wilson, is that "genetic variability has been
exhausted, but the resulting uniform genotype predisposes psycholog
ical development toward certain outcomes as opposed to others,
species-specific human traits exist" (p. 296).
Wilson (1980), however, believes "that the evidence appears to
lean heavily in favor" of the third possibility:

"Genetic variability

still exists and at least some human behavioral traits have a genetic
foundation" (p. 296).

In addition, "the evidence of genetic variation

affecting social behavior is also strong" (p. 299).

Sociobiologists,

according to this perspective, should be engaged in the cross-cultural
determination of genetic variability and the differences in social
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behavior which they ultimately cause.
(1977) crosses the horizon.

The shadow of Arthur Jensen

Those who wish to explore sociobio

logical themes need to practice the anthropological genetics Wilson
proposes in Sociobiology.
On the other hand, in On Human Nature, which was written at
approximately the same time as the paper on genetic variations,
Wilson (1978) makes exactly the opposite claim: "Human social evolu
tion is obviously more cultural than genetic.

The sociobiological

hypothesis does not therefore account for differences among socie
ties. but it can explain why human beings differ from other mammals"
(p. 160, emphasis added).

In another quote from the same volume

Wilson explicitly denies the logic behind his earlier admonition to
explore genetic variability:
Although genetic evolution of some kind continued during
this later, historical sprint [the last 10,000 years], it
cannot have fashioned more than a tiny fraction of the
traits of human nature. Otherwise surviving huntergatherer people would differ genetically to a significant
degree from people in advanced industrial nations, but this
is demonstrably not the case. (p. 35).
From this alternative and contrasting orientation, it seems
obvious that sociobiologists should engage in explorations of what
anthropologists at one time called the "psychic unity of mankind"
(Harris, 1968, p. 15).

One should look for species commonalities and

interspecies differences. From this point of view, sociobiologists
are attempting to develop in an empirical fashion what has been
termed philosophical anthropology or general, taken-for-granted
assumptions concerning human beings as a species (Honneth & Joas,
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1988).

One looks for cross-cultural similarities, not genetic

variation.

This is the orientation taken by Melvin Konner in The

Tangled Wing (1982), which is quite possibly the most comprehensive
discussion available of the biological foundations of species
commonalities.
In their recently published volume Interactions: The Biological
Context of Human Social Systems. Niles Eldredge and Marjorie Grene
(1992) specifically propose a "schema for a philosophical anthro
pology" (pp. 184-201).

They argue, for example, that human social

ity is structured by mediated immediacy.

Humans learn to perceive

everything "through the mediation of linguistic and other cultural
devices" (p. 185).

They quote with approval Rousseau who argued that

we need each other "to shape a place for ourselves within a nature
that would defeat each of us alone" (pp. 184-185).

Human culture,

according to the coauthor of punctuated equilibria theory, requires a
different level of analysis than Wilson's reductionism allows.
and culture are not biological epiphenomena.

Mind

Obviously cultures

change and intellectual history is not somehow frozen in time.

On

the other hand, we all--simply by being members of the same species-share many similar problems and needs.
It makes a great deal of difference whether a sociobiologist is
looking for genetic variation or species commonalities.
human characteristics do vary cross-culturally.

A number of

Skin pigmentation,

blood groups, and lactose tolerance are well-known examples (Sutton &
Wagner, 1985, pp. 398-411).

According to Sutton and Wagner, the
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percentage of Thais who are lactase-positive is only 3% of the
population.

For Sweden, the figure is 97%.

Clearly the ability to

absorb the nutrients in milk varies by culture and geographical area
(Weiss & Mann, 1981, pp. 475-477).

On the other hand, these examples

are well-known in part simply because they are so well-documented and
so unusual.

As Wilson (1978) himself states, it is demonstrably not

the case that contemporary hunter-gatherers "differ genetically to a
significant degree from people in advanced industrial nations" (p.
35).

He observes that "I do not for a moment ascribe the relative

performances of modem societies to genetic differences" (p. 82).
While Wilson then adds that "there is a limit beyond which biolog
ical evolution will begin to pull cultural evolution back to itself"
(p. 82), this is a completely different issue. The failure of soc
iologists to distinguish between these two fundamentally

different

themes has contributed to the a priori rejection of sociobiology by
much of sociology.

Wilson has greatly added to the confusion by

presenting two completely distinct theoretical positions as the es
sence of his discipline.

Concentrating on species commonalities

may lead to a conservative delineation of limits to change.
have seen, this is one of the positions taken by Wilson.
clear that whatever limits obtain are universal.

As we

But it is

Sociobiologists,

for example, have placed much importance on the research carried out
on Israeli kibbutzim which suggests that infants who grow up in
close physical proximity generally develop a sexual aversion towards
each other.

This has important consequences for what is viewed by
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sociobiologists as the universal incest taboo.

While this re

search has been subject to criticism (Kitcher, 1985), the important
theoretical point is that sociobiologists, in this case, are propos
ing a process and theory of socialization which would apply in any
culture which practices it.

While the kibbutz may serve as a natural

experiment, it is not being proposed that Israelis somehow differ
genetically from other people.
The failure to understand this distinction, along with Wilson's
tendency to advocate various and contradictory positions, has helped
to contribute to the vehemence with which he has been attacked.
Richard Lemer and the group Science for the People have pointed to
what they see as similarities between Wilson's work and Nazism (Alper
et al., 1978; Chasin, 1977; Lemer, 1992).
empirical, cross-cultural analysis of human

By concentrating on an
commonalities, however,

Wilson can legitimately claim that his sociobiology is completely
contrary to the Nazi classification of racial differences.

In later

chapters we will extend his search for common or cross-cultural human
needs and environments.

At this point I only wish to note the dis

tinctions in logic and analysis which are implied by looking for any
possible differences or any possible commonalities between and across
cultures.
By attempting to force the data into the taken-for-granted
assumption of genetic differences, one may wind up with the pop
sociobiological absurdities of University of Western Ontario psy
chologist J. Philippe Rushton who argues--incredibly--that blacks
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and whites in the United States practice different reproductive
strategies based on the common Darwinian distinction between "r"
and "K" reproductive strategies (Rushton, 1987, 1988a, 1988b).

An

"r" strategy produces the maximum number of infants with the mini
mum amount of parental care and involvement.
opposite.

A "K" strategy is the

Rushton (1987) seems to actually believe that "Mongoloids

are more K-selected than Caucasoids, who in turn are more K-selected
than Negroids" (p. 1020).

That is, differences in numbers of child

ren between races are due to differences in racial chromosomes.
There is, unfortunately, not "a shred of direct scientific evidence"
that different people have different genes which "make them more or
less K-like" (Lemer, 1992, pp. 141-142).
out, it is also true, of course,

As Richard Lemer points

that "r" and "K" reproduction

strategies are used by biologists to distinguish species, not groups
within the same species.

To the extent that Wilson looks at common

species characteristics, it is unfair and inaccurate to condemn his
narratives in the same fashion as a story which contains the crudi
ties and absurdities of Rushton.

This is especially true of his more

recent writings on biodiversity (Wilson, 1992).
As I have previously suggested, the ambiguities in Wilson's own
writing are partly responsible for the criticism he has received.

In

a discussion of the sociobiology controversy in 1983, for example,
Lumsden and Wilson (1983) make an incredibly damaging, self-critical
statement.

It now appears that most of Sociobiology was fundamentally

mistaken,
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but this way of describing human life [as presented in
Sociobiology1, the critics insisted, remains grossly
inadequate. Human beings are not automata that perform
simply according to the instructions of their genes.
They have minds and free will. They can perceive and
reflect upon the consequences of their actions. This
high level of human mental activity creates culture,
which has achieved a life of its own beyond the ordinary
limits of biology. The principal habitat of the human
mind is the very culture that it creates. Consequently,
individual cultures diverge in their evolution and they
vary enormously from one society to the next in ways that
cannot be explained by traditional reductionistic biolo
gical analysis. The questions of importance in the social
sciences--of mind, self, culture, and history--are beyond
the reach of sociobiology as that subject matter was orig
inally formulated.
These criticisms of human sociobiology, also forcefully
argued by Science for the People, were largely correct (!).
They came to be fully appreciated even by those most opti
mistic about the prospects of the new discipline [i.e.,
Edward Wilson], (p. 45, emphasis added).
It as if Mortimer Adler suddenly admitted that Nietzsche had
been right all along, but not to worry. His own philosophical system
is still intact.
self-deprecation.

One hardly knows what to make of this kind of total
One could hardly expect more from Alfred Schutz or

Erving Goffman or the authors of The Social Construction of Reality
(Berger & Luckmann, 1966).

It is clearly effective as a debating

technique and rhetorical strategy.
are saying/have said/mean/did mean.

Of course I understand what you
Of course I am taking your

arguments into account.12 Now, let's go on from here.
nothing has really changed.

And of course

To some extent, I think it is fair to

say Wilson has followed this approach.

It is a kind of tolerant,

ecumenical acceptance of all criticism followed by a failure to take
it into account in any significant fashion.

The stories Wilson tells
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after 1983 do not seem to indicate a conversion experience.

Edward

Wilson has not suddenly embraced Herbert Blumer.
For example, an article written by Wilson and Michael Ruse in
1986 argues that "biology shows that internal moral principles do
exist.

They are immanent in the unique programmes of the brain

that originated during evolution" (p. 174).

Furthermore, "human

thinking is under the influence of ’epigenetic rules', genetically
based processes of development that predispose the individual to
adopt one or a few forms of behaviors as opposed to others" (p. 180).
This sounds suspiciously like the definition of mind as a neuronal
epiphenomenon of the hypothalamic-limbic complex--Wilson's original
position in 1975.

The largely correct strictures of Science for the

People are forgotten.

The reductionism which was evident to critics

of Sociobiology is once again prominent.

Perhaps the subtle nuances

of Wilson's self-criticism in 1983 have themselves become victims of
a tough-minded process of natural selection operating within the
sociobiological community.

(See Endnote 11).

On the other hand, it is clear that Wilson was never the Naziinspired ogre envisioned by Science for the People.

As I have tried

to make clear, the relationships between political positions and
scientific positions are extremely complex and flexible.

Once Wilson

began to espouse the commonalities of humankind, his position was
inso facto contrary to the "Social Darwinist" fantasies of the early
eugenicists (Degler, 1991, pp. 32-83; Hofstadter, 1959, pp. 170-200).
In his recent work The Diversity of Life (1992), Wilson makes his
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liberal politics absolutely clear.

He is very strongly in favor of

"an environmental ethic which would protect biodiversity at all
costs.

If this ethic requires the strong hand of protective law"

and governmental regulation.

Wilson (1992) argues that this "is the

government's moral responsibility" (p. 342).

He suggests that the

"stewardship of environment" is an issue "where all reflective per
sons can surely find common ground" (p. 351).

Environmental des

truction would eliminate "still undeveloped medicines, crops,
pharmaceuticals, timber, fibers, pulp, soil-restoring vegetation"
as well as untold medical products (p. 347).

Wilson believes that

only "an enduring environmental ethic" will preserve "access to the
world in which the human spirit was bom" (p. 351).
As we have seen, Wilson (1978) places great stress on religion
calling it "the most complex and ineradicable part of human nature"
(p. 176).

The problem is that Wilson's conception of religion is

simplistic in the extreme.

As Mary Midgley (1985) observes in Evo

lution as a Religion. "Wilson seldom mentions any manifestation of
religion which is not openly crude and contemptible" (p. 113).
Religion is, above all, "the process by which individuals are per
suaded to subordinate their immediate self-interest to the interests
of the group" (Wilson, 1978, p. 183).

If society is viewed ontolo-

gically as merely the struggle of all against all--survival of the
fittest--than any reference to the group per se is illegitimate and
illusory.

The individualistic, taken-for-granted assumption is that

there is always and inevitably a necessary conflict between society--
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which liberal nominalism regards as a dubious level of analysis to
begin with--and the individual.

But what then becomes of Wilson's

environmental ethic and his acceptance of institutional means to en
force its acceptance?

In this situation he assumes no conflict

exists between what is good for the individual and what is essential
for societal survival.

In the case of environmental ethics the

individual and social levels of analysis require and complement
each other.

Surely the same is true of much religious activity.

Wilson ignores entire aspects of religious experience with his
simplistic scientific materialism.

In a very real sense much of

Liberation Theology is fundamentally concerned with an environmental
ethic (Berryman, 1987).

Liberation Theology in Latin America sees no

necessary conflict between the real interests of individuals, social
development, and critical education (Garcia, 1987).

Religion does

not presuppose, as Wilson seems to believe, scientific obscurantism
and political tyranny.

By denying the complex elements of religious

experience, Wilson eliminates one potential source of support for the
environmental ethic he wants to implement.
In an important article entitled Rival Fatalisms: The Hollowness
of the Sociobiologv Debate. Mary Midgley (1980) has analyzed the reductionism evident in Wilson's religious discussion.

She compares

him to "those sage characters, who in the French Revolution enthroned
the Goddess of Reason on the alter of Notre Dame and expected the
populace to worship her" (p. 24).

Wilson (1978) believes that if

"religion can be systematically analyzed and explained" its influence
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as a source of morality "will be gone forever" (p. 208).

Explaining

religion, however, is qualitatively distinct from experiencing it.
Jumping in the water is not the same thing is knowing how and why we
are able to swim (i.e., the evolutionary history of swimming).
Wilson's analysis of religion suffers from an inability to distin
guish between mysticism and microscopes.

Religion and science are

not in all ways commensurable--as Wilson's scientific materialism
appears to assume.
By propagating a radically individualistic, genetic narrative,
Wilson constructs a vision of humans as self-sufficient monads each
pursuing his or her own rational self-interest by as much genetic
duplication as possible.

There is not, as Darwin (1859/1984) stated

of his own work in the famous conclusion of On the Origin of Species,
a "grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers" (p. 228).
There is only a reductionistic "Scientific Materialism" which ex
cludes all consideration of significant elements of human experience.
Wilson's world is cold, hard, and devoid of human meaning and pur
pose.13 It is not a place for developing human connections with each
other or with other species.

There is no sense of wonder.

It is the

solipsistic universe of the selfish gene.
By way of contrast, a much different image of the natural world
and

its significance for human beings is provided in the writings of

anthropologist and naturalist Loren Eiseley (1959).

In such works as

How Flowers Changed the World (pp. 61-77) or The Night Country (1971)
Eiseley convincingly demonstrates that poetry, religion, and science
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can peacefully and powerfully coexist.

Consider the world he (1971)

describes in The Mind as Nature:
Directly stated, the evolution of the entire universe-stars, elements, life, man--is a process of drawing some
thing out of nothing, out of the utter void of nohbeing.
The creative element in the mind of man--that latency
which can conceive gods, carve statues, moves the heart
with symbols of great poetry or devise the formulas of
modern physics--emerges in as mysterious a fashion as
those elementary particles which leap into momentary exist
ence in great cyclotrons, only to vanish again like infin
itesimal ghosts. The reality we know in our limited life
times is dwarfed by the unseen potential of the abyss where
science stops, (pp. 214-215)
If Wilson in Sociobiology is a kind of biological reincarnation
of Francis Bacon, Eiseley represents Thoreau living in Walden and
overcome by a sense of wonder and human possibility.14 To Eiseley
much of nature is mysterious, profound, and impossible to adequately
understand by scientific methods alone.

There is, however, no neces

sary conflict between the various kinds of analyses.

Wilson (1978)

states that he considers the scientific ethos "superior to religion"
(p. 208).

Eiseley, I believe, would say that neither is superior to

the other because they have different purposes and serve different
functions.

At times, if we are lucky, they combine and provide the

fortunate onlooker with a synergistic

understanding and appreciation

of his or her own natural and social universe.

Eiseley reminds one

of the Darwin who took eight years to write a book on barnacles
(Darwin, 1876/1969, p. 117).

In many respects, time

are, for Eiseley, unimportant considerations.

or efficiency

One suspects that Wil

son would not wait too long before he dissected his first barnacle.15
From the biocritical perspective on human needs which I develop
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in this dissertation, the major shortcoming of Wilson's Sociobiology
concerns the kinds of evolutionary narratives he relates and the gaps
or aporias they contain.

Wilson's narratives tend to conflate proxi

mate and ultimate evolutionary processes in an unwarranted reduction
of the complexities of human motivations and actions.

As William

Allman (1994) has observed:
Human beings love their children because those ancestors
who loved their children had more surviving children, and
we're descended from them and not the others who didn't
love their kids. So in the grand evolutionary biological
sense, we love our kids because of genes. But in the real
sense of Why do vou love vour kids? you love them because
it is part of your human nature that evolved as part of our
ancestors' brain mechanisms. There is nothing in those brain
mechanisms that says That kid has vour genes, and so vou
should love him. (p. 49, emphasis in original).
A great deal of sociobiological narratives seem unrealistic and
even absurd because they fail to make the kinds of distinctions Allman suggests are essential.

It is not necessary, in other words, to

reduce religion to a kind of crude materialistic epiphenomenon.

Be

cause proximate factors are operative, one is not required to assume
that men and women should necessarily be more sexually attracted to
wards those people who can increase their genetic progeny.

The sex

ual attraction is the same no matter what the maximization principle
implies.

Wilson's reductionism is similar to early varieties of

sociological functionalism, but he comes at the data from the oppo
site direction.

Functionalists tended to assume that the current

purpose or function of social behavior necessarily explained some
thing about its origin.

Wilson's narratives read as if he believes

that the ultimate causes of evolutionary development explain
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proximate human motivations.

Both positions are fundamentally

reduction-istic and mistaken.

They confound explanations of

evolutionary history with the proximate mechanisms which are the
result of that history.
An alternative to the unnecessary reductionism evident in
Wilson is provided in the writings of Robert Richards.

Richards is

the foremost exponent in the United States of what has been termed
evolutionary ethics.

Perhaps his writings extend the reductionistic

natural theology (Kaye, 1986) of Wilson in a productive fashion.

If

so, Richards' importance for sociology and the development of a
biocritical perspective could be considerable and is worth examining
at length.

In the following chapter we will critically examine his

Revised Version of evolutionary theory and its relationshp to pre
vious work on evolutionary ethics.
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CHAPTER IV
EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS: THE NATURALISTIC FALLACY
AND THE REVISED THEORY OF ROBERT RICHARDS
Introduction
Sociological discussions of facts and values need to take into
account the work which has been done in the field of evolutionary
ethics on the naturalistic fallacy.

Previous work done in the field

of evolutionary ethics has suggested that the debate over values in
social science is unnecessary and, in fact, has been resolved.

In

this chapter I will examine the validity of this position by looking
at the evolutionary ethics of philosopher and historian of science
Robert Richards.

Richards' sophisticated philosophical analysis

avoids many of the simplistic assumptions of sociobiologists such as
Wilson, although his analysis also begins with our evolutionary past
Richards' work presents an excellent opportunity for sociologists to
examine the •possibility of an evolutionary ethics.

If he has indeed

overcome the fact/value dualism, he deserves the widest possible
audience.
One of the fundamental distinctions evident in the history of
philosophy is the differentiation between a phrase that is prescrip
tive and a phrase that is descriptive: One cannot legitimately ob
tain an ought from an is.

Max Weber (1919/1946) introduced the same

distinction into sociological discourse with his description of
95
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"science as a vocation" (pp. 129-156).

As Weber argued, "To take a

practical political stand is one thing, and to analyze political
structures and party positions is another" (p. 145).
This presumably inviolable barrier was first described by David
Hume in 1739:
In every system of morality which I have hitherto met with,
I have always remarked that the author proceeds in the or
dinary way of reasoning when all of a sudden I am surprised
to find that instead of the usual propositions is and is not.
I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an
ought and an ought not. This change is imperceptible, but
is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought or
ought not expresses some new relation or affirmation, it is
necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at
the same time that a reason should be given for what seems
altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a de
duction from others which are entirely different from it
(Treatise III.i.1, emphasis in original).
This is the philosophical reasoning behind the commonplace
sociological observation that science is objective but values are
inherently subjective.

The attempt to derive facts from values is

believed to always involve Hume's "naturalistic fallacy" (Midgley,
1978, pp. 177-200).

We might, for example, agree on how a particular

social problem is described (i.e., the number of homeless), but this
tells us nothing about what to do about any specific situation.
There is a fundamental difference--a deduction from others which are
entirely different from it--between a prescriptive and a descriptive
sentence. (Moore, 1903).

In more formal philosophical language, a

prescriptive statement must always include a value premise.

When

this appears not to be the case, it is merely an illegitimately
taken-for-granted and unexpressed assumption.
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A number of prominent scientists have argued that the Cart
esian split between the is and the ought may be overcome by the use
of evolutionary explanations and theory: an evolutionary ethics is
available which bridges the gap identified by Hume.

If true, this

has major implications for sociological theory and analysis because
the generally accepted sociological distinction between the subject
ive and the objective is rendered moot.

Sociologists no longer need

concern themselves with the question of values in social science
(Bernstein, 1976; Friedrichs, 1970; Myrdal, 1969).
are intrinsic to the evolutionary process.

Particular values

From this perspective,

the proper factual description includes the values which are an im
manent result of our evolutionary history.
In On Human Nature, for example, Edward Wilson (1978) argues
that "a correct application of evolutionary theory also favors diver
sity in the gene pool as a cardinal value" (p. 205).

He suggests

that "universal human rights might properly be regarded as a primary
value" (p. 206).

As we have seen in the previous chapter, Wilson is

very much interested in religion and he strongly "believes that
sociobiology has ethical and religious implications" (pp. 176-217).
But does Wilson's elaboration of evolutionary ethics actually over
come Hume's objections?
It is clear that in the above quotations Wilson is including
implicit and unspecified value criteria which therefore make possible
the transition from is to ought.

Diversity in the gene pool is only

a cardinal value as long as one assumes that is, in fact, the case.
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Such diversity is clearly a descriptive statement.

If one assumes

unchanging environmental conditions over extended periods of time,
it is evident that a lack of diversity would be the most efficient
adaptation.

Any new variations would be selected against.

In a

condition of environmental stasis, a viable response need not pre
suppose diversity.

Thus the value of such diversity in our own

situation is a value judgment as to its efficiency with respect to
Homo sapiens.
The statement on universal human rights is even more trans
parent, if also more muddled.

Wilson (1978) seems to believe that

because we are mammals and our societies are based on the mammalian
plan, we have a "mammalian imperative to promote universal human
rights.

Mammals promote the reproductive success of their kin and

try to enjoy the benefits of group membership" (p. 206).

Therefore,

humans "will accede to universal rights because power is too fluid
in advanced technological societies to circumvent this mammalian
imperative" (p. 206).

The best one can say at this point is that

Wilson's discussion is unintentionally incoherent.

Even if we as

sume the existence of the mammalian plan, it is easy to see what
value premise is being omitted:
Premise: Mammals share a biological imperative
the reproductive success of their kin and group
Conclusion: Humans should promote reproductive
and group living by emphasizing universal human
(p. 206)

promoting
living.
success
rights.

Accepting for the moment the proposed equating of sociality,
kin selection and human rights, it is still obvious that a value
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premise is lacking in Wilson's presentation.

He assumes that we

should follow our biological imperatives, or what David Barash calls
the whisperings within (1979).

We should, in other words, do what

our genetic inheritance prompts us to do.
in other words, is the following:

The missing value premise,

Second Premise: Humans ought to do

what their evolutionary history predisposes them to do.
It is the Second Premise which supplies the ought which makes
the transition possible between the is and the ought in Wilson's
argument.

Much of sociobiology makes similar kinds of assumptions,

but without

specific and explicit theories of human needs, it is

unclear why we should pay attention to our genetic inheritance.

As

Peter Singer has remarked, "reasoning beings are not bound to do what
makes evolutionary sense" (Singer, 1981, p.81).

We need additional

criteria which provide reasons for following the proposed dictates of
Wilson's sociobiology.

One might make the further assumption that

evolutionary history and genetic inheritance have given us specific
needs as a species.

Surprisingly, much of sociobiology ignores the

concept of needs and assumes that biological equals desirable equals
socially worthwhile.

Many sociobiologists do not see the necessity

of making the kinds of distinctions made by Hume.

The fact/value

problem supposedly disappears in a plethora of Biological Impera
tives .
Robert Richards' contemporary attempt to develop an evolu
tionary ethics has had many historical antecedents.

Herbert Spencer

(1820-1903) was a well-known sociological proponent of the
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evolutionary perspective.

While Spencer has faded from contemporary

view, his writings provide clear examples of the strengths and
weaknesses of the evolutionary approach.

Richards (1987) goes so

far as to suggest that "Spencer developed a kind of evolutionary
Kantianism which solved the ongoing arguments between empiricists
such as Locke and the disciples of Kant" (pp. 285-286).

Spencer,

according to Richards, showed that "the structures of thought and
perception in each individual were a priori and necessary, but
[they were] the evolved consequences of the inheritance of acquired
mental habits" (p. 286).

We each develop with similar structures of

thought (i.e., Kant's a priori) but those structures are a result of
evolutionary history and do not represent an unchanging transcend
ental consciousness.

As Richards notes, other than the discredited

Lamarckian or acquired theory of inheritance, "we now regard this
conclusion as essentially correct" (p. 286).

He argues that "Spencer

deserves at least honorable mention for the Newton prize" for inte
grating the social sciences in the same fashion as Newton did for
physics (p. 287).

From the point of view of the biocritical per

spective I will develop in Chapter V, one of the advantages of
Spencer's analysis was his view of humankind as fundamentally similar
in species characteristics and evolutionary history.
Unfortunately Spencer's work also exemplifies many of the
shortcomings characteristic of contemporary sociobiologists with
respect to the naturalistic fallacy.

He saw evolution as necessarily

progressive (Timascheff, 1957, pp. 33-33).

He visualized change as
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"a long-run movement toward increased social harmony and human
happiness" (Ashley & Orenstein, 1990, p. 154).

Spencer, not Darwin,

coined the phrase "survival of the fittest" and believed that "the
fittest societies survive, thereby leading to an adaptive upgrading
of the world as a whole" (Ritzer, 1983, p. 27).

Movement from

homogeneity to heterogeneity resulted in a universal law of pro
gress which, like religious theodicies, enabled Spencer to see "good
ness even in the face of the most brutal facts" (Oates, 1988, p.
447).

As Ashley and Orenstein (1990) note, "Evolutionary -progress

was not an outcome of his sociology: it was a fundamental assumption
on which his sociology was constructed" (pp. 167-168, emphasis in
original).
If progress is inherent in evolutionary development, it seemed
self-evident to Spencer that an accurate formulation of human evolu
tion implied positive evaluations.

As long as one viewed progress

as positive or good, one only needed to let nature run its course.
We will, in other words, naturally evolve towards an optimal state.
All that is necessary is to let things alone. This, of course, is
the justification of Spencer's infamous laissez faire Social Dar
winism.

Beyond an absolute minimum of social regulation, "all

governmental regulations harmed society" (Ashley & Orenstein, 1990,
p. 168).

They unnaturally interfered with a socially progressive

and benevolent evolutionary process.
to social evolution.
should be.

The proper mores are intrinsic

By merely describing what is we imply what

All we need to do is not interfere with natural social
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dynamics.
Unfortunately for Spencer, a number of his contemporaries
pointed out various problems with his use of the term natural which
are still relevant to contemporary discussions of evolutionary
ethics.

One of the most famous was Thomas Huxley (1894/1993) who

argued that the cosmic process was exactly the opposite of what
Spencer claimed.

He saw ethical progress as depending on "restraints

upon the struggle for existence between men [sic] and society"
(p. 44).

Ethical progress, according to Huxley, "repudiates the

gladiatorial theory of existence" (p. 67).

It is precisely our

opposition to the natural which, according to Huxley, propels what
ever progress is discemable in human evolution.

As Huxley pointed

out, "the thief and the murderer follow nature just as much as the
philanthropist” (p. 66).

How do we determine which is more natural?

Huxley justifiably critiques Spencer's evolutionary utopianism for
assuming a Panglossian conception and evaluation of the evolutionary
process. This is still a problem for any naturalistic ethics, as we
shall see in our analysis of Richards.

Natural disasters, disease,

plague, cruelty and murder are seemingly as natural as progressive
evolutionary trends.

Whether or not events are given a positive

designation depends on a selective and prior evaluation of particular
events.

A value premise is always present.

For Huxley, although he

used different terminology, the naturalistic fallacy is clearly
operative in all positive conceptions of human evolution.

Any

naturalistic ethics needs to confront this fundamental criticism.
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A number of authors have argued that Huxley's arguments can
be adequately answered.

One of the most famous proponents of an

alternative approach was Huxley's own grandson, Julian Huxley.

He

developed a theoretical perspective he termed "evolutionary human
ism which demonstrated, he believed, the immanent values fundamental
to human evolution" (Huxley, 1957, pp. 181-212).

It seems clear,

however, from such works as Religion Without Revelation (1957) that
Julian Huxley's work exhibits the same mingling of evaluation and
description as does Spencer's.

Unless one accepts the taken-for-

granted assumptions and evaluations presumed by Huxley, his des
cription of evolution is literally non-sense.
man is the highest form of life.

Huxley argues that

He further suggests that

The past history of biological evolution gives us a cer
tain further guidance. We can justifiably extrapolate
some of the main trends of progress into the future, and
conclude that man should aim at a continued increase of
those qualities which have spelt progress in the biolog
ical past--efficiency and control of the environment
wholeness and harmony of working storage of experience,
degree of mental organization, (p. 193, emphasis added).
We see in Huxley's remarks a specific example of the shift from
is to ought which Hume criticizes.

It seems obvious that what Huxley

regards as guidance and progress depend on prior evaluative concep
tions of human happiness or morality.

In this respect, his grand

father's criticisms of Spencer's position are more justified and
coherent than his own writings and evaluations16.
A more sophisticated attempt to present a naturalistic ethics
is presented in the work of Mary Midgley (1978, 1984, 1993).

In

Beast and Man: The Roots of Human Nature (1978) she directly
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confronts the criticism of Thomas Huxley and others that there is a
basic distinction between the natural and whatever we evaluate as
good.

Midgley (1978) argues that what is seen as natural is "never

just a condition or activity, but a certain level of that condition
or activity, proportionate to the rest of one's life" (p. 79, empha
sis in original).

She believes, in other words, that certain

combinations of activity are essential to what should be viewed as
natural and that not every activity which occurs is natural in her
terms.
Midgley (1978) suggests that we may discuss what is natural in
a weak sense and in a strong sense.

Using this terminology, cruelty

is "natural in a weak sense simply because it occurs" (p. 79).

She

claims that in a strong sense it is unnatural because, quoting Bishop
Joseph Butler, the eighteenth-century English theologian, it is
"contrary to the whole constitution of that nature" (p. 79).

Certain

actions, as Plato and Aristotle believed, are more rewarding and
natural than others for all human beings as integrated beings, as a
result of their common evolutionary background and species char
acteristics.

Midgley (1993) argues that there is "some underlying

human nature--some structure indicating what kinds of things can be
good and bad for human beings" (p. 92, emphasis in original).
Particular actions are more likely to naturally lead to a satisfying
human existence which is "harmonious through time" (Midgley, 1984,
p. 186).

Certain activities are more likely than others to satisfy

human needs.
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Any transcultural theory of human needs assumes that Midgley's
argument is correct in this respect.

Midgley's position begins to

seriously address the criticisms of Huxley concerning a naturalistic
ethics.

As it stands, her distinction between a weak sense and a

strong sense of natural is not entirely convincing.

It is clear that

this distinction depends on certain prior philosophical and ethical
criteria as to what constitutes a balanced life.
an implied concept of human potential.

It also depends on

She assumes that we are cap

able of achieving more than we usually do but offers no criteria upon
which one might make a determination of lost potential.

How do we

compare different ways of achieving what is presumed to be natural?
How do we decide who is correct when conceptions of the natural dis
agree and conflict?

These are some of the questions we will examine

in the following chapter which discusses the concept of human needs.
While Midgley's analysis raises important questions for any
evolutionary ethics, she is unclear in certain areas which are of
special interest to Robert Richards.

Both Midgley and Richards be

lieve that we have no option but to reason from facts to values.

If

we ask "how should this institution be altered," according to Midgley
(1978), we have "no option but to reason from the facts about human
wants and needs”17 (p. 189).

Richards (1987) argues similarly that

all ethical systems require "empirical assumptions" (p. 615).
Richards, however, presents an explicit demonstration of how he be
lieves it is possible to move beyond the fact/value dichotomy.
Midgley does not.
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Before we look at Richards' specific arguments concerning the
naturalistic fallacy, let us look more closely at the idea that any
ethical theory requires empirical assumptions.

Even if there are

some distinctions to be made between facts and values, the elementary
distinction between these terms need to be conceptually unpacked and
elaborated.

More complexity is involved than is typically assumed by

sociological positivism (Alexander, 1982; Bryant, 1985).

Utilizing

an evolutionary or biosocial perspective influences social policy
decisions even if the traditional Cartesian split between facts and
values is assumed to be valid.
Consider the arguments over "eugenics that were common in the
United States during the early part of this century" (Degler, 1991,
pp. 32-55; Hofstadter, 1955, pp. 161-204).

It was assumed by many

at during that period that positive steps could be taken genetically
to promote racial fitness and that the reduction of undesirable gen
etic material was one useful approach.

Involuntary sterilization of

the genetically unfit began in Indiana, which in 1907 became the
first state to enact an involuntary sterilization law (Degler, 1991,
p. 45).

By the 1930s, "12,000 involuntary sterilizations had been

carried out in the U.S. on various definitions of misfits" (Degler,
1991, p. 46).

Irrespective of their many other faults, it was soon

clear to biologists that empirical facts demonstrated the absolute
futility of the sterilization programs.

Human beings were simply

not biologically constituted in the manner which the sterilization
laws assumed.

As W.D. Hudson (1969) has written, there is clearly a
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connection between evaluations and factual assumptions (p. 29).
The basic biological difficulty involved in all the steriliza
tion programs is that the carriers of the majority of harmful genetic
defects are heterozygous.

This means that the individual involved

carries at least two different alleles, or alternative forms of a
gene, in the same position.

Genetic deficiencies which result in

such conditions as cystic fibrosis, are autosomal (carried by
chromosomes other than sex chromosomes) homozygous recessive traits
(i.e., carried by both parents).

Thus in a familiar example, the

sickle-cell anemia trait only develops in children when it is passed
on by both parents (Sutton & Wagner, 1985, p. 321).

If the trait is

only inherited from one parent, the negative effects of the disease
are recessive (Cummings, 1991, pp. 378-380).
Given the elementary assumptions of population genetics, it is
possible to calculate the heterozygote frequency in a population
which is necessary in order to produce a particular homozygous fre
quency.

The frequency of heterozygous carriers required is much

greater than the corresponding homozygous population which manifests
observable phenotypic defects. For example sickle-cell anemia affects
approximately 1 in 500 black North Americans (Cummings, 1991,
p. 379).

In order for this frequency to occur, it requires a heter

ozygous frequency of 1 in 12.
Cummings (1991) gives a simple example with respect to albin
ism.

Assume that it has one chance in 10,000 of occurring.

Most

people might assume that the corresponding heterozygote frequency
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must also be quite low, but such is not the case.

If 1 in 10,000

people are homozygous for albinism, 1 in 50 people must be hetero
zygous to produce this result.

Why?

The chances that two homo

zygous persons will marry is 1/2500 (1/50 x 1/50).

Because they are

heterozygous, according to the basic assumptions of Mendelian gen
etics, the chance they will produce a homozygous recessive child is
1/4.

The chance that the marriage will produce an albino child is

therefore 1/2500 x 1/4 - 1/10,000.

For the trait to be present in

1/10,000 people, 1 in 50 must be heterozygous. Similar disparities
exist with other seemingly small percentages.

The corresponding

figure for a 1 in 20,000 chance of developing a recessive trait is
that 1 in 71 persons must be heterozygous for that trait (pp. 379380).
The empirical facts concerning genetic distribution can now be
seen as having a major bearing on the question of sterilization
legislation.

It does no good, even accepting the aims of the legis

lation, to sterilize homozygous or recognizable carriers of a par
ticular trait because the vast majority of those responsible for
producing the phenotypic variations are heterozygous carriers.
There is no way to determine this population by visual inspection.
They appear entirely normal.

There is, in fact, nothing wrong with

them, except that in combination with a similar individual the re
sulting children may carry a genetic disorder.

Even if

involuntary

sterilizations had been performed on all visible carriers, it would
have had very little affect on the extent of inherited genetic
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Neil Tennant estimates that for many recessive traits

"sterilization of all homozygotes would only halve the frequency of
the recessive gene in 500 generations" (Tennant, 1983, p. 291, empha
sis added). The factual relationships in this case preclude by
definition the success of the attempted programs.

Facts have a bear

ing on ethical decisions.
Both Midgley and Richards assume that people need to justify
and give reasons for their ethical choices.

They both argue that the

assumptions one makes concerning human nature influence ethical
decisions.

When we think we are doing something praiseworthy, we are

necessarily assuming something about the particular situation or the
people that are influenced by our actions.

Sociologists are not, as

has been suggested by both Karl Mannheim (1936) and Karl Popper
(1963), a kind of unattached species of free-floating falsificationists.

As both Midgley and Richards make clear, our evolutionary

and biosocial history makes a difference. Richards believes that his
position bridges the gap between facts and values.
his

If that is true,

writings are of the utmost importance for sociologists.
Robert Richards' Evolutionary Ethics

Contrary to contemporary specialization in academia, Dr. Robert
Richards is professor of history, philosophy, and behavioral science
at the University of Chicago.

He is also chairman of the Committee

on the Conceptual Foundations of Science and director of the Program
in History, Philosophy, and Social Studies of Science and Medicine
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(Callebaut, 1993, p. 435; Richards, 1987).

In 1988 he received the

Pfizer Prize given by the History of Science Society for Darwin and
the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior (1987).
The award honors the outstanding book in the history of science dur
ing the preceding three years (Callebaut, 1993, p. 435).

This work

also contains Richards' most extensive treatment of evolutionary
ethics (Richards, 1987, pp. 595-627).
Richards describes his own approach as "a kind of meta-ethical
perspective meant to deal with certain problems in the conceptions of
ethics, namely problems related to the naturalistic fallacy"
(Richards, quoted in Callebaut, 1993, p. 439).

As will become evi

dent, Richards vehemently disagrees with Hume's depiction of an
unbridgeable fact/value dichotomy.

At the same time, he believes

that evolutionary biology is inevitably concerned with the kinds of
philosophical problems which have been the subject of much historical
debate.

He argues that evolutionary biology is intrinsically

historical:
The practitioners of contemporary evolutionary theory
have--perhaps because of the nature of their own science-become terribly interested in both conceptual philosophical
problems and historical problems. One only has to mention
people like Steve Gould, Richard Lewontin, and Ernst Mayr to
recognize that philosophical and historical considerations
inform the development of their own views. (p. 77)
According to Richards (quoted in Callebaut, 1993), evolutionary
biologists have a tendency to argue that they are promoting a Darwin
ian of point of view.

A work such as his prize-winning volume on

Darwin may at least help to clarify this particular issue.
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This [appeal to a patron saint such as Darwin] goes on all
the time in science in one fashion or another. It is a
little more obvious, I think, in evolutionary biology.
And by the opponents there are attempts to undercut that
authority by suggesting that someone advancing a so-called
Darwinian view would, if he were thinking correctly about
the problem, discover that it is not Darwin at all whose
case he is moving, but someone like, perhaps, Ernst Haeckel.
In this way, historical considerations play a large role in
the kinds of disputes and their arbitration that go on in
evolutionary biology. That is one of the ways in which
historians can play--a rather modest--role in contemporary
discussions, if only as referees to point out when one side
is playing loose with the evidence.18 (p. 78)
While Richards has been appropriately honored for his contri
butions to a Darwinian dialogue,19 it is in his role as a philosopher
of science dealing with problems related to the naturalistic fallacy
which is of special concern to sociologists.

As philosopher William

Hughes (1986) has stated of Richards, "He has a much better under
standing of the logic that lies behind the naturalistic fallacy than
earlier evolutionary theorists, and his arguments therefore deserve
careful consideration" (p. 307).

If, as Richards argues, facts in

some sense imply particular values, than we should be able to simi
larly claim that objective situations suggest or imply particular
courses of action.

This is a conclusion which would be of consider

able interest to the positivistic tradition in sociology which "draws
an unbridgeable distinction between empirical facts and judgments of
value" (Rhoads, 1991, p. 37).
Despite all the critical, subjective or postmodernist theories
available in sociology today, I agree with John Rhoads' estimation
that the "positivist model influences profoundly" the way research is
formulated and conducted and that "it is so ingrained in sociological
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thinking that it is mostly taken for granted" (Rhoads, 1991, p. 37).
I suspect that most sociologists would agree with the following
description of the scientific method by sociobiologist Sarah Blaffer
Hrdy (1990):
In spite of its limitations, scientific inquiry as cur
rently practiced, with all of the drawbacks--including
reductionist models, underlying assumptions that have been
influenced by cultural context, domination of disciplines
by males, and so forth, all the things that gave us several
generations of male-biased primatology--science with all
these drawbacks is better than such unabashedly ideological
programs that have become advocated in certain religious as
well as in some feminist research programs (such as those
advocating conscious partiality--the notion that since we
can't help being biased, let's be biased in an ideologically
correct way). (p. 136)
In rejecting the unbridgeable gap between empirical observa
tions and value judgments, Richards is challenging the basic assump
tions of an often taken-for-granted scientific positivism.

If, as

he suggests, the "naturalistic fallacy is no fallacy, than perhaps
the stark dichotomies believed necessary by what Rhoads (1991) terms
social theory according to positivism" are avoidable (pp. 7-37).
Perhaps the black and white tones painted by the sociologist as
philosophical dualist will dissolve into stippled grays in the spaces
made possible by Richards’ conceptual moves.

The acceptance of what

Richards terms his Revised Theory would be the death knell for the
sociologist as a kind of long-suffering, frustrated positivist man
que.

If Richards is correct, the frustration was unnecessary because

the problem was nonexistent and framed in incorrect terms.
if one built a better telescope to look into the ocean.

It is as

The lens

will always be blurred no matter how precisely it was ground.
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Richards (1987) outlines his revised version of evolutionary
ethics in an Appendix to his study of Darwin (pp. 595-627), as well
as in shorter statements and comments on critics (Richards, 1986b,
pp. 337-354; 1988, pp. 149-168; 1989, pp. 331-343).

Richards

(1987) refers to his theory as a revised version because it "aug
ment's Darwin's and differs in certain respects from Edward Wil
son's" (p. 603).

His aim is "fundamentally logical and conceptual:

to demonstrate that an ethics based on presumed facts of biological
evolution can be justified by using those facts and the theory
articulating them" (p. 603).
Richards wants to develop a theory which is morally superior
to the contract altruism of Edward Wilson (e.g., relying exclusively
on kin selection and reciprocal altruism).

Richards (1987) argues

that "RV supposes that a moral sense has evolved in the human group"
(p. 603).

People have been "selected to provide for the welfare" of

our own family members, "aided perhaps by group selection on small
communities" (p. 603).

Richards asks us to accept his version of

evolutionary history as given.

Assuming its validity, what then

follows?
Contrary to the reductionism of Wilson in Sociobiologv (1975),
Richards (1987) realizes that people are "cultural animals whose
actions are interpreted according to the traditions established in
the history of particular groups" (1987, p. 604).

Richards, in other

words, does not reduce a cultural level of analysis to individual
istic psychology, as does Wilson in On Human Nature (1978).

Wilson
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(1978) assumes that "cultural change is the statistical product of
large numbers of human beings who cope as well as they can with
social existence" (p. 81).

Presumably one can, according to this

perspective, comprehend such things as the effects of Social Security
or a Declaration of War by looking at the statistical product of
individual psyches.

But as Marshall Sahlins (1976) has correctly

remarked, "the reasons why millions of Americans fought in World War
II would not account for the occurrence or the nature of that war"
(p. 8).

Individuals may have fought because they were scared, angry,

aggressive, patriotic, conformist, afraid of jail, hated Germans,
followed orders, etc.

The causal factors responsible for World War

II require emergent levels of analysis which are taken into account
in Richards' conceptual analysis.
Following Darwin, Richards (1987) argues that our evolutionary
history was responsible for the development of a moral sense in Homo
sapiens and that a human "is ineluctably a moral being" (p. 612).
This assumption is central to his examination of the naturalistic
fallacy and it is based on the similar analysis Darwin developed in
The Descent of Man (1871).
Contrary to the popular notion of an amoral winner-take-all
Social Darwinism, Darwin wrote in The Descent of Man that natural
selection was responsible for the origin of human moral systems.

He

argued "that any animal whatever endowed with well-marked social
instincts, would inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience, as
soon as its intellectual powers had become well-developed, or nearly
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as well developed as in man" (Darwin, 1871/1981, pp. 71-72).

He

"did not wish to maintain that they would acquire exactly the same
moral sense as ours, but an inward monitor would tell the animal that
it would have been better to have followed the one impulse rather
than the other" (p. 73).

In order to support this position, Darwin

posited a natural history of moral development.
Initially, social instincts will lead an individual "to take
pleasure in the society of its fellows" (Darwin, 1871/1981, p. 72).
People are naturally social and gregarious.

They "feel a certain

amount of sympathy" towards their conspecifics (p. 72).

According

to Darwin, and in line with current thinking about "kin selection and
reciprocal altruism" (Wilson, 1975, pp. 117-121), the social in
stincts are not extended to all other members of the same species,
but "only to those of the same association," (i.e., genetic relations
and everyday companions), (Darwin, 1871/1981, p. 72).

The signifi

cant point for Darwin, as well as for Richards, is that hominids very
early recognized the importance of others.
required other people.

Successful adaptations

The solitary Australopithecus afarensis was

an easy prey.
Secondly, according to Darwin (1871/1981), our mental powers
developed to the point where "images of past actions and motives
would be incessantly passing through the brain of each individual"
(p. 72).

We became gradually able to remember and analyze our

actions.

We slowly became aware of the conflict between "the endur

ing and always present social instinct" and other instincts of "short
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duration" such as hunger (p. 72).

In modem terminology, we might

say we often show "a lack of judgment" based on Darwin's instincts of
"short duration."

As a result, Darwin argued that a "feeling of

dissatisfaction, inevitably results" (p. 72).

We develop a guilty

conscience.
Thirdly, what Darwin (1871/1981) calls common opinion and the
power of language comes to express and represent "the wishes of mem
bers of the same community" (p. 72).

We gradually are able to ex

press our views to others and vice versa.

Public opinion gradually

strengthens the social instinct of every group member as each person
becomes increasingly aware of the interests of others and the judg
ment of the community" (p. 73).

As we experience life in groups and

grow in our ability to reflect on and understand our actions, we are
more likely to take the opinions of others into account.
Darwin (1871/1981) recognized, once again in agreement with
current sociobiological opinion, that we are more likely to be sym
pathetic to kin than to strangers and that we often help others with
the expectation of future assistance on their part (pp. 81-82).

He

writes that as our "reasoning powers improve, each man would soon
learn from experience that if he aided his fellow-men, he would be
aided in return" (p. 163).

Given his emphasis on social virtues

and the importance of "praise and the blame of our fellow-men" on
their continued development, Darwin was optimistic about long-range
projections of evolutionary trends (p. 164).

He remarks that "Look

ing to future generations, there is no cause to fear that the social
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instincts will grow weaker, and we may expect that virtuous habits
will grow stronger" (p. 104).
The ability to reason and reflect on behavior and the increas
ing importance of public opinion improved the likelihood of people
developing virtuous habits.

Contrary to popular images of a violent

Darwinian social conflagration, Darwin believed the overall trends
in his description of natural selection were in some sense progres
sive (Richards, 1988, pp. 129-148).

In this opinion, he is closer

to current ecological perspectives which stress the overall balance
of natural processes (Orr, 1992; Rolston, 1986, 1993), as opposed to
the random kill-or-be-killed images of Tennyson's nature red in tooth
and claw and its contemporary exponents (Williams, 1988).

According

to Darwin (1871/1981), "it is apparently a truer and more cheerful
view that progress has been much more general that retrogression” (p.
184).

After a close textual analysis and comparison of Spencer and

Darwin, Richards (1988) even suggests that "if we take Darwin whole,
we see that his view of progress in evolution does not differ ter
ribly from that of Spencer" (p. 146).20
Progress for Darwin is defined as improvement in general group
welfare.

He sharply distinguished his version of good from utili

tarian notions of happiness as a guiding moral principle (Richards,
1987, pp. 217-219).

Richards is likewise critical of utilitarianism

and argues that his evolutionary explanation is based on a nonconsequentionalist emphasis on the importance of motives.

He believes

that the human motive of altruism "has been established by community

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

118
or kin selection" (p. 609).

For an act to be moral it has to be

performed from an altruistic motive and the actor has to intend to
act from that motive.

Other species may engage in actions with

altruistic consequences, but they don't, according to Richards, do
so with altruistic intentions.
Richards (1987) asks us to assume, as did Darwin, that the
"criterion of morality" is the "general good" or the "welfare and
survival of the group" (p. 600). In accordance with Richards'
recognition of more complex levels of analysis, he states that the
general or community good must be "intelligently applied; choices
are not automatic but are subject to improvable reason" (p. 612).
While human beings are in part constituted by the process of making
value judgments--it's part of what we mean by being human--the spe
cific choices we make are always affected by differing cultural
realities.

We all necessarily make moral choices, but we base

them on differing criteria.

As Richards (1986) states, "the claim

that man is ineluctably a moral creature means by virtue of specific
evolutionary processes, he has the capacity for acting morally"
(p. 342, emphasis in original).

Richards proposes that we assume his

evolutionary Just-So story is valid.

Given that assumption, he be

lieves that his evolutionary ethics escapes the "usual form of the
naturalistic fallacy" (Richards, 1987, p. 612).
Richards first notes that one form of the "naturalistic fal
lacy" is to assume that whatever exists represents "the good."

Ernst

Haeckel, for example, believed in the racial superiority of the
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German Volk (Lemer, 1992, p. 38; Richards, 1987, p. 596).

The

German Volk was, by definition, the highest product of evolutionary
history.

All others could be compared to that standard and found

wanting.

Whatever is--in this case Germany--is right. Naturally,

many writers have objected to this kind of evolutionary ethics (Degler, 1991; Lemer, 1992).
Darwin's theory, however, and Richards' (1987) revised version
"does not specify a particular social arrangement as being best"
(p. 613).

It assumes, rather, that people will tend to "enhance the

community good but that what constitutes an ideal pattern will change
historically and cross-culturally" (p. 613).

Richards argues that

the process of making moral choices is a result of evolutionary his
tory, not our specific moral positions.

His revised version sanc

tions "acts that, on balance, appear to be conducive to the community
good, the criterion of morally approved behavior will remain con
stant, while the conception of what particular acts fall under the
criterion will continue to change" (p. 614).

Richards' theory does

not glorify any specific society or suggest the apotheosis of the
status quo.

He therefore claims that one form of the naturalistic

fallacy has been successfully overcome by his version of evolutionary
ethics.
"But doesn't," Richards (1987) asks, "RV derive ethical norms
from evolutionary facts in some way?

Unequivocally yes" (p. 614).

He claims, however, that "this involves no logically or morally
fallacious move" (p. 614).

All ethical theories, according to
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Richards, utilize empirical evidence in "framework assumptions and
internal assumptions" (p. 614).

Internal questions "concern the

logic of the moral principle and the terms of discourse of a parti
cular ethical system" (p. 614).

That is, if we assume the validity

of a certain moral system, how do we specifically determine what it
recommends as valid?

For example, assuming the concept of a just

war, how does the concept relate to a particular society at a parti
cular point in time?

In order to carry out the analysis, certain

empirical assumptions about the effects of military actions need to
be analyzed.

How do military actions impinge on human communities?

A sociologist might say one needs to operationalize the concept of a
just war.
Framework questions also require empirical evidence.

Every

ethical system makes ontological assumptions about human nature.
Even deontological systems such as Kant's "assume that people are
capable of understanding and following rules which are ultimately
based on empirical considerations" (Richards, 1987, p. 615).

It

does no good to explain the Categorical Imperative to, say, a platy
pus.

The fact that this example seems a nrima facie absurdity only

indicates how many empirical assumptions are taken for granted in
even the most rational systems of ethics.

If every system of ethics

uses empirical evidence, a critique of evolutionary ethics for doing
the same thing is unwarranted. Consequently, says Richards, "either
the naturalistic fallacy is no fallacy, or no ethical system can be
justified" (p. 620).

As Abraham Edel has argued, "our definitions of
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good and ought depend on information about the nature of human
beings" (Edel, 1955, p. 78).
According to Richards' (1987) evolutionary information, the
evolutionary process "has equipped human beings with a number of
social instincts such as the need to protect offspring, to provide
for the general well-being of members of the community (including
oneself) and other dispositions that constitute a moral creature"
(p. 620).

Richards wants us to grant him the supposition that RV

"correctly accounts for all relevant biological facts" (p. 620).
Given that assumption, Richards advances three Justifying Arguments
in which he presents his case for negating the arguments of Hume and
overcoming the fact/value dichotomy.
Richards bases his First Justifying Argument on Alan Gewirth's
discussion of inference rules (Gewirth, 1982).

An inference rule

permits "the assertion of the conclusion on the basis of the pre
mises" (Richards, 1987, p. 617).
(1982) gives the example:
thunder" (p. 108).

As a causal inference rule, Gewirth

"It is lightning, therefore it ought to

Richards (1987) puts this in the language of mod

ern logic: "From 'x causes y' infer 'since x, y ought to occur'"
(p. 621).

One can think of many similar examples such as "It is

snowing, therefore it ought to be cold" or "I am in Death Valley,
therefore it ought to be hot." According to Richards, this is one
way of deriving an ought from an is.
Richards' (1987) second justifying argument involves assuming
the inference rule that "from a particular sort of structured
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context, conclude that the activity appropriate to that context ought
to occur” (p. 623).

This is similar to Darwin's (1871/1981) comment

in The Descent of Man that "hounds ought to hunt, pointers to point,
and retrievers to retrieve their game" (p. 92).

Animals ought to do

what their evolutionary history predisposes them to do (i.e., point
ers to point). According to Richards, the same reasoning should
follow for human beings.

Homo sapiens are a particular species with

a unique evolutionary past.

Richards (1987) contends that

the evidence shows that evolution has, as a matter of fact,
constructed human beings to act for the community good; but
to act for the community good is what we mean by being moral.
Since, therefore, human beings are moral beings--an unavoid
able condition produced by evolution--each ought to act for
the community good. (pp. 623-624, emphasis in original)
If humans are constituted as moral, they should act "to promote
the community good" (Richards, 1987, p . 624).

In doing so, we are

only doing what in the ultimate, evolutionary sense is analogous to
the pointer learning to point.

Basing his argument on Darwin's

natural history of morality, Richards states that acting morally de
fines what it means to be human.
Altruism--acting for the community good--is part of the evolu
tionary dispositions which we naturally tend to follow.

This is what

allows Richards (1987) to argue that his theory avoids a total rela
tivism such as the "canonization of Hitler along with Saint Francis"
(p. 620).

If someone challenges his definition of altruism as a

moral act, Richards says the best he can do to justify his framework
assumptions is to ask the reader to "consult his or her own intui
tions and those commonly of the run of human beings" (p. 624).
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Richards agrees with the idea that "no system can validate its own
first principles but must move outside the system in order to avoid
tautological reasoning" (p. 617).

One can, nevertheless, rely on

"common sense moral judgments and intuitively clear cases" (p. 617).
Richards suggests that we can count on people "acquiescing in the
general moral principle of altruism" because "men [sic] are made
that way" (Richards, 1986b, p. 345).
Richards' (1987) third justifying argument shows that his re
vised version is warranted because it grounds other "key strategies
used to construct moral systems" (p. 626).
universalistic.

Most ethical systems are

Spencer, for example, believed that his notion of

"equal freedom should be acceptable to anyone as an intuitively valid
moral axiom" (Richards, 1986b, p. 312), but he provides no justifica
tion as to why we might expect ultimate agreement.

Richards believes

that RV "shows that the pith of every person's nature, the core by
which he or she is constituted a social and moral being, has been
created according to the same standard" (Richards, 1987, p. 627).
It is our common evolutionary history which is responsible for our
"capacity for acting morally" (Richards, 1986b, p. 342).

The fact

that we share common human capabilities is the result of our transcultural evolutionary history.

We share common species character

istics including the capacity for moral reasoning which Richards
sees as an intrinsic and exceptional characteristic of Homo sapiens-the differentia distinguishing humankind from all other species.
Richards' rejection of the naturalistic fallacy and his
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suggestion that evolutionary history presupposes certain moral values
has drawn considerable critical commentary (Cela-Conde, 1986; Ge
wirth, 1986; Hughes, 1986; Thomas, 1986; Trigg, 1986; Williams,
1990).

Alan Gewirth attacks Richards for not being specific enough

to differentiate what is morally right from what is morally wrong
(Gewirth, 1986, pp. 297-305).

If, as Richards admits, "aggressive

and murderous impulses are also a

result of the evolutionary pro

cess, how do we distinguish between those and the altruism which
Richards proposes?" (Gewirth, 1986, p. 301).

Evolution is being used

as a generic explanation for what are considered both moral and im
moral actions.

Evolution has resulted in individuals who act against

the community good.

How do we explain their actions?

According to

Gewirth, the only possibility is to utilize more rationalistic cri
teria and to recognize that "Both morality and rationality are norm
ative concepts: they involve not merely empirically factual or causal
relations but also considerations of rightness or validity" (Gewirth,
1986, pp. 304-305, emphasis in original).
Gewirth attacks Richards' solution of the naturalistic fallacy
from the standpoint of specificity.

Even if we could somehow deduce

certain moral considerations from evolutionary history, Gewirth ar
gues that Richards' reasoning provides no way to distinguish moral
from immoral actions and is therefore necessarily invalid.

Descrip

tions of evolutionary processes in themselves provide no criteria for
solving moral dilemmas.

He argues that "The independent operation of

human reason is indispensable for explaining and justifying the
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criteria and operations of morality” (Gewirth, 1986, p. 305).
Patricia Williams (1990) presents a
Richards on a number of levels.

forceful critique of

She points to logical problems with

Richards' claims concerning the naturalistic fallacy.

According to

Williams, if we examine Richards' claims as logical postulates, we
find the following progression.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

People evolved to have altruistic motives.
People evolved to believe altruistic motives
are real motives.
Altruistic motives are moral motives.
To act from moral motives is to act as people
ought.
People ought to act altruistically, (p. 452)

The inconsistency in Richards' argument, according to Williams
(1986), is premise (3). The claim that altruistic motives are moral
motives "says nothing about biology" (p. 452).

It is based on exter

nal rational or moral criteria which have no direct connection with
Richards' evolutionary history.

It is "imported illegitimately from

a non-biological source" (Williams, 1990, p. 453).

Without premise

(3), Richards, argument is reduced to "People ought to act altruis
tically if altruistic motives are moral motives" (Williams, 1990,
p. 453).

This statement is a conditional if-then kind of argument

and is not categorical in its implications: if altruistic actions
are moral, then we ought to act altruistically.

Williams criticizes

Richards for claiming more than this.
She also convincingly demonstrates that Richards' use of the
term ought, in his solution to the naturalistic fallacy, is ambiguous
and depends on a variety of definitional forms.

There is the ought
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of natural processes, which is a causal ought, as in Richards' exam
ple that thunder ought to follow lightning.

Following Gewirth

(1982), Williams also argues that there is a hypothetical ought in
the sense that if we commit ourselves to structured contexts, then
we ought to do what those contexts require.

If we are teaching in

a university, then we should prepare adequately for our classes.

If

we live in a democracy, then we sshould follow democratic procedures.
Clearly a causal ought and a hypothetical ought are two very differ
ent things.

Williams' argues that Richard's mistake is to confuse

the two meanings and assume that a causal statement is the same as a
hypothetical statement.

Such is not the case.

For this reason, says

Williams, as well as for a lack of specificity, Richards' solution of
the naturalistic fallacy is no solution at all.
Richards can also be challenged with respect to the empirical
assumptions he asks us to accept.

As Roger Trigg (1986) argues,

aspects of Richards' argument seem "remarkably optimistic" (p. 334).
It is by no means self-evident that "every person's nature must re
sound to the same moral cord: acting for the common good" (Richards,

1987, p. 627).

Much of modern biological theory has reached exactly

opposite conclusions (Dawkins, 1989; Ruse, 1988, pp. 63-70).

As

Richard Dawkins has argued, "Nothing, it seems can prevent the march
of selfish genes" (Dawkins, 1986, p. 267).

Biologist George Williams

(1988) argues that the "modern concept of natural selection can hon
estly be described as process for maximizing short-sighted selfish
ness" (Williams, 1988, p. 385).

If everyone is naturally moral,
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those who are not moral must somehow be different.

As Trigg (1986)

suggests, other than those who have somehow misunderstood the
situation--or give in to Darwin's "instincts of short duration--all
other people should be moral beings.

If they continue to act im

morally or selfishly, then in some sense they logically must be sub
human" (p. 333).

Richards (1987), for example, refers to the prob

lem of "psychopaths among us" and suggests that, according to the
terms of his analysis, they are "bom deformed in spirit" and "are
to be regarded as less than moral creatures" (p. 627).

Similarly,

he states that "one who cannot comprehend the soundness of basic
moral principles we regard as hardly a man" (p. 618).

But if some

one is deformed and less than moral s/he can, perhaps, be treated
much differently with impunity.

One easily develops the attitudes

of a social elite that assumes that its servants are a qualitatively
different species.21
One of Richards' (1987) principal shortcomings is that he has
no theory of human needs but wants to avoid what he calls "the moral
muck of relativism" (p. 618).

He states that he is trying to develop

an evolutionary perspective "without the objectionable detour through
human needs" (p. 622, emphasis added).

Richards relies instead on a

deontological ethical theory which stresses the importance of follow
ing rules and the importance of the moral agent's intentions.

One

can give examples, however, of many different and conflicting rules.
As Richards himself points out, Inca priests no doubt believed that
they were contributing to the peace and harmony of Incan society by
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killing sacrificial victims (p. 615).

The inescapable conclusion is

that we have to "judge the Inca high priest as a good and moral man
for sacrificing virgins" (p. 617).

As Patricia Williams (1990) has

argued, even some of people at Auschwitz "believed that they were
acting for the community good" (p. 456).

If that is the case, how

ever, Richards' (1987) theory cannot distinguish between the morality
of his own intuitively clear comparison of Hitler and Saint Francis
(p. 620).

Even assuming the veracity of the evolutionary story spun

by Richards, his evolutionary ethics is fatally flawed by what anth
ropologists term a total cultural relativism.

As I will argue in

Chapter V, one needs an explicit transcultural theory of human needs
in order to avoid Richards' dilemma.
It is important for sociologists to understand both the
strengths and weaknesses of Richards' analysis.

His work provides a

sophisticated philosophical analysis or unpacking of the kinds of
assumptions surrounding facts and values which sociology often leaves
unexamined.

It provides a interdisciplinary push towards a critique

of our taken-for-granted assumptions.

Sociology would benefit from

renewed discourse on the naturalistic fallacy which includes discus
sion about the problem of warranted knowledge.

Richards' work on

evolutionary ethics is a useful beginning.
It is absolutely clear, as Richards states, that empirical
evidence is essential for making value judgments.

Richards is cor

rect to argue that all ethical theories utilize some conception of
the facts and, in that sense, the naturalistic fallacy is no
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fallacy.

Every sociologist assumes that it is in some sense pos

sible to obtain data.

Even the most enthusiastic social construct

ionist assumes that one may collect data about the process of con
struction.

Following Richard Rorty (1979), a sociologist might

argue that "we understand knowledge when we understand the social
justification of belief" (p. 170).

But there still must be some

method of understanding the social justification.

If there were no

data, there would be no sociology.
Richards is right to suggest that the connections between
empirical data and value judgments are more complex than many text
book homilies on objectivity.

He is wrong in his conflation of the

causal and the hypothetical usage of the term ought.

That someone

ought to do something is not isomorphic with a causal sequence such
as the example that thunder ought to follow lightning.

That a person

ought to perform a duty toward others is a moral value judgment.

To

claim they are identical, as Richards suggests in his second justify
ing argument begs the question.

He assumes the naturalistic fallacy

is no fallacy by equating alternative usages of a multivalent term.
As Abraham Edel (1955) has observed, "It is true, roughly speaking,
that a categorical assertion containing a given term does not follow
validly from premises which do not contain that term" (p. 75).

From

the statement, this is a rock, one cannot determine if the proper
course of action is to throw it at someone, take the stone home and
polish it, or simply leave it alone.
On the other hand, Edel's qualifying phrase roughly speaking
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still allows us space to make relevant distinctions within and
around the logical categories of description and prescription.

Per

haps it is true that there is no logical way, ultimately, to overcome
Hume's strictures about the naturalistic fallacy.

But if the phrase

fact/value has dualistic qualities, it is a dualism with many con
nections and areas that overlap.

It is more analogous, say, to two

jellyfish tangled together in the waves than to a shark and a dolphin
warily eyeing each other from a distance.
Richards' discussion would be greatly improved if he would make
use of the multiplicity of subtle connections between facts and val
ues.

It is obvious that simply choosing an area of research involves

some values (i.e., what is considered important enough to justify
research).

The research process itself assumes, as Jacob Bronowski

wrote, that "We ought to act In such a way that what is true can be
verified to be so" (Bronowski, 1956, p. 74).

Scientific research

assumes that one ought to be truthful.
Robert Friedrichs (1970), in his book A Sociology of Sociology
provides a number of arguments which Richards could use in his
discussion of the naturalistic fallacy.

Friedrichs first notes that

problem selection is inevitably a reflection of value judgments.

He

also argues that "terminology such as system or equilibrium is not
value free" (pp. 138-148).

He refers to John Seeley's inexhausti

bility theorem which states that the "the subject matter of something
cannot in principle be exhausted if the first description both alters
and in any case increases the subject matter to be described"
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(Seeley, 1963, p. 56).

The results of scientific research in them

selves become a part of the social matrix.

They have an impact.

Logically, one cannot know the consequences of the impact before it
occurs.

How could anyone have known the impact of Marx's writings

before he was bom?

It was a gradually emergent, singular, unpre

dictable occurrence which had enormous social consequences.

Pure

research (i.e., Marx's historical studies of the working class in
England) had tremendous applied consequences.
The level of significance which is acceptable in research is
also a value judgment.

Friedrichs (1970) notes that psychology tends

to "demand more assurance about significance levels than do sociolo
gists” (p. 158).

Perhaps this is because their experimental designs

may involve more practical consequences or they "must accept greater
responsibility than a typical sociologist" for their results (p.
158). Friedrichs' makes the obvious point that the Manhattan Pro
ject required a greater degree of certainty than the latest Harris
Poll.

The consequences of error in any research influence the degree

of certainty required.

What is required reflects value judgments

external to the ideal research design of classic positivism.

It is

not--a la Comte--that sociologists should become the new clergy.
Friedrichs' point is rather that the course of ordinary research
inevitably involves choices between various alternatives.

Fried

richs' argument is, that while a Comtean sacerdotal sociology would
clearly combine facts and values, so too does a rigorously behavior
istic sociology when carrying out its most objective experiments.
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The naturalistic fallacy is still a fallacy of sorts, but it has lost
some of

its bite.

All research involves making choices and value

judgments.
Richards would also improve his argument if he made use of
John Dewey's discussion of ends-in-view and the means-ends continuum
(Hook, 1939/1971, pp. 127-148).

Dewey refused to place the means of

accomplishing a task in an inferior position compared to ends.

We

may discover, for example, "that our declared end is such that no
available methods or means seem likely to achieve it" (p. 144).

In

that case the possibility of achieving the "end-in-vie\, is causally
determined by the physical and social means employed to implement the
end-in-view" (p. 144).

As Larry Hickman (1990) has noted concerning

Dewey's analysis: "In production that is fruitful, means and ends
cooperate; they receive checks from one another, they undergo alter
ation and accommodation with respect to one another" (p. 67).
What is seen as an end at one time may later be viewed as a
means to a further end.

Which term is applied to any particular

process is historically contingent.

For example, the Civil Rights

movement in the 1960s often sought such specific ends as the right
to vote (Viorst, 1979).

At the time of the movement, voting rights

were clearly viewed as one objective or end.

At a later date, when

the possibility of voting was a taken-for-granted activity, it was
just as clearly viewed as a means to other ends.

Its function was

now seen as instrumental to the achievement of different ends such
as political power.

The relationship between means and ends is
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better seen as a continuum than as an absolute dualism.
When a patient voluntarily enters a drug treatment center, his
first end-in-view may be to not use alcohol for twenty-four hours.
Perhaps he later extends the time frame to one week.

Perhaps at

another point he decides he wants to see how much reading he can get
done during the time he remains in the treatment center.

Perhaps at

an even later date he decides to change his attitude towards good
nutrition and drastically alters his diet.
at the center he chooses another end.

At each point in his stay

Ultimately his goal will be to

leave the treatment center and resume other

activities.

All of the

ends presuppose the successful completion of his first end, which was
to discontinue drinking.

The ends expand and earlier ends-in-view

are accomplished and taken-for-granted while pursuing later ends-inview.

Dewey's analysis helps to clarify the convoluted relationships

between means and ends or facts and values.

Richards would improve

his analysis if he incorporated some of the distinctions and termin
ology utilized by John Dewey.
It would also help Richards to augment his emphasis on group
morality with a consideration of specific human needs.

As Edel

(1955) has argued, "cultural forms are capable of being estimated
for their satisfaction of human needs" (p. 242).

By excluding an

"objectionable detour through human needs" (Richards, 1987, p.
622), Richards eliminates an approach that would help him avoid
a total cultural relativism.

We must also assume, of course, that

needs should be met.
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Robert Richards presents a detailed and sophisticated defense
of evolutionary ethics.

Any work which deals with the naturalistic

fallacy should consider Richards' analysis.

While he is ultimately

not successful in his attempts to overcome the fallacy, his analysis
enables sociologists to examine the fact/value dichotomy with in
creased philosophical and conceptual rigor.
of assuming that whatever is, is right.

He avoids the tautology

By expunging the concept of

need, however, he ignores an additional sense of the word ought which
would prove very helpful to the case he is attempting to prove.

If

it makes sense, as Darwin wrote in The Descent of Man. that pointers
should point, it also makes sense that human beings should do what
they are best suited for. What we are best suited for, would, by
definition, meet our needs.

Without the concept of needs, Richards'

standard of the community good is historically and culturally
contingent, as well as lacking the requisite specificity for serving
as a guide for human choices and actions.

We now turn to a discus

sion of human needs.
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CHAPTER V

TOWARD A BIOSOCIAL THEORY OF HUMAN NEEDS

Over the course of their evolution, humans regularly needed
to recognize objects, avoid predators, avoid incest, avoid
teratogens when pregnant, repair nutritional deficiences by
dietary modification, judge distance, identify plant foods,
capture animals, acquire grammer, attend to alarm cries, de
tect when children needed assistance, be motivated to make
that assistance, avoid contagious disease, acquire a lexi
con, be motivated to nurse, select conspecifics as mates,
select mates of the opposite sex, along with a host of other
tasks. (John Tooby and Leda Cosmides, 1992, p. I)22
The concept of human needs is surprisingly undertheorized with
in the sociological tradition.

Standard reference works such as

Timasheff (1957), Bottomore and Nisbet (1978), Collins (1988) and
Ritzer (1988) contain no references to needs or human needs in their
subject indexes.

This reflects in part a sociological bias against

consideration of any individualistic traits.

Jonathan Turner (1987)

has noted, for example, that "motivation has not been examined either
explicitly or extensively by sociologists in recent decades" (p. 26).
These theoretical lacunae have had a number of harmful consequences
for sociology which will be examined in this chapter.

My contention

is that the development of an adequate theory of human needs is the
key theoretical move necessary for sociology to move beyond the
disciplinary myopia and polemics which are increasingly evident to
sociologists (Sanderson & Ellis, 1992) and even to the mass media
(Kanrowite, 1992).
The concept of human needs enables us to begin the necessary
135
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integration between disciplines which is a prerequisite to warranted
social science inferences.
any relevant data.

Social science needs to take into account

What has been termed vertical integration sug

gests that data within each discipline should be mutually consistent
and also consistent with what is known in the natural sciences (Tooby
& Cosmides, 1992, pp. 19-24).

Sociologists, for example, should be

utilizing the results of current research in evolutionary psychology.
It has been demonstrated by researchers John Tooby and Leda
Cosmides (1992) that the basic manner in which we approach and solve
cognitive problems is strongly influenced by our evolutionary his
tory.

In an interview with William Allman (1994), Cosmides argues

that "the human mind contains a number of specific mechanisms for
processing information about the social world.
anisms is a cheater detector" (p. 40).

One of these mech

We find it easier to solve

logical problems when they are presented in familiar or social
terms than if they are "presented as problems of abstract logic"
pp. 29-51).

Sociologists should seriously consider the possibi

lity that the human brain is by no means a tabula rasa. We need
to utilize relevant research from such areas as evolutionary psycho
logy and genetics in order to even begin to adequately develop a
social science.

There is no good reason for sociology to promote

theories which are blatantly contradicted by the latest findings in,
say, paleontology or population genetics. At the very least, the data
should be taken into account and/or challenged--as opposed to simply
being ignored.

As Gerhard Lenski (1988) has recently argued,
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evolutionary ecology is one possible approach to interdisciplinary
adequacy.

This becomes clear in any sociological analysis of social

problems.
A biosocial theory of human needs enables us to move forward
in the seemingly endless debates in sociology over social problems
and social constructionism.

As Mary Midgley (1983b) has suggested,

any criticism of existing social customs must be made "on the grounds
that these customs fail to meet real human needs" (p. 91).

The con

cept of social problems inso facto assumes that a particular insti
tutional arrangement is not adequately meeting a specific human need.
If there is no need, there is no problem.

If a theorist has no ex

plicit theory of human needs, s/he has no way of legitimately arguing
that one particular problem is more serious or important than any
other problem.

As we shall see, much sociological confusion in this

area is due to a failure to adequately distinguish between needs and
wants.

If, however, there are a number of specific human needs, this

provides warranted grounds for enumerating whatever are then viewed
as social problems.

Given the emergence of what Pauline Rosenau

(1992) terms skeptical postmodernists-- those who dispute the possi
bility of performativity for the social science (i.e., Dewey's war
ranted knowledge)--this is no small feat.
If human beings, as such, have certain transcultural needs,
when it is clear that different cultures and societies vary in how
well they provide for those needs.

A biosocial approach assumes that

specific needs are a result of our evolutionary history as a species.
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If, like Durkheim, we eliminate by fiat all consideration of bio
logical/evolutionary data, we also eliminate important knowledge
about what it means to be a member of Homo sapiens. As Cosmides
suggests, this applies to both subjective as well as more macro or
objective sociological theorizing--a point that seems especially
misunderstood within sociology today.

A theory of human needs is

essential for sociological perspectives. While this has often been
an acceptable idea--if only implicitly--in much sociological theoriz
ing, it needs to become much more explicit and commonplace.

Socio

logy needs to make use of the best data which are available no matter
the source.
Increased awareness of the significance of human needs would
enable sociology to begin to answer what Ritzer (1988) calls "a cen
tral problem in contemporary sociological theory the macro-micro
link" (pp. 366-384).

Human needs provide a link between theorizing

on the macro or social level and the individual or micro level.
While the concept of human needs has been traditionally viewed by
sociologists as merely an individualistic phenomenon, or even takenfor-granted under the ceteris paribus assumption, I will show here
and in the following chapters that this is an erroneous and unneces
sarily limiting position.
Much of the contemporary debate concerning human needs is the
result of conceptual confusion between the idea of wants as opposed
to the idea of needs.

Neo-classical economists, for example, assume

by their use of marginal utility that all wants are commensurate and

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

139
of potentially equal significance.

It is useless, they believe, to

talk of needs because all we can measure are choices or wants.
Every choice, as recorded by a market sale of equal monetary value,
is, by definition, equal. The conceptual difficulty which results
is that drugs such as cocaine are of equal "value to anything else
which has the same price" (Junker, 1962, pp. 193-198; Tool, 1985,
pp. 292-314).
The orthodox economist is in much the same position as the
positivistic sociologist with respect to the determination of social
problems.

If wants are measured by the market, opinions are measured

by a survey.

The only legitimate method of determining social pro

blems is to ask people what they define as problems in the manner of
the Gallup or Harris Polls.

If wants are defined by what people

purchase in the market, social problems are defined by public opinion
polls, or, in effect, what people say in the market.

If intelligence

is what is measured by intelligence tests, social problems are what
are measured by opinion tests.
Given this definition of social problems, social construct
ionists argue that the proper area of investigation for the sociolo
gist qua sociologist is to determine how social problems have come
to be defined as such.

Given this definition by the public, social

problems are examined by looking at "claims-making activities or
public complaints" (Spector & Kitsuse, 1977, p. 96).
cance of the claim is not the issue.

The signifi

For the sociologist, as Spector

and Kitsuse (1977) write, "social problems should be defined without
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reference to the numbers of people involved" (p. 39).

This logic

ally follows from their argument that they "are not concerned whether
or not the imputed condition exists" (p. 76).
has equal epistemological validity.

Every social problem

This necessarily follows if one

argues that "the existence of the condition itself is irrelevant to
and outside our analysis" (p. 76).

By this definition, Nazism and

local zoning conflicts are both social problems.

That is really all

the sociologist can say, other than looking at the ways the problems
were socially constructed.

The strict constructionist in this case

reaches the same conclusion as the skeptical postmodernist: Every
story is as valid as any other.
One of the reasons sociology arrived at this solipsistic
absurdity23 is its refusal to develop or take seriously a transcultural theory of human needs.

As David Braybrooke (1987) has

argued, "Just bv being asserted and recognized as a need it has
normative force" (p. Ill, emphasis added).

What we are concerned

with in discussions of social problems are examining social condi
tions and processes which do not meet human needs.

Given a deter

minate conception of human needs, it is possible to empirically anal
yze which social conditions or processes are most deficient in meet
ing those needs.

Social problems are conditions which negatively im

pact on human needs.

They are not what sociologists define as social

problems, or what the public defines as social problems. They are not
merely the processes which determine their public visibility.

Social

problms are the result of historical processes and current social
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conditions which fail to meet determinate human needs.
Assume, for example, that one visits rural Colombia, as I did
for ten weeks as a college sophomore.

If one visits a finca or

hacienda in Colombia, or other Latin American countries, it is en
tirely possible that the campesinos living in the poorest conditions
might tell you they were perfectly content.

This is, admittedly,

much less likely today but was certainly a likelihood historically.
If, however, the peasant has an average life expectancy of 40, lacks
adequate nutrition, has no possibility of improving his or her social
class, has no chance of formal education, and, in all important
aspects, is experiencing a condition the average person in the U.S.
might term feudal, is it reasonable to say no social problems exist?
Given a determinate conception of human needs, the answer is clearly
negative.
In the Colombian example, obvious human needs are not being
met.

The fact that the individual campesino might not agree with an

outside analysis does not affect the validity of the analysis.
Different social situations produce different "life chances" (Gerth
& Mills, 1953, p. 313).

Preferences or wants should be freely

arrived at and a result of relevant knowledge and experience
(Braybrooke, 1989, p. 241).
different wants.

Differing social experiences produce

Whether or not the Colombian peasant says his

situation is problematic depends on a complexity of factors which
involves much besides the opinion survey.

As Patricia Hill Collins

notes, "Under hegemonic conditions, less powerful groups may define
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their condition as a social problem, but may choose or be forced to
hide their self-definitions from the more powerful groups" (Collins,
1989, p. 87).

The advantage of looking at needs as opposed to wants

is that everyone has certain needs that must be met no matter the
local conditions.
social problems.

This suggests a transcultural means of analyzing
As Braybrooke argues, "People will not have any

opportunity to have further preferences heeded if the needs that
their biological functioning and survival imply go unmet" (Bray
brooke, 1989, p. 199).
Following the analysis of Martha Nussbaum (1992, 1993), a
determinate conception of human needs implies that "human life has
certain central defining features" (Nussbaum, 1992, p. 205).

She

calls her position "internalist to distinguish it from metaphysical
essentialism" (Nussbaum, 1992, pp. 206-207).

Her own conception

"does not claim to derive from any source external to selfinterpretations and self-evaluations of human beings in history"
(Nussbaum, 1992, p. 215).

She also recognizes that "the hope for a

pure unmediated account of our human essence as it is in itself,
apart from history and interpretation, is no hope at all but a deep
confusion" (Nussbaum, 1992, p. 207).

There are, in other words, no

unmediated categories of reality construction a position that agrees
with theoretical work in the sociology of knowledge (Berger & Luckmann, 1966).

It is possible, nevertheless, to discuss the "shared

conditions of human existence" (Nussbaum, 1993, p. 248).

Because

these conditions are indeed shared, it is possible to "criticize
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local and traditional moralities in the name of a more inclusive ac
count of the circumstances of human life, and the needs for human
functioning that these circumstances call forth" (Nussbaum, 1993,
p. 250).
Every social problem is not simply a matter of definition or
social construction.

Nor is a social problem merely a culturally-

relative, local concern impervious to outside critique.

As Amitai

Etzioni (1968) has argued, "theories which assume autonomous human
needs provide an independent basis with which to compare societies
to each other, as more or less consonant with basic human needs"
(p. 878).
It is very difficult to carry out the kind of empirical
bracketing Spector and Kitsuse (1977) propose.

They state, for

example, "we have defined social problem activities as claimsmaking, complaints, and demands for the relief and amelioration of
offensive conditions" (p. 96, emphasis added).
conditions be described as offensive?

But why should the

We are presumably making no

judgments at all about the imputed conditions.

Clearly, if they do

not in some sense exist, it is difficult to see how they could be
labeled offensive.

Even Joseph Gusfield (1980), who is one of

sociology's leading social constructionists, has argued that "It is
the social problems arena itself that emerges as the object of
[constructionist] critique the sociologist becomes the critic of
the effort of public agencies to make legitimate claims to solve
social problems as technical problems" (p. 13, emphasis added).

If,
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however, sociologists can judge the legitimacy of the activities of
public agencies, why can't they do the same with other groups?
It is this practical difficulty of sticking to the strict
constructionist perspective which Steve Woolgar and Dorothy Pawluch
(1985) refer to as ontological gerrymandering.

Strict construction

ists, in other words, demonstrate the same kinds of shortcomings they
see in those they criticize.

Why should sociologists

ignore empirical considerations?

consistently

Incredibly, Spector and Kitsuse

(1977) argue at one point that they are not suggesting that objective
conditions are not real.
Does this mean that we maintain that such conditions do
not exist, or that the sociologist or anv other scientist
should not attempt to document their existence and study
their causes? Not at all. Whatever the factual basis of
the various conditions imputed to exist, the claims-making
and responding activities themselves are the subject matter
of the sociology of social problems, (p. 78)
This can only mean that it is acceptable for the sociologist as
a scientist to examine objective conditions but not the sociologist
who is only interested in examining social problems.
very least, a very confused position.

This is, at the

It is a kind of territorial

gerrymandering which makes no sense at all. It suggests a highly dub
ious distinction between sociologists who as scientists are allowed
to study the factual basis of social problems, but who are not, by
definition, really dealing with the subject matter of the sociology
of social problems which is only claims-making and responding activ
ities themselves.

But surely this intellectual Scholasticism is the

result of an arid and artificial attempt to deny recognition of the
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fact that social problems involve determinate needs of human beings.
Social problems, for example, adversely affect human health.
Jaber Gubrium (1993) argues in "For a Cautious Naturalism"
that his "constructionist work on Alzheimer's is linked to related,
nonpublic neurophysiological, cognitive, and behavioral facts in a
complex way" (p. 59).

Alzheimer's disease, therefore, is clearly

related to some kind of objective facts, but its social meanings and
definitions vary historically.

This is very different from Spector

and Kitsuse (1977) who argue that "we would go farther and insist
that the very characterization of a condition as physical, genetic,
or physiological is -part of the definition of the condition, and
not, analytically speaking, a characteristic of the objective condi
tion itself" (p. 47, emphasis in original).

At this point, the

social constructionist argument is almost unintelligible.

A person

doesn't in some sense have syphilis until its meaning is socially
constructed?

Obviously people might react to the disease completely

different fashions with major differences in social interaction as a
result.

The same is true of Alzheimer's.

This doesn't mean that

syphilis or Alzheimer's is totally emergent or socially constructed.
Martha Nussbaum's perspective is diametrically opposed to the social
constructionist approach of Spector and Kitsuse.

These two conflict

ing perspectives illuminate the importance of a theory of human needs
and clearly demonstrate where it impacts on sociological theory.

One

of the reasons for the degree of controversy we see today within the
constructionist field (Miller & Holstein, 1993), is that there are
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difficulties and ambiguities in both objective and subjective argu
ments.

This is related in part to the lack of a determinate theory

of human needs in each approach.
In a view contrary to Nussbaum's, Armand Mauss criticizes the
objectivist approach of D. Stanley Eitzen for suggesting that there
are certain universals or an "ideal social life against which actual
social conditions can be compared" (Mauss, 1989, p. 22, emphasis in
original). Eitzen (1984) had argued
that there is an objective reality to social problems.
There are structures that induce material or psychic
suffering for certain segments of the population there
are structures that prevent certain societal partici
pants from developing and realizing their full human
potential. (p. 10).
According to Mauss (1989) it is apparant "that there are no
such objective, transcultural standards" (p. 22).

He quotes Spector

and Kitsuse who affirm that "there are no such universals across
times and cultures" (p. 22).

What is lacking in this entire dis

cussion, however, is any recognition that this is an empirical
question or any recognition of the fact that a great many people out
side the discipline of sociology have been investigating this speci
fic topic (Brown, 1991; Callebaut, 1993; Ruse & Wilson, 1986).

Ed

ward Wilson (1978), for example, argues that it is "because of the
kind of cross-cultural universals that Mauss rejects that people,
ultimately, will not tolerate slavery.
fore, unnatural" (pp. 80-81).

It is in some sense, there

Mary Midgley in Beast and Man (1978)

presents a variety of similar arguments. What is astounding to any
one familiar with evolutionary and biosocial research is the lack of
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awareness within sociology that this data is significant for the
kinds of questions being debated in the area of social problems.
If there are social "structures that induce material or psy
chic suffering" it is because they are not meeting specific human
needs.

Eitzen, although using an objective approach, says nothing

about any such needs.

Mauss says that it is apparent that no such

universals exist across times and cultures because social systems
exhibit so much variation.

Presumably the variation produces differ

ent needs and values, but Mauss has nothing specific to say on this
topic.

Without a mutual discourse on human needs there is no way to

advance beyond the conflicting polemics of both authors.
social science come down to who can shout the loudest?

But should
I think not,

even though this is the logical result of total epistemological
skepticism.

Absolute cultural relativism implies that "the criterion

of truth will derive from one's contingent position of social auth
ority" (Nussbaum, 1992, p. 209).
Totally skeptical postmodernists might consider that this argu
ment is explicitly made by Robert Bork (1990) in his recent work The
Tempting of America. Given complete epistemological skepticism,
there is no principled way, claims Bork, to distinguish between the
pain caused him by his knowledge of abortions and the actions of a
torturer.

The best we can do is follow the wishes of the majority as

expressed in a popular vote.

If the majority now wishes to abolish

legal abortions, there is no reason why they shouldn't.

As Nussbaum

writes, "Caveat deconstructor" (Nussbaum, 1992, p. 221).
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If, however, we assume that the pragmatic tradition in philo
sophy has even partial validity--a limitation its own assumptions
would certainly suggest--it is reasonable to believe that some kinds
of knowledge and information are more pragmatically warranted than
others: In a particular situation, some knowledge works better, and
this is true transculturally.

The airplanes we fly from culture to

culture utilize the same technological principles no matter the
country of origin.

The principles they embody are pragmatically

demonstrated every time they successfully depart.

As Dewey (1929)

wrote, "knowing is not the act of an outside spectator, but of a
participator inside the natural and social scene" (p. 196, emphasis
added). A simple clash of opinions is the only possible result when
"general ideas are not capable of being continuously checked and re
vised by observation" (Dewey, 1939/1989, p. 91).

Pragmatically

warranted knowledge "resides in the consequences of directed action"
(Dewey, 1929, p. 196).

Epistemology is a process.

Even Jeffrey

Stout (1988a), who is highly critical of Dewey's term warranted
knowledge, writes that we justify our knowledge by reasons and evi
dence and "the experience and wisdom which we've accumulated so far"
(p. 29).

Dewey would certainly agree that all knowledge is tentative

and affected by its historical and social context.24
Spector and Kitsuse (1977) assume that their case for social
constructionism is strengthened by the argument that "the notion that
social problems are a kind of condition must be abandoned in favor of
them as a kind of activity" (p. 73, emphasis in original).

Clearly
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this is a false binary.

In the philosophy of Dewey, problems are

defined as activities. The problem of a child not receiving adequate
nutrition is obviously a process which is the result of varying temp
oral dimensions in specific situations.
process which has occurred over time.

Urban deterioration is a
If a situation is defined as

problematic due to the prevalence of certain childhood diseases,
this, quite clearly, is not a synchronic development.
Social problems are the result of diachronic processes produc
ing contemporary conditions which fail to meet specific human needs.
Defining a social problem is not, therefore, simply a matter of per
sonal inclination.

As Nussbaum argues, "It is that gap between basic

(potential) humanness and its full realization that exerts a claim on
society and government" (Nussbaum, 1992, p. 228).

But how do we

begin to establish what potential humanness might represent?

How, In

other words, do we begin to develop a determinate theory of needs?
We might first observe that the notion of potential need not
involve a completely non-empirical orientation.

When discussing a

loss of potential one need not postulate a totally metaphysical
rendering of the elan vital.

A loss of potential refers to certain

determinate needs which are not being met by any particular society.
The determination of transcultural human needs depends on our
species-specific evolutionary history which has resulted in the
particular abilities, traits and needs generic to Homo sapiens
(Barkow, Cosmides, &

Tooby, 1992).

The only way to investigate

which needs are being met is to implicitly or explicitly assume
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human beings as such require certain kinds of need satisfaction.

Our

biosocial evolutionary history has resulted in specific needs which
need to be met by any member of our own species.

As Donald Symons

(1992) has noted, "Eucalyptus leaves are tasty to koalas but not to
human beings because the two species have different feeding adapta
tions" (p. 142).

How, however, do we know what kinds of needs are

specific to human beings?
One way of looking at the question of human needs is by at
tempting to determine what is natural in the sense of "in accord with
our genetically determined biochemistry and physiology" (Eaton et
al., 1988, p. 88).

A tremendous amount of research has been carried

out on the ecology, health and diets of both contemporary hunter/
gatherers and our Paleolithic ancestors (Diamond, 1992; Johanson,
Johanson & Edgar, 1994; Willis, 1989).

As Eaton et al. (1988) ob

serve, "before about 10,000 years ago there were no farmers" (p. 24).
Human beings existed for 100,000 generations as hunters and gatherers
"but only about 500 generations have utilized agriculture and appro
ximately 10 generations have experienced the industrial revolution"
(p. 26)).

As Diamond (19912) notes, "hunter-gatherers practiced the

most successful and long-persistent life style in the career of our
species" (p. 190).

Our genetic endowment, in other words, is the re

sult of adaptations to an environment that was massively different
than what we experience in an age of computers: "That the vast major
ity of our genes are ancient in origin means that nearly all our
biochemistry and physiology are fine-tuned to conditions of life that
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existed before 10,000 years ago" (Eaton et al., 1988, p. 39).
The importance of this approach for a determinate conception of
human needs revolves around what Eaton et al. (1988) have termed the
discordance hypothesis.

Given the rapid pace of cultural evolution

and the gradual effects of genetic evolution, "an inevitable discord
ance exists between the world we live in today and the world our
genes ’think' we live in still" (p. 43).

As Alexandra Maryanski

(1994) recently observed, "the shift from food foraging to a seden
tary lifestyle without a corresponding shift in human biology is
likely to have skewed the direct historical relation between beha
vior and adaptation" (p. 381).

This has resulted in what have been

termed "degenerative diseases" (Burkitt, 1979, pp. 17-18) or "di
seases of civilization" (Eaton et al., pp. 46-68) "which cause 75%
of the deaths in industrial societies" (p. 43).

Contemporary

hunter/gatherer societies, which are closer to Paleolithic living
conditions, demonstrate greatly different epidemiological patterns.
This suggests that the "discordance hypothesis has considerable
validity" (Konner, 1990, pp. 39-46).
Average serum cholesterol values of contemporary hunters and
gatherers are extremely low compared to levels in the United States.
Various groups examined by Eaton et al. (1988), "recorded average
cholesterol levels between 106 and 141, compared with a U.S. average
of 210" (p. 114).

Diseases such as diabetes, coronary heart disease,

lung diseases, various kinds of cancers, osteoporosis, hearing loss,
dental caries, alcohol-related diseases, hypertension and obesity are
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all concentrated in industrial societies and are clearly related to
the diet and health practices of the West (Burkitt, 1979, pp. 25-31;
Eaton et al., 1988, pp. 38-68).
The level of fat consumption in the United States--the per
centage of total calories provided by fat--"is unprecedented in human
evolutionary experience" (Eaton et al., 1988, p. 111).

Paleontolog

ical evidence concerning Paleolithic nutrition practices suggests
that the percentage of total fat intake was 1/2 the current U.S.
consumption in the Late Paleolithic (p. 84).
was about triple our current rates.

Protein consumption

People consumed very little

sugar, alcohol, no tobacco expect in Australia, about 1/quarter the
sodium, five to ten times the nonnutrient fiber, and approximately
twice the calcium of current rates (p. 86).

In providing a determi

nate conception of human needs, it is helpful to recognize that
Our genes were selected to operate within the most ancient
human spectrum of experience. Following a diet comparable
to the one that humans were genetically adapted to should
postpone, mitigate, and in many cases prevent altogether,
a host of diseases that debilitate us--diseases almost un
known among recent hunters and gatherers (p. 87).25
Another approach to the question of human needs is provided by
the philosophical and conceptual analysis of Martha Nussbaum (1992)
and David Braybrooke (1987).

Nusbaum (1992) notes that in spite of

the obvious cultural diversity between various societies, "we do
recognize others as humans across many divisions of time and place"
(p. 215).

Whatever else is the case, we are usually aware of when

we are dealing with a human being and when we are not.
Secondly, according to Nussbaum (1992), we have "a broadly
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shared general consensus about the features whose absence means the
end of a human form of life" (p. 215, emphasis added).

Likewise the

addition of nohhuman abilities such as immortality or unlimited power
lead to our recognition of what is particular to Homo sapiens. If we
look, for example, at human mythologies and stories, we often find
accounts of what it might be to become other than human.

All human

beings "live all our lives in bodies of a certain sort" (p. 217).
We all knowingly face the inevitability of death.
ient being would, by definition, not be human.

An immortal sent

A being who occupied

another corporal form would, by definition, not be human.

As members

of the species Homo sapiens. Nussbaum argues (1992) that each of us
minimally needs the following:
1.

A need to satisfy hunger and thirst. The need for
sustenance. If we discovered someone who really did
not experience hunger or thirst at all, it would be
reasonable to conclude that this was a different kind
of being.

2.

A need for shelter. All humans need to find refuge
from the cold, the sun, from rain, wind, snow and
frost.

3.

A need for extended and adequate care as infants. Our
prolonged period of infant dependency produces speciesspecific needs and requirements.

4.

A need for affiliation with other human beings. We live
for and with others and would regard a life devoid of
friendship and social interaction as seriously deficient.

5.

A need for play and humor. Laughter and play are often
our first modes of mutual recognition. The inability to
play or laugh is a sign of deep disturbance in an indivi
dual child. Laughter is a species-specific characteristic.

6.

A need to utilize practical reason. We need to take part
in the planning and managing of our own lives. We need to
have input and choice concerning our daily activities.
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7.

A need for sexual activity. While less urgent than hunger
or thirst in the sense that it is possible to live longer
without its satisfaction, it is one of our strongest evo
lutionary traits, (pp. 216-220)

In addition, Braybrooke (1987) suggests "The need (beyond what
is covered under the proceeding needs) for whatever is indispensable
to preserving the body intact in important respects" (p. 36).

We

will include this as (8) and add it to our list above.
This list of basic needs is similar to what Braybrooke (1987)
terms course-of life needs, which he defines as needs which are
"indispensable to mind or body in performing the roles of parent,
householder, worker, and citizen" (pp. 32-38 and p. 48).

For both

Nussbaum and Braybooke, their lists provide a starting point for
examining the question of what particular needs are generic to humans
as such.

As Braybrooke notes, once basic needs have been outlined,

it is then possible to develop "minimum standards of provision" (pp.
38-47).

At that point, determining whether needs have been met or

not is a matter of empirical inquiry. Determination involves "ob
serving the condition of the members of the reference population"
(p. 39).

The development of a bioevolutionary theory of human needs

is the key to moving beyond debates over social consturctionism.

If

human beings, as a species, have determinate needs, we are able make
empirical judgments concerning which social arrangements and condi
tions are doing more or less to adequately meet those needs.

Trans-

cultural comparisons need not inevitably be based on pure subject
ivism.
What Nussbaum (1992) terms her "thick value conception of basic
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human functional capabilities is based upon her initial list of
needs" (p. 222).

That is, given her determinate conception of human

needs, the implications as far as what people should experience log
ically follows.

She argues that the generic human "capability to

function should be the goal of legislation and public planning" and
should include the following:
1.

Being able to live to the end of a complete human life,
as far as possible; not dying prematurely, or before
one's life is so reduced as to not be worth living.

2. Being able to have good health; to be adequately nour
ished; to have adequate shelter; having opportunities
for sexual satisfaction.
3.

Being able to live for and with others, to recognize and
show concern for other human beings, to engage in various
forms of of familial and social interaction.

4.

Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational acti
vities .

5. Being able to live one's own life and nobody else's;
being able to live one'sown life in one's very own
surroundings and context, (pp. 221-222)
According to Nussbaum, these functional capabilities are con
stitutive of what it means to be human in a meaningful sense.

The

are derived from needs which are basic to all members of Homo sap
iens . They are not contingent upon particular circumstances.

They

are categorical and generic to humankind.
As C. B. Megone (1992) has noted, one may make a "distinction
between an instrumental and a categorical need" (pp. 14-27).

For

example, I might say "I need to fly to California to see my daugh
ter."

In this case, because my daughter is in California--and given

various time constraints which would preclude any alternative method
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of transportation--! can accurately state that, if I am going to
see her, then I need to fly there, as there are no available alter
natives.
view:

The flight is a means to what Dewey would call an end-in

a wish to visit my daughter.

The need is relative to the

specific context and limiting conditions of my particular desire.
is contingent.

It

If I am going to see her at all, then I need to take

an airplane because it is the only way possible, given my circum
stances, for me to make the trip.
Megone (1992) suggests that there is another basic type of need
which exists "in virtue of the nature of human beings" (p. 22).

That

is, for a human being, there are certain needs which need to be met
because "in the absence of these a human being is not able to be a
good member of its kind" (p. 22).

A categorical need, is such that

"the fulfillment of the need, is constitutive of the thing (a human
being) developing as the kind of thing that it is (as a human being)"
(p. 23).

Human beings have a categorical need for food and shelter

simply in order to live.

Adequate levels of nutrition are presup

posed by what it means to be human.

They are not, therefore, in

strumental in the sense of my flight to California.

The satisfac

tion of this categorical need is intrinsically valuable because all
other human activities require this as an antecedent condition.
A need for adequate nutrition, shelter, companionship, sexual
activity, and practical reason are constitutive of Homo sapiens as a
species.

They are the result of our species-specific evolutionary

history.

If these particular needs are not in some sense adequately

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

157
met, those affected will not develop the possibilities which they
embody simply as a member of a specific species. Contrary to much
sociological opinion, as Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby (1992) assert,
"evolved structure does not constrain; it creates or enables" (p.
39).

Each species' evolved structure is, however, evolution-

arily distinct.

The particular structures, which define our spe

cies characteristics, enable all Homo sapiens to make use of abil
ities which are generic to each of us.

Our common features require

that we also have common categorical needs.

Evident commonalities

allow the use of transcultural standards in the determination of so
cial problems.

The use of categorical needs also provide a more

realistic possiblity of measurement (e.g., required minimum calories
per day, required minimum standard of living) as opposed to the
seemingly more sophisticated reliance on marginal utility.

As Bray

brooke (1987) observes, "the fact remains, no one has drawn up any
thing like a full schedule of a single person's utilities" (p. 172).
It is important to recognize that categorical needs or courseof-life needs do not depend on personal desires or preferences.

Peo

ple need adequate nutrition whether they recognize that need or not.
People need to exercise whether they like exercise or not.

People

need companions and meaningful relationships whether they recognize
their necessity or not.

The theoretical orientation of biocriticism

or biocritique, which I will develop in the next chapter, assumes
that determinate human needs are an empirical possibility.

I agree

with Braybrooke (1989) that "it is course-of-life needs that are
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crucial to assessing social policy" (p. 32).

The link between macro

and micro analyses are our transcultural, species-specific human
needs and evolutionary characteristics.

They need to be made expli

cit and seriously taken into account.
There are significant problems and areas of practical concern
with the position that I am advancing.

If one assumes that there are

important theoretical and empirical distinctions between needs and
wants, it is clear that in many situations a specific individual may
not recognize his or her own authentic needs.

My example of the

Colombian camnesino. for example, implied that an outside observer
was more likely to understand the real needs of the peasant than the
peasant himself.

Clearly this suggests the possibility that the out

side observer is in possession of The Truth which needs to be pro
vided to the ignorant and benighted peasant.

We are close to the

logic which seems to indicate that only the Revolutionary Vanguard
understands the situation correctly or without false consciousness.
If I know what is best for you, but you--for various reasons-are unaware of the same necessities, perhaps, in Rousseau's famous
phrase, you should be "forced to be free" (Russell, 1945, p. 697).
The practical reason why humankind should concentrate on wants as
opposed to needs is that each person presumably determines his or her
own wants individually.

In a market economy, for example, purchases

are explicit expression of wants.

They represent, according to

laissez faire assumptions, the most democratic method possible to
measure those wants.

Any presumption that it is possible to make a
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valid or coherent distinction between needs and wants runs the risk
of developing totalitarian political implications.

The ideal type of

this situation is the distant bureaucrat who informs the locals what
is best for them.

The normal reaction is to tell the bureaucrat to

go to hell.
The difficulties inherent in the distinction between needs and
wants or preferences should not be minimized.

There is a kind of

authoritarian logic to any presumption of false consciousness on the
part of another individual.

If I am absolutely certain of The Truth,

in the sense, for example, of the Pope speaking ex cathedra, than I
am likely to feel justified in forcing you to do whatever is neces
sary to save your soul.

One sees a first step toward the kind of

logic utilized by the Catholic Inquisition.

As Jeffrey Stout (1988a)

has noted, "What made the creation of liberal institutions necessary,
in large part, was the manifest failure of religious groups to estab
lish rational agreement on their competing detailed visions of the
good" (p. 212).

Different religions are, of course, absolutely cer

tain of their own definitions of the good.
definitions are mutually contradictory.

Unfortunately their

Something of the same pro

blem is inherent in any discussion of needs which distinguishes be
tween needs and wants.
As C. Wright Mills (1959) wrote:
If we take the simple democratic view that what men [sic]
are interested in is all that concerns us, than we are
accepting the values that have been inculcated, often
accidentally and often deliberately by vested interests.
These values are often the only ones men have had any
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chance to develop. They are unconsciously acquired habits
rather than choices.
If we take the dogmatic view that what is to men's interests,
whether they are interested in it or not, is all that need
concern us morally, than we run the risk of violating demo
cratic values. We may become manipulators or coercers, or
both rather than persuaders. (194, emphasis in original).
Mills himself suggests one possible approach to this dilemma
which is to persuade as opposed to manipulate or coerce.
gists have not always recognized the difference.

Sociolo

One of the chief

virtues of works like Foucault's Discipline and Punish (1979) is a
demonstration of the myraid techniques of social control by social
institutions.

What Foucault (1979) terms "the gentle way in punish

ment is a classic analysis of enlightened social control by modern
professionals" (pp. 104-131).

Along with institutional methods of

social control, social science developed its own specialized insider
jargon which has continuted uninterrupted into the era of postmodern
ism and critical theory.
If we are going to try to convince another person of her needs,
it is clear she has to first of all understand what we are talking
about.

As we will make clear in the discussion of biocritique, it is

absolutely essential that one understand the language of the other in
order for any equalitarian dialogue to occur.

Anyone in a position

to make specific policy recommendations which may run counter to the
expressed wishes of any group, needs to speak the language of the
group to which the policy measures apply.
One of the major faults of critical theory has been a tendency
to theorize in an absolutely opaque vocabulary which is only
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comprehensible to a select group.

The same criticism applies to

much of the current writings of postmodernists.

(One thinks, for

example, of the extreme difficulty of understanding Adorno or Der
rida.)

Postmodernists argue that we need to rely on local stand

ards for making moral judgments but express their ideas in ways
that almost no local person could possibly comprehend.
As David Ashley and David Orenstein (1990) note in their
discussion of interpretative theory:
To test the accuracy of interpretive theory, it is neces
sary to refer to human practice. Interpretive theory
fails to receive corroboration when there is a disappoint
ment of expectation within a context of communicative in
teraction. For instance, one's knowledge of a foreign lan
guage can be tested by seeing whether it is possible to
give orders successfully in that language and to have such
orders obeyed by the actions one intended to produce through
speech, (p. 50)
From Dewey's perspective, the intended actions which were a re
sult of the orders given, provide a pragmatic warrant for assuming
that one was able to express what was intended.

In my own exper

iences in Spain, Colombia, and Mexico, it was clear that every
conversation in Spanish provided immediate feedback concerning any
expectation within a context of communicative interaction.

Employ

ing a second language produces a constant experiment in interpretive
theory.

It also suggests one possible approach towards transcending

the kind of dualistic needs/wants dilemma outlined by Mills.

It is

essential that both parties to any dialogue speak the same language.
It is still possible, of course, that differences will remain
after the most extensive and mutually-comprehensible dialogue--which
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is one of the shortcomings of Jurgen Habermas's "ideal speech sit
uation" (Rhoads, 1991, pp. 314-317). In that case, all one can prac
tically do is abide by the results of political democracy.

In a

democracy, people by definition have the option of ignoring their
needs and engaging in activities that are personally harmful.

People

have to be allowed to follow their own preferences and make mistakes.
It is entirely possible that someone might recognize his real needs
and still choose to follow another path.

Speaking the same language,

however, at least allows the possibility for Mills's persuasion, as
opposed to coercion, to occur.

It is a necessary, if not sufficient,

condition for equalitarian dialogue.
The stipulation of mutual comprehensibility has important im
plications for sociological theory.

Contrary to the nightmarish

neologisms and insider vocabulary of much postmodernist analysis
(Rosenau, 1992, pp. xi-xiv), the theory of human needs which I am
proposing is continually subject to, and will be modified by, what
Alfred Schutz (1962) called the postulate of adequacy:
Each term in a scientific model of human action must
be constructed in such a way that a human act performed
within the life-world by an individual actor in the way
indicated by the typical construct would be understand
able for the actor himself as well as for his fellowmen in terms of common-sense interpretation of everyday
life. Compliance with this postulate warrants the consis
tency of the constructs of the social scientist with the
constructs of common-sense experience of the social real
ity. (p. 44)
A discussion of human needs should be potentially comprehen
sible to any individual acting in a manner in compliance or contrary
to his or her postulated needs.

Assuming the prerequisite of a
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common language, the other should be able to tinderstand what you are
talking about.

The result of following the postulate of adequacy

is a kind of theoretical and practical modesty.

Social scientists

are likely to be critical of this formulation because it implies
that most disciplinary jargon is methodologically unwarranted.

It

suggests that, as a practical matter, introductory sociology stu
dents should be able to understand any instructor's theories.

Any

theory should make sense in terms of common-sense interpretations of
everyday life.

Given adequate levels of nutrition, education, in

come, and freedom of choice--Braybrookes' (1987) "needs freely ar
rived at" (p. 241)--the differences expressed between the wants of
the other and the needs postulated by a particular theory should
decrease, assuming the theory is pragmatically warranted, logically
consistent, and meets Schutz's postulate of adequacy.

One way of

decreasing the risks discussed by Mills is to make sure we share a
mutually comprehensible language.
A second method of dealing with the problem of what might be
termed an "Inquisition Complex" is to adopt a position of epistem
ological humility.

It is important to recognize at all times that

one's viewpoint is necessarily a reflection of one's own history.
culture and personal experiences. Knowledge is a process which
continually produces new information.

As Tooby and Cosmides (1992)

write:
Given the fact that we are almost entirely ignorant of the
computational specifics of the hundreds of thousands of
mechanisms which comprise the human mind, it is far beyond
the present competence of anyone living to say what are and
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are not achievable outcomes for human beings,

(p. 40)

It should also be noted that one may adopt this position of
modesty when postulating any cross-cultural, generic human needs.
A theory of human needs is always open to revision in the light of
new experience and information.

The possibility of shared, trans-

cultural human needs does not imply any kind of rigid essentialism.
Our knowledge of human evolutionary history, for example, is contin
ually changing (Johanson et al., 1994; Willis, 1989).

In proposing

that sociologists take into account our evolutionary history, I am
not arguing that human evolution has produced completely known and
invariant human needs.

It is entirely possible that different human

needs, in the sense described earlier, are still to be determined.
The most important implication of the earlier discussion is that,
based on the best available data, it is possible in principle to make
a determination of transcultural human needs.

Any individual, simply

as a member of Homo sapiens. shares the postulated needs.
We may encounter alternative human capabilities and necessities
based on additional information.

Contrary to the suggestion that any

description of human needs is necessarily ethnocentric and culturally
biased, it is entirely possible that encounters with other cultures
will demonstrate shortcomings in our own identification of needs.
The theories which we advance are, of course, necessarily influenced
by our own cultural and historical contexts (Phillips, 1986, pp. 4149).

As Phillips has argued, "there is no place to stand outside our

beliefs and our language" (p. 44).
biases and assumptions.

Every theory contains its own

As Tooby and Cosmides (1992) observe,
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this is because the world itself provides no framework that
can decide among the infinite number of potential category
dimensions, the infinite number of relations, and the infi
nite number of potential hypotheses that could be used to
analyze it. (p. 106).
The ability to falsify a proposition is not, by itself, a use
ful or practical research strategy insofar as the number of possible
empirical generalizations is infinite (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992, p. 76).
One of the principal functions of theory is to narrow the range of
possibilities and suggest where to look.

The possibility of empiri

cal refutation is not inso facto helpful for research unless it is
embedded in a specific theoretical context.
On the other hand, "our theories have an oddly reciprocal re
lationship between language and nature.

There is sometimes feedback

from nature, and theoretical accounts are adjusted accordingly"
(Phillips, 1986, p. 44).

We are able to develop a pragmatically

warranted system of knowledge, even though the feedback is "never
totally free of theoretical influences" (p. 44).

Every time we turn

on the ignition and the car starts, we are justified in assuming that
the knowledge used to construct the car was adequate for its funct
ioning.

It works.26

There is no reason why theories in the social sciences cannot
make similar kinds of pragmatically warranted assumptions and state
ments.

But our assumptions and statements as sociologists are more

likely to be pragmatically warranted if they take into account
information available from disciplines outside sociology.

A theory

of human needs, for example, should include any relevant information
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concerning needs from such areas as evolutionary psychology, biology,
endocrinology, genetics, or physical anthropology.

If one is going

to assume as did Marx, for example, that under conditions of primi
tive communism more equalitarian social arrangements obtained than in
industrial societies, clearly information from any discipline rele
vant to that assertion should be considered (Barkow et al., 1992,
pp. 3-15; Symons, 1992, p. 152).

Only a myopic and misguided sense

of disciplinary proprietorship suggests otherwise.

As C. Wright

Mills accurately noted in 1959, we need to expand the sociological
imagination.

Only the crudest kinds of sociological prejudices ex

clude nonsociological data from sociological explanations of human
behavior.
Consider the typical discussion of probability sampling in
light of the data available from paleoanthropology and evolutionary
psychology.

The usual discussion of sample designs points to the

advantages of the random sample, as opposed to purposive or "conven
ience samples" (Nachmias & Nachmias, 1981, pp. 429-441).

The lan

guage used and the implicit judgments made imply that only random
samples provide scientific data because "only probability sampling
makes possible representative sampling designs" (p. 429).

This is a

taken-for-granted assumption of what Tooby and Cosmides (1992) refer
to as the "standard social science model" (pp. 31-34).

Sociological

"domain assumptions" (Goulder, 1970, pp. 31-35) devalue any informa
tion which is not a product of standard random sampling techniques.
A reflexive sociology needs to recognize that it is merely a
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metaphysical assumption to presume that differences between human
beings preclude by definition any meaningful data from a sample of
one.
Suppose, as the most recent data available to evolutionary
psychologists indicate, that much of interest to social science is
generic to Homo sapiens (Barkow et al., 1992; Brown, 1991).

What

that means is that a sample of one may provide data and information
which is of transcultural significance if we know where to look and
consider the data relevant.

One must take into account data which

analyze what Tooby and Cosmides (1992) refer to "a clearly recogniz
able species-typical architecture" (p. 80).

For example, there are

now large amounts of data on "the perceptual organization of colors"
(Durham, 1991, pp. 213-223; Shepard, 1992, pp. 495-532), the sig
nificance of language mechanisms and vocalizations (Femald, 1992,
pp. 391-428; Pinker & Bloom, 1992, 451-493), or "evolved responses
to landscapes" (Orians, 1980; Orians & Heerwagen, 1992, pp. 555-579).
All of this information is of interest to evolutionary psychologists
because it is believed that our evolutionary history has resulted in
particular kinds of responses which are species-specific.

The dis

cordance hypothesis is based on a similar perspective.
Sociology, however, assumes that all our "important character
istics are a result of cultural development and we may safely ignore
individual psychology and biology"

(Tooby & Cosmides, 1992, p. 32).

Human variations, as expressed in cultural differences, are the rele
vant causal variables.

A single individual, therefore, provides very
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little useful data.

Whatever needs are specific to a single indivi

dual are, by sociological fiat, unimportant. But what if our evolu
tionary past has resulted in biosocial adaptations which are generic
to our species?

If that is the case, a researcher should be aware of

transcultural biological and psychological similarities. not simply
cultural differences.

The only way to obtain particular kinds of

data is to begin on the individual level. In his description of a
sui generis methodology exclusive to sociology, Durkheim was pro
foundly mistaken.
It should be obvious that "a universal evolved psychology will
produce variable manifest behavior given different environmnetal
conditions" (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992, p. 46).

This has resulted in

the sociological emphasis on cultural differences.

In this case,

however, one individual, no matter how great the cultural variation
between different societies, may
ful data.

still provide a great deal of use

Because sociology dismisses the logic behind this argu

ment, it misconstrues or ignores relevant data from other disci
plines .
Consider the incredible elation described by Johanson and Edey
(1981) during their group's discovery of "Lucy" in 1974 (pp. 13-24).
This single, small Austraolnithecus afarensis skeleton is almost
certainly the most famous fossil of all time.

Why should one small

three and one-half feet tall skeleton produce such astounding jubulation?

"Oh, Jesus we've got it.

We've got the Whole Thing!" yel

led Johanson's assistant Tom Gray (p. 17).

Johanson's description
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of the resulting scene at his camp is a classic description of the
emotion which accompanies scientific discovery.
The camp was rocking with excitement. That first night we
never went to bed at all. We talked and talked. We drank
beer after beer. There was a tape recorder in the camp, and
a tape of the Beatles song Lucy in the Sky with Diamonds went
belting out into the night sky, and was played at full volume
over and over again out of sheer exuberance. At some point
during that unforgettable evening--I no longer remember exact
ly when--the new fossil picked up the name of Lucy. (p. 18)
One can picture the reaction of Sociologicus archtypicalus to the
same find:

Oh throw the damn thing away said Emile. After all,

there's only one.
An unfair comparison?

But why should paleontologists be able

to obtain so much data from one fossil compared to sociology's
trained incompetence with a single living individual?

The facile

response is Sociology deals with groups, palentology with individual
remains.

Why, however, should sociologists ignore relevant data from

all other disciplines simply because it is obtained on an indivi
dualistic basis?

Other than a kind of traditionalistic dogmatism and

superstition, I seeno reason for making such

an arbitrary and arti

ficial distinction.A naturalistic monism suggests we proceed
otherwise.

In this case, it also agrees with much current post

modernist thought in rejecting binaries such as nature/nurture.
Conceptual and empirical analysis of human needs is in a pi
votal position to close the distance between research on individual
and research on group phenomena.

"Needs," according to Braybrooke,

(1987) are "foundedon persistent features of human biology and
psychology" (244).

He also argues that needs "can be ascribed with
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presumptive universality to human beings regardless of differences
in cultures and circumstances" (p. 244).

On the one hand, it is

clearly the individual who experiences the kinds of needs Braybrooke
and Nussbaum believe are constitutive of Homo sapiens. We begin once
again with Dennis Wrong's (1961) observation that "in the beginning
there is the body" (p. 190).

According to current perspectives in

sociology, this is obviously a micro perspective.

We are looking at

separate individuals.
Let us assume, however, that these separate individuals all
have similar needs, as much current research in a variety of disci
plines implies.

As Tooby and Cosmides (1992) propose, let us define

the psychological mechanims of Homo sapiens as "domain-specific
inferential systems" (p. 92).

This is completely contrary to tra

ditional assumptions in sociology which have viewed a general capa
city for culture as the only relevant evolutionary factor.

Sociolo

gists have placed great emphasis on learning as a context-free,
generalized socialization mechanism.

As Leslie White (1973) ob

serves, "the sociology of human beings is a function of this external
suprabiological, supraorganic tradition called culture" (p. 10).

The

problem for White's line of reasoning, however, is that it is com
pletely contradicted by current findings in areas other than socio
logy:
Results out of cognitive psychology, evolutionary biology,
artificial intelligence, developmental psychology, lin
guistics, and philosophy converge on the same conclusion:
A psychological architecture that consisted of nothing but
equipotential, general-purpose, content-independent or
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content-free mechanisms could not successfully perform the
tasks the human mind is known to perform or solve the adap
tive problems humans evolved to solve--from seeing, to
learning a language, to recognizing an emotional expression
to the many disparate activities aggregated under the term
learning culture, (p. 34)
By more adequately investigating and theorizing human needs,
sociologists would be able to understand and interpret information
from these diverse areas.

Sociology traditionally ignores the kinds

of findings listed by Tooby and Cosmides because they are defined as
psychological or biological.

If one assumes that sociology, by

disciplinary stipulation, only deals with emergent or group pheno
mena, there is simply no way to utilize this kind of data.

The sin

gle most important result of my proposed sociological reexamination
of human needs is that it potentially broadens sociology's domainspecific inferential systems and increases the possible utility of
information collected in other disciplines.

We have to reintroduce

the idea of the individual into sociology not simply as a correction
to a macro orientation, but in order to make sense of what has hap
pened in other disciplines. Discussion of human needs invites an
expanded sociological discourse which includes previously neglected
participants.
To the extent that similar needs are species-specific, the
familiar distinction between micro and macro is even more tenuous.
Specific needs are individualistic qualities, but they are shared by
the members of particular groups.
phenomena.

In that sense, they are also group

This is not to deny, however, the importance of emergent

characteristics in any social situation.

Anyone, for example,
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subject to an unpopular military draft should have no difficulty
accepting the pragmatic significance of institutional phenomena.

In

my discussion of Edward Wilson, I previously pointed out the distinc
tion between an institutional explanation of the causes of war and
analyses of the motivations of individual soldiers.

Individual sold

iers fight for various reasons which have very little to do with the
political and economic decisions which precipitated a specific con
flict, although it would be foolish to ignore psychological char
acteristics of the powerful.
The emphasis placed on the importance of the individual in this
chapter in no way minimizes the significance of macro or institu
tional processes. Sociologists need to take seriously, however, the
commonly-expressed truism that institutions presuppose the necessity
of individual actors.

From the standpoint of evolutionary psycho

logy, the claim that "some phenomena are 'socially constucted' only
means that the social environment provided some of the inputs used
by the psychological mechanisms of the individuals involved" (Tooby
&

Cosmides, 1992, p. 117).

This is the opposite of a sociological

perspective which presupposes the unique significance of cultural
levels of explanation.

By making use of an analysis of human needs,

we can more usefully interpret research which begins at the indivi
dual level.

As we shall see in the following chapter, an emphasis on

needs also suggests a more critical orientation than simple pre
occupation with wants.

According to Braybrooke (1987), "far better

to say, in defense of progressive taxation, that the poor find it
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difficult to cover their basic needs, while the rich can indulge in
the most frivolous preferences" (p. 173).

A biocritical perspective

presupposes determinate human needs.
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CHAPTER VI
TOWARD A BIOCRITICAL PERSPECTIVE

Introduction
The development of a biocritical perspective begins with the
observation that human beings share a common evolutionary history.
An adequate recognition of our evolutionary past suggests several
things with respect to our fellow human beings:
1.

We all evolved from an original African context.

2.

We are all members of the same species and genetically we

all have a great deal in common.
3.

All our distinctive species-specific characteristics

developed as a result of our evolutionary history.

What we value in

our fellow human beings is ultimately a result of the same evolu
tion evolutionary process.
4.

Because of our similar evolutionary history, the great

majority of human beings share similar neural-biological character
istics and common ontogenetic development.

We

begin life with sim

ilar hard-wiring and go through similar stages of growth.
5.

Due ultimately to our biological similarities, Homo sap

iens. share common and distinctive physiological and psychological
needs.
It is clear from paleoanthropological evidence that we are all
of African descent (Johanson et al., 1994; Leakey, 1981; Willis,
174
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1989; Wolpoff, 1980).

As Milford Wolpoff notes, "The autsralonithe-

cines of Africa are the earliest hominids that are definitively human
in their attributes" (Wolpoff, 1980, p. 131).

The fact that we are

North Americans is the chance result of evolutionary history and
migrations.

While a number

of controversies exist with respect to

the processes and manner in which this evolution occurred (Dawkins,
1986, pp. 223-318; Ruse, 1988, pp. 31-42), the origin of humankind
in Africa and our subsequent evolutionary development are not in
dispute.

As Richard Dawkins argues, Darwinism is the only available

empirical theory which adequately accounts for contemporary data
(Dawkins, 1986, p. x).
We came from the same place.

The stochastic evolutionary

mechanisms of mutation, natural selection, gene flow and genetic
drift are responsible for the phenotypical variations between human
groups which we see today (Cummings, 1988, pp. 386-413; Sutton & Wag
ner, 1985, pp. 290-411).
iens

The variation in phenotypes among Homo sap

is a principal source of the lack of recognition of commonali

ties among contemporary populations.
Most of the genetic variation which occurs among humans is
variation within populations as opposed to variation among popula
tions.

Biologist Michael Cummings (1988) estimates that "genetic

differences between what are viewed as racial groups accounts for
7% of all human genetic diversity.

The remaining 93% is a result of

variation within each racial" group (p. 404).
There are a number of specific genetic differences between
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various human groupings.

Genetic polymorphisms exist with respect

to such things as Lactose tolerance and blood groups which have been
well-documented cross-culturally (Sutton & Wagner, 1985, pp. 398405).

If, however, the overwhelming majority of genetic variations

among human beings occurs within groups which have traditionally
been defined as racially distinct, it is clear that we have much more
in common biologically than a cursory inspection of phenotypical
variation reveals.

We see the differences but don't understand the

similarities which a biocritical perspective suggests are the evo
lutionary background of our common needs.
It is unreasonable to assume that natural selection has oper
ated in the development of all other species and has not affected
humankind.

It is only our own anthropocentric hubris which allows

us to view our own evolutionary history as sui generis (Callebaut,
1993).

In Jared Diamond's (1992) phrase, we are the third chimpan

zee and this makes a difference both in our perceptions and in our
needs.

By not recognizing our evolutionary history, we distort our

social development and construct the kind of artificial dualism which
Durkheim proclaimed as the essence of the sociological method.

As

Timothy Crippen (1992) has argued, "discussions of and efforts to
explain human cultural behavior are incomplete to the degree that
they ignore the complex influences of genes, hormones, neurotrans
mitters, and experience on brain ontogeny and phylogeny" (pp. 390391).
We are of nature and in nature.

We are not above nature or
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qualitatively distinct from nature.

As Mary Midgley (1978) has

observed, "we are not just rather like animals; we are animals"
(p. xiii, emphasis in original).

Certainly the differences between

humans and other animals are striking and important.

As we have seen

in Chapter 2, however, ethological investigations have narrowed the
previously accepted qualitative distinctions between Homo sapiens and
other species.

With respect to the evolutionary history which we

have shared with other species, the term the human animal is redun
dant.

As William Gray (1987) has noted, "we are here for the same

reason that tigers and whales and starfish are here--because of our
adaptive fitness to our biological circumstances" (p. 479).
Human beings are not some kind of disembodied spiritual wraiths
--a ghost in the machine on Emile Durkheim's culturological stage.
Once again, we note that in the beginning there is the body.

Socio

logy needs to literally remember the discipline (i.e., remake it
today while also recalling an evolutionary perspective). Sociology
needs to develop an approach to theory which incorporates an epistemological and evolutionary naturalism.

What we value as human be

ings is ultimately dependent on our evolutionary history.

If all

biological considerations are excluded by definition from sociolog
ical analysis, we unnecessarily distort and limit our understandings
of social behavior.

Other than academic tradition (i.e., an auto

matic defense of academic turf), there is no justifiable reason to
not make use of whatever kinds of data help to explain the problem at
hand.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

178
From the standpoint of the biocritical perspective I am
developing, a major problem in contemporary social science is not
the difference betweeen acepting a hard or soft version of genetic
influence, but rather the nearly total lack of recognition that
evolutionary processes have any significance at all (Sanderson &
Ellis, 1992, pp. 32-33).

The theoretical difficulty for sociologists

is that all of the human characteristics which we value are ulti
mately the result of natural evolutionary processes.

As Franz Wuke-

tits (1988) has written,
the human mind is a systems property of the human brain;
it depends on the specific arrangement of nerve cells.
Thus, mental life in humans can only be understood by
studying its neuro-biological basis. This means that
organic evolution was the precondition to the development
or evolution of psychic and spiritual (mental) phenomena:
Cognitive behavior in animals and humans is a result of
evolutionary processes, (p. 457)
This means, of course, that all the dualities established by
sociologists to distinguish their field--nature/culture, mind/body,
human/animal deny the evolutionary history which was involved in the
very qualities which we now define as distinctly human.

All of our

philosophy, science, technology and art was ultimately made possible
by the same evolutionary forces which produced all other earthly
biota.

In this respect, we are certainly not unique.
In his recognition of this commonality, Edward Wilson's

sociobiological orientation is accurate and warranted.

Nature, as

Richard Dawkins (1986) has cogently argued, is the blind watchmaker.
Evolutionary epistemologist Henry Plotkin, in his recent book Darwin
Machines and the Nature of Knowledee (1994), summarizes the
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significance of the evolutionary literature with his observation that
we simply will not understand human rationality and intel
ligence, or human communication and culture, until we
understand how these seemingly unnatural attributes are
deeply rooted in human biology. They are the special adap
tations that make us special. What is unarguable is that
they are the products of human evolution. There really are
no substantive alternative ways of understanding our extra
ordinary capacity for knowledge, (p. xiv)
Assuming for the moment that the above statements constitute warrant
ed knowledge in John Dewey's (1929) sense of the term, what implica
tions do they suggest for sociological theory and analysis?

What I

term biocritique builds on knowledge of our common evolutionary his
tory.

It is primarily a different way of looking at data by taking

into account information which is normally neglected or considered
insignificant.

Because it is presumably a cross-cultural constant,

sociologists tend to assume that biological or psychological factors
may be ignored in the explanation of social behavior: They have the
same influence in all cultures so we may safely ignore their effects.
The utterly fallacious nature of this assumption is made clear
by looking at statements which are logically similar to the biolog
ical ceteris paribus assumption:

"If language is a constant in all

cultures, we may safely ignore its effects on human actions."

Or,

"the use of fire is a cross-cultural constant, so we may ignore its
influence on human behaviors." Because something is a transcultural
constant does not mean that it has no significance for human actions.
As Tooby and Cosmides accurately note, "a universal evolved psycho
logy will produce variable manifest behavior given different envi
ronmental conditions" (Tooby &

Cosmides, 1992, p. 46).

This
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obviously does not indicate that human psychological characteristics
are inconsequential for understanding human actions or that you
can't explain a variable with a constant.
mental factors interact over time.

Evolutionary and environ

What the resulting effects are is

an empirical question.
Because we inevitably misperceive what we don't understand or
simply ignore, sociologists who only focus on cultural differences
can't accept the plausibility of transcultural common interests and
necessities.

Richard Dawkins (1986) terms this "The argument from

personal incredulity." He discusses the comment by a Bishop to the
effect that "camouflage is not always easily explicable" in Darwinian
terms.

The Bishop wondered why the polar bear needs to be colored

white if it is so dominant.

Dawkins points out that "predators also

benefit from being concealed from their prey" (pp. 38-39).

He sug

gests that the Bishop's argument might be translated as follows:
I personally, off the top of my head sitting in my study,
never having visited the Arctic, never having seen a polar
bear in the wild, and having been educated in classical
literature and theology, have not so far managed to think
of why polar bears might benefit from being white, (p. 38)
Sociologists who reject out of hand the possibility of crosscultural commonalities might keep the argument from personal incredu
lity in mind. Because the biocritical perspective stresses the im
portance of cross-cultural similarities, it is directory contrary to
the current postmodern turn toward local knowledge and particularism
(Seidman, 1991).

Contemporary fashion, however, is a surely a poor

reason for the rejection of theoretical concepts.

Biocritique
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suggests that we need to look at our common interests and evolution
ary history (Brown, 1991).
Sociologists are taught to examine human differences.

When we

analyze different groups, classes, races, sexes or cultures we natur
ally are concerned with the different things we see.

We look at cul

ture cross-culturally and see distinctive family patterns, customs,
and religions.
where.

We expect to see differences and we find them every

Languages are obviously different.

different.

Sexual customs are very

Taken-for-granted attitudes and non-verbal communica

tion vary and lead to much cross-cultural confusion (Hall, 1959).
What Alfred Schutz (1964) called recipe knowledge--our typifications of everyday life--seemingly have very little transcultural
validity (Schutz, 1964, pp. 95-96).
pect them to act.

People don't act like we ex

What stands out are all the variations in what

are normally the nonproblematic assumptions of our own cultural
microcosm.

Our recipe-knowledge literally tells us when its normal

to eat, but in Spain, we try to adjust to a 10:00pm dinner.

Spanish

folkways concerning the proper mealtime are certainly different from
ours.
It is true, nevertheless, that people in Spain do eat dinner.
Sociology has made much of the first fact and ignored the second.

A

biocritical approach to sociological theory assumes the importance of
cross-cultural similarities, as well as the differences in customs
which every traveler experiences.

A new way of looking at sociolog

ical data is both warranted and desirable.

The work of Wilson,
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Richards, Braybrooke, Midgley and Nussbaum suggests unexamined
possibilities for improving sociological theories and data.

As

philosopher Holmes Rolston III has argued, we shape our values "in
significant measure in accord with our notion of the kind of universe
that we live in" (Rolson, 1986, p. 27).

I am proposing that socio

logical attitudes concerning the extent of cultural differences dis
tort our perceptions of human similarities.

When we encounter what

postmodernists term the other, (Boyne, 1990), we see the cultural
differences, but not the biological similarities.
all, exactly what we have been taught to see.

That is, after

But suppose an empha

sis on our shared evolutionary history had stressed our biological
commonalities.
In June, 1994 my wife and I stayed for a time with a Mexican
family in Cuernavaca.

By the third day of our visit, the Senora was

telling us about her family, about her niece who was having trouble
at work, and showing us pictures from family albums.

She described

the pleasures of Mexican cooking and complained about the strange
ways of the younger generation.

She and her husband both worried

about their finances, their drinking water, and their health.

They

told us about a relative who had gone to live in the U.S. and asked
us about our own city and living conditions.

Their concerns were

obviously very similar to those of many families in the United
States.

Given the translation from Spanish to English, we could

have easily been listening to a family in Kalamazoo.

These kind of

experiences simply wouldn't be possible without profound
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transcultural human commonalities and similarities.

As Tooby and

Cosmides (1992) note, "the best refutation of cultural relativity
is the activity of anthropologists themselves, who could not under
stand or live within other human groups unless the inhabitants of
those groups shared assumptions that were, in fact, very similar to
those of the ethnographer" (p. 92).
In order to comprehend the similarities, however, it is
necessarily to share a common language.

In the United States, less

than 1% of our total student population studies Chinese, Russian,
Spanish, Hindi or Arabic--languages spoken by three-fourths of the
world's population (Ferrante, 1992, p. 6).

There is no reason to

assume that sociology or sociologists are immune to this kind of
linguistic know-nothingism.

The lack of any understanding of lang

uage and the role it plays in influencing our perceptions of other
cultures limits our comprehension of cross-cultural similarities.
One of the reasons an evolutionary perspective seems so strange to
sociologists is that we are a nation of monoglots.

A person who

speaks a different language is, by definition, the other.

Anything

defined by the "dominant hegemonic perspective as the other is
considered strange or different" (Rajchman, 1985, pp. 43-76).

How

can we expect to look for transcultural commonalities when differences
are presupposed by the very terms of our linguistic nondiscourse?
course we see differences everywhere we look.

Of

If you can't even talk

to someone, they certainly are different.
Along with being monoglots, we are what might be termed
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lenguacentric. That is, we assume that knowledge or information
about any other language is unnecessary and that English represents
a kind of chosen language.

Given the predominance of spoken English,

there is very little in our everyday experiences to suggest other
wise.

As a result, our common experience is also momoaudible: We

normally only hear one language.

This has had significant effects on

our theories and taken-for-granted assumptions.
In a monoaudible culture, one is almost never personally or
experientially exposed to another language.

If one hardly ever hears

another language, on the rare occasions that this does occur it will
naturally seem extremely strange or different.

"Someone who uses

another language within the cultural context of the United States is
very clearly labelled the other" (Macedo, 1994, pp. 91-135).

The

reasoning involved appears to be something like this: I speak Eng
lish.

Everyone I normally see and hear speaks English.

Anyone who

doesn't speak English is, at the very least, a little strange and
more likely, a bit stupid or mentally deficient.

I.Q., in other

words, is positively correlated with non-accented English.
A nation of monoglots necessarily generates a kind of auditory
auto-da-fe. The linguistic Inquisition speaks with single voice.
Why can't the ungrateful imbecile learn English?

Nietzsche and Max

Scheler wrote about the "significance of resentment as an influence
on behavior" (Remmling, 1967, pp. 32-39, 172-176).

One could con

struct a hostility index and chart the degree of antipathy of
English-speakers to spoken Spanish.

Why should we have to learn
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their language?

There are, I think, a number of good reasons which

are related to the development of a biocritical perspective.
Learning another language makes clear, on an experiential
basis, the contingency of one's own language.

What I call house can

just as easily be designated la casa by the Spanish speaker.
had grown up in Spain I would, in fact, call it that.

If I

Children

everywhere learn the language of their own cultures and "are fluent
speakers of complex grammatical sentences by the age of three, with
out benefit of formal instruction" (Pinker & Bloom, 1992, p. 451,
emphasis added).

The generalized ability to learn a language "is a

result of our evolutionary history" (pp. 452-493).

The specific

language we learn is obviously dependent on our culture.
If my language is totally arbitrary, then perhaps the same can
be said about my clothing or my food.

This reasoning may lead to a

more flexible kind of mentality and less of a tendency to label the
merely different as the other.

It becomes clear that beneath the

ethnographic differences there are common human concerns.

By under

standing another person's language, I am more likely to understand
and recognize her personhood.

Until the language barrier is

breached, it's easy to assume an unbridgeable gulf between us and
them.

As George Herbert Mead (1934/1962) noted,
A person learns a new language and puts himself into the
attitude of those that make use of that language. He cannot
read its literature, cannot converse with those that belong
to that community, without taking on its peculiar attitudes.
He becomes in that sense a different individual. You cannot
convey a language as pure abstraction; you inevitably in some
way convey also the life that lies behind it. And this result
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builds itself into relationship with the organized attitudes
of the individual who gets this language and inevitably brings
about a readjustment of views, (p. 283).
In my own experiences visiting Mexico, working in Colombia and
also studying in Spain, the importance of the Spanish language cannot
be overestimated.

The everyday reality of using a different language

was an experiment in participant-observation which experientally
demonstrated to me the interaction of language and my perceptions of
cross-cultural similarities and differences.
Once the others, especially in Mexico, realize that you under
stand their language, the sort of faceless cipher stare and mutual
lack of comprehension that tourists often assume is natural drastic
ally change.

Cab drivers turn into veritable street poets with opin

ions on all topics.

The natural attitude in Mexico is, in fact, more

outgoing and gregarious than is the case in the U.S.

"One is sup

posed to say Good Morning or Good Afternoon or Good Evening to every
one.

Failure to do so may be considered insulting" (Gandy, 1990, p.

23).

In similar situations in the U.S., an unsolicited greeting

might be considered strange.
A common language opens up the possibility of a phenomenolog
ical sharing of everyday life.

The other takes you into account be

cause you speak the same language and then acts in such a wav as to
make vou more aware of common concerns. Failure to speak the same
language results in a self-fulfilling prophecy of mutual misunder
standings and accentuation of differences.

Without the common

linguistic framing of the interaction, there is no possibility of
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opening up towards the other and no possibility of authentic friend
ship.

Friendship might be defined as two or more people developing

a mutual, taken-for-granted trust.
trust is potentially available.

With a common language, such

Without it, we are likely as the

archetypal tourist to find blank stares and mutual incomprehension.
Because we don't understand the other's language, we don't
understand what s/he is trying to do or say.

Because we don't

-understand the language, we don't understand a different cultural
situation.

Because we don't understand the different cultural

situation, we don't perceive the similarity of cross-cultural
activities, needs, and concerns.

Because we misperceive what we

don't understand, we can't accept the plausibility of transcultural
necessities and common interests.
species.

We are all members of the same

When we actually see each other we should recognize our

overwhelming similarities as a species.
of the same human needs.

We all begin life with many

If we look for commonalities, we will find

them.
The Logic of Biocritique
A biocritical approach to sociological theory assumes that the
biosocial perspectives we have been examining have demonstrated the
plausibility of species-specific human characteristics and needs.

By

taking our evolutionary history into account, we accentuate and make
visible the transcultural needs and common developments of Homo sap
iens as a distinct species.

The discussion in previous chapters has,
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I believe, established the plausibility of determinate human needs.
Let us take as our ideal type the short list provided by Nussbaum in Chapter 4.

Human beings, as such, have a need to satisfy

hunger and thirst, a need for shelter, a need for extended and ade
quate care as infants, a need for affiliation with other human be
ings, a need for play and humor, a need for sexual activity, and "a
need to make vise of practical reason" (Nussbaum, 1992, pp. 216-220).
It is possible that this list should be extended, but let us assume
it minimally describes human needs.

Other efforts to provide policy

recommendations have produced very similar lists (Braybrooke, 1987,
pp. 32-47).

Nussbaum's list reflects the kinds of transcultural

similarities which are often ignored by cultural relativists (Geertz,
1973).

It is difficult to argue that any of Nussbaum's categories

should be excluded.

Even if differences persist, however, the

possibility of such a list is more important than its specific
provisions.
A biocritical analysis assumes that we do, in fact, know a
considerable amount about human needs.

It assumes that our needs are

ultimately the result of our specific evolutionary history.

It takes

information about needs from any discipline which seems relevant.

In

the establishment of cross-cultural human needs, it utilizes research
done in evolutionary biology, neurophysiology, psychology, sociobiology, physical anthropology, genetics and any other areas which are
germane to the problem at hand.

It assumes that it is possible to

generate a list of basic course-of-life needs, although each list
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will vary somewhat over time.

It takes as axiomatic and self-evident

that human needs should be adequately met by supportive social
institutions.
Sociology in general has posited the cultural relativity of all
value judgments.

Durkheim (1924/1953), for example, assumed that the

morality of a society was simply a function of its particular social
organization:

"History has established each society has in the main

a morality suited to it" (p. 56).

Perhaps the most famous proponent

of "coexisting and equally valid patterns of life" was Ruth Benedict
(1934, p. 240).

Sociology, according to this perspective, has noth

ing to add to ethical discussions.

As Randall Collins (1975) puts

it, "ethics is always an area of the ultimately arbitrary" (p. 547).
Even Jeffrey Alexander (1981), who is well-known for his critique of
positivism, has written that "the question of moral rationality must
be argued on a deeper plane, and we must be prepared to accept cer
tain inevitable differences of opinion" (p. 286).

As Stephen Seidman

(1991) recently wrote, "The values of the community of which the cri
tic is a part stands as the ’ultimate' realm of moral appeal" (p.
143).

Sociological opinion has generally proposed the cultural re

lativity of all value judgments.

In the realm of ethics, the socio

logical Owl of Minerva is grounded and flightless.
A biocritical approach suggests that at least short flights of
critical reason are possible.

It observes that some social institu

tions or cultures are better than others in adequately meeting spe
cific human needs.

Not every society is as effective as every other

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

190
in the satisfaction of a particular need.

The extent of variation

is an empirical question which may be investigated in the same man
ner as any other research problem.

In the United States, for exam

ple, heart disease is the leading cause of death and is responsible
for 34% of the total mortality among the fifteen leading causes of
death (United States Department of Health and Public Services, 1993,
p. 11).

Different countries have different rates of mortality re

sulting from different diseases.

Those which have lower rates than

others are doing a better job of meeting needs in particular areas.
Research can be conducted on needs in the same fashion as all other
social science research.
It may be possible to utilize official documents or census
data.

With proper qualifications and interpretation, it may be pos

sible to use various kinds of survey data.

Perhaps above all else

we need to observe behavior and use various methods of participant
observation.

The important theoretical point is that it is possible

to make meaningful comparisons between cultures with respect to the
satisfaction of human needs.

We are capable of providing reasons why

certain countries do a better job of meeting human needs than others.
This capability is what allows us to make comparative judgments about
social institutions in Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia, Cuba or Swe
den.

Hitler's ’Final Solution' was fundamentally wrong because it

was obviously the direct antithesis of the satisfaction of transcultural human needs which

is at the theoretical base of biocritique.

To use Hans Gerth's and C. Wright Mills' (1953) phrase,
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different countries do better or worse jobs of giving people various
life chances.

These are defined as factual probabilities of the

class structure and might include
everything from the chance to stay alive during the first
year after birth to the chance to view fine art, the chance
to remain healthy and grow tall, and if sick to get well
again quickly, the chance to avoid becoming a juvenile
delinquent--and very crucially, the chance to complete an
intermediate or higher educational grade, (p. 313)
Biocritique suggests that we can make intelligent choices in
the realm of values.

Assuming a common evolutionary history which

has produced common human needs, it is clear that some societies are
better able than others to meet those needs.

As Etzioni (1968) has

argued, determinate human needs provide an "independent basis with
which to compare societies with each other" (p. 878).

As Derek

Phillips (1986) has argued, a consistent moral and cultural rela
tivism presents a host of theoretical and practical problems.
If we assume that every culture has values which are proper for
its own peoples, which local values do we accept?

There are, after

all, going to be differences of opinion in any community.

Further

more, as Phillips (1986) asks, does the mere fact of a presumed
consensus in Stalinist Russia or Cuba or Sweden mean that all three
countries "have the same identical moral status?" (p. 21).

Phillips

gives the example of the value judgment "Hitler's ‘Final Solution' to
the so-called ’Jewish Question' was wrong" (p. 40).

He notes that it

is much easier to reach agreement on this statement among social
scientists than it is to reach agreement about presumably scientific
statements.

This suggests that relying exclusively on local
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standards or internal criteria is not an adequate solution to ethical
conflict or differences.

It is difficult to know what to do when the

indigenous populations disagree.
What are required to make intelligent value judgments, accord
ing to Phillips (1986), are relevant data and clearly reasoned and
comprehensible arguments (p. 40).

He argues that the rational

justifiability of a value judgment is in principle the same as the
rational justifiability of an empirical statement.

Phillips bases

this conclusion on "the ethical theorizing of Alan Gewirth" (pp. 85115).
Briefly, Gewirth argues that the two categorical features of
human action are its intentional and voluntary nature.

The fact that

action occurs at all shows that the actor considers it worthwhile.27
Because each actor feels he has a right as a human being to freedom
and well-being in the pursuit of his own goals, he must, by the
principle of universalizability extend the same right to others.

If

he did not, "he would be in the position of asserting that being a
prospective purposive agent both is and is not a sufficient condi
tion for having the generic rights" [i.e., to freedom and well-being
as the necessary precondition for human action] (Phillips, 1986,
p. 96, emphasis in original).

Gewirth (1978) presents a logical

justification of Kant's categorical imperative (Gewirth, 1978).

We

should, logically, treat others as we expect to be treated ourselves.
While Gewrith and Phillips present an interesting discussion of
the question of cultural relativity, they weaken their position by
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the exclusion of all biological and evolutionary data.

If the only

requirements of human action are its voluntary and free nature, it
would seem that the most blatant laissez faire Social Darwinism would
be one logically desirable environment.

It is clear that Gewirth and

especially Phillips--who is a socialist--do not personally view that
environment as culturally desirable.

Nevertheless, it is difficult

to see how the ideal system of conservative theorists such as Milton
Friedman (1962) could be legitimately rejected by Gewirth.

He deve

lops no specific theory of human needs and, therefore, has no logical
way of critiquing any particular social arrangements as long as some
one defines them as voluntary or free.
Biocritique is a critical perspective because it assumes that
there is always some gap between what is and what could be under
different conditions.

Perfection is a nonexistent virtue.

All

discussions of social problems involve some estimation of a loss of
potential.

Adolescent suicide or leukemia is viewed as particularly

tragic due to the presumed loss of potential resulting from premature
death.

She could have accomplished so much more is a common refrain.

She could have loved more, or seen more, or done any number of
things.

The fact that everyone feels this way at times does not de

tract from the general argument. It only indicates that none of us
believe that we accomplish all that we could.
In making comparative evaluations, as well as making an inter
nal critique of one's own culture, biocritical analysis looks at how
well each group is meeting basic human needs.

It develops empirical
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indicators to measure the effectiveness of each society in meeting
its peoples' needs.

While recognizing the futility of utopian crit

ique, it utilizes as a basis of comparison the standards and social
practices in whatever cultures or societies appear to be doing the
best contemporary job of meeting human needs.

It bases its criti

cism, ultimately, on the fact that each of us could learn the lan
guage and culture of any other group as the result of our basic
biological and species similarities.
In its critical analysis, biocritique takes note of the impli
cations of the fact that any nongenetically damaged human being can
learn the language and culture of any society.

Thus the life chances

which are potentially available to any individual are the life
chances which obtain in that country which is doing the best job of
meeting human needs.

Irrespective of the situation in which any

individual finds herself, it is a realistic assumption to conclude
that she could have developed in the cultures which provide optimal
satisfaction of human needs.

Biocitique suggests that a theoreti

cally adequate estimation of a person's loss of potential or life
chances would compare her situation with the average situation in
the country which best meets human needs. To use a simple example,
if Country X has an average life expectancy of 53 and Country Y has
an average life expectancy of 78, the average loss of life chances
comparing Country X to Country Y is twenty-five years.
Because of basic species similarities, it is clear that the
average person in Country X could have been raised in, accepted, and
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utilized the resources of Country Y.

There is no special reason why

she did not do so expect for the fact of historical and evolutionary
contingency.

We are where we are as the result of chance factors in

our evolutionary and historical background.

There are no essential

differences between the people in Country X compared to Country Y
which preclude in principle a completely different cultural develop
ment for both peoples.

Obviously a person in Country Y is also cap

able of being socialized in Country X and losing the advantages, on
the average, which are enjoyed by her former fellow citizens.

News

casts of famine and epidemics in Africa seem particularly tragic be
cause we in the West realize how different life might have been for
the stricken individuals with the kind of proper education, medical
care and nutrition which many of us take for granted.

As suggested

earlier, consciousness of kind increases in emergency situations.
If we are able to learn and absorb any culture into which we
are born and develop, we all, by definition, could absorb whatever
extant culture best meets our generic human needs.

Ralph Burhoe has

coined the phrase "cultural kin to refer to a shared coevolutionary
process of cultural/genetic adaptation" (Burhoe, 1988, p. 423).
Biocritique proposes that we all have the potential of becoming cul
tural kin because we all have the potential to learn each other's
language and absorb each other's culture.

A child from China raised

by Canadian parents naturally learns Canadian culture.

The child

from Canada raised in China becomes Chinese.
This potential cultural equality depends on and is ultimately
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made possible by biological similarity.

Because we are all Homo

sapiens. we all can learn whatever recipe knowledge we encounter.
Our cultural background is best seen as an accident of birth.
does not choose one'e parents.

One

Our common biological development

allows for the possibility of us all becoming cultural kin.

Bio-

critique takes the theoretical implications of our shared commonal
ities and makes them explicit.

It valorizes and dis-closes the

awareness of our genotypical similarities which has been overwhelmed
as a result of our phenotypic and cultural dissimilarities.

It sug

gests that we remember that we are indeed all brothers and sisters
under the skin.
reflections.

What we define as the other are our own genetic

We see others through our own specific linguistic and

culturally distorted lenses and don't realize that we are always
looking into mirrors.

The indistinct images we dimly perceive are

of ourselves.
If we attempt to provide a warranted justification for making
value judgments, we need to take this potential cultural equality
into account.

If we are able to learn any culture, we all could,

by definition, absorb whatever culture best meets our needs.

If we

determined, by using explicit criteria designed to measure the
effectiveness of need satisfaction, that Denmark was the country
which best met those needs, it is obvious that we all could learn
Danish as a common language.

The fact that this is possible at all

indicates our shared biosocial transcultural commonality.

No human

beings are reproductively isolated from any others and anyone could
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potentially share the same culture at birth.
Assuming that the satisfaction of human needs is a desideratum,
biocritique makes explicit what was often only implied in classical
critical theory.

It was not usually clear in the writings of cri

tical theorists such as Horkheimer and Adorno why they were critical
or on what criteria they were basing their critiques and justifying
their value judgments (Horkheimer, 1947, 1972; Horkheimer & Adorno,
1972; Kellner, 1989).

Derek Phillips (1986) has argued that the same

lack of clarity concerning "the moral element in social theory"
exists in the work of Habermas (Phillips, 1986, p. 83).
It does no good to argue that one should not make value judg
ments because social science should be objective.

As Michael Polanyi

has stated, "if we decided to examine the universe objectively in the
sense of paying equal attention to portions of equal mass, that would
result in a lifetime preoccupation with interstellar dust" (Polanyi,
1962, p. 3).

Simply by choosing a research topic, we imply that we

think that this subject is important and worth discussing.

Beginning

with W. V. 0. Quine's brilliant analysis of "Two Dogmas of Empiri
cism" (1961, pp. 20-46), it has been clearly demonstrated that a
simplistic fact/value dichotomy simply won't do.

A biocritical ap

proach realizes the complexity surrounding this issue and makes its
theory of valuation explicit.28
As the earlier discussion of Donna Haraway's work Primate
Visions (1989) indicated, the conceptual categories and domain
assumptions that we bring to our research inevitably affect our work.
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Japanese primatologists made different assumptions than their North
American counterparts and reached different conclusions (pp. 244258).

Among North American scientists, gender was a factor which

strongly influenced orientation towards primate research and the
types of questions which were pursued (pp. 279-367).

Men and women

saw their research subjects quite differently and concentrated on
different aspects of primate behavior.

Male primatologists tend not

to recognize bias when their analyses are centered around the male
sex (i.e., Man the Hunter). When females write about females, how
ever, the resulting distortions seem self-evident to many male
colleagues.

But all analysis is selective.

As Michael Polanyi (1962) has made clear, it doesn't help to
make an antiquated and erroneous distinction between pure and applied
science.

Even pure science disguises a hidden desire for social

control.

Polanyi nicely captures the Faustian dimension of science

in his discussion of intellectual passions:
Heuristic passion seeks no personal possession. It sets
out not to conquer, but to enrich the world. Yet such a
move is also an attack. It raises a claim and makes a
tremendous demand on other men [sic]: for itasks that
its gift to humanity be accepted by all. Inorder to be
satisfied, our intellectual passions must find a response.
This universal intent creates a tension; we suffer when a
vision of reality to which we have been committed ourselves
is contemptuously ignored by others. For a general unbelief
imperils our own convictions by evoking an echo in us. Our
vision must conquer or die. (p. 150, emphasis added)
It may only be a theory, but an author is going to dohis or
her best to make converts. How can other people be

so blindtowhat

is so obvious to me? is certainly a common academic question.

People
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have a strong tendency to define rationality as any shared opinion.
Intellectual disagreements (Polanyi, 1962) can be very frustrating
to the extent to which a discoverer has committed himself
[sic] to a new vision of reality, he has separated himself
from others who still think on the old lines. His persua
sive passion spurs him now to cross the gap by converting
everybody to his way of seeing things, (p. 150)
Polanyi gives us a glimpse as to why Thomas Kuhn's scientific
revolutions (1970) are always so acrimonious. Scientists' subjective
commitments are always involved and always at risk.
and the objective are convoluted and combined.

The subjective

The reaction of the

participants to the discovery of Lucy is a classic example of the
emotion of science (Johanson & Edey, 1981, pp. 13-24).

While I be

lieve that John Dewey demonstrated that knowledge may be differ
entially warranted (Dewey, 1920, 1929), it is nevertheless true that
no knowledge is complete.

We do the best we can with the information

available.
Given that some evaluation is implied in any sociological
description, how should we proceed?

Looking at Durkheim, Weber,

Collins and Alexander, we have seen that sociology has generally
assumed that all value judgments are relative to the situation which
is being described.

Logically, according to this view, one simply

can't make justified criticisms of any social practices.
a biocritical approach would be a contradiction in terms.
this puts sociologists in a classic double bind:

Presumably
But surely

One cannot avoid

making value judgments while doing research but one should not make
value judgments because there are no justifiable criteria on which
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they can be based.

Suppose, however, that this assumption is fund

amentally mistaken.

It is, after all, very difficult to justify a

strict culturally-relative view of the Nazis.
A biocritical perspective assumes that human beings have gen
eric human needs.

David Braybrooke terms these course-of-life needs

(Braybrooke, 1987, pp. 32-38).

Human beings have course-of-life

needs for such things as food and water, exercise and companionship.
Assuming that the satisfaction of human needs is a desirable state
allows for the possibility of meaningful comparisons concerning how
well different cultures meet these needs.

As we have seen in the

analysis of Robert Richard's evolutionary ethics, evolution and
natural selection do not, by themselves, provide objective value
criteria for value judgments.

The key theoretical move necessary is

the development of an empirical description of transcultural human
needs.

Given the warranted assertability of such needs, it is then

possible to make comparisons dealing with the question of the ade
quacy of social arrangements in meeting particular needs.

Cross-

cultural comparisons may be made using objective criteria, such as
comparative standards of health and human welfare, which avoid an
absolute cultural relativism.
Knowledge is best viewed as an unceasing process or activity.
It is entirely possible that human beings have capacities which are
as yet unrecognized.

It is also clear that needs are based on a

coevolutionary process.
on our knowledge.

What are seen as needs will vary depending

The genetic discoveries of the last several
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decades have altered the conceptions of human needs of even the most
orthodox Darwinist.

Dawkins, for example, argues (1986, 1989) that

our basic human need is the maximum propagation of our genetic
inheritance (i.e., the selfish gene).
While philosophers like Mary Midgley (1979) have argued that
the idea of a selfish gene is a category mistake--one cannot legi
timately apply a term that implies human volition to an entity that
exhibits no consciousness--it is nevertheless true that Dawkins and
others have introduced a new need into our scientific and moral dis
course (i.e., the maximization principle or maximum genetic repro
duction) . Other needs may be described or understood only at a fu
ture date.

This does not exclude the possibility of utilizing the

kind of naturalistic analysis of needs provided by Braybrooke, Midg
ley, and others as a pragmatic but revisable model of human neces
sities.
needs.

We have some idea of what kinds of conditions satisfy our
In actuality, we know a considerable amount about this topic

but the narrowness of our disciplinary vision has prevented us from
realizing the extent of our understanding.

While all description

implies some kinds of evaluation, one useful way of helping to recog
nize some of our own biases is to broaden the base of acceptable
information.
Sociology, for example, has almost completely ignored the find
ings of researchers in the areas of human ecology and environmental
studies.

In his studies of Habitat Selection, for example, Gorden

Orians (1980) has argued that the kinds of habitats and environments
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homo sapiens select for occupation show significant cross-cultural
similarities.

People generally respond positively to "open savannah

environments with scattered trees and abundant grass, while they re
acted negatively to treeless plains, especially if they were flat"
(p. 61).

Furthermore, "valleys of modest size have attracted humans

for ages and the attraction of water is also very familiar" (p. 61).
Orians argues that people have definite preferences for parti
cular kinds of habitats and that these preferences show a great deal
of historical and cross-cultural stability (Orians & Heerwagen, 1992,
pp. 555-579).

We seem to prefer a savannah-like environment of open

spaces, vegetation, trees, and a view of the water.

Orians (1980)

makes the interesting observation that the real estate market is an
important indicator of habitat preference.

In his hometown of

Seattle
views of waterfronts enter into appraisals of real estate
in all parts of the county but the manner in which they do
is very complex. Real estate agents in Seattle have an
unofficial complex classification of views, ranging from
pigeon-hole views that permit a small section of the moun
tains to be seen, to sweeping views which can encompass
the entire Olympic Mountains or an extensive stretch of the
Cascade Mountains. The more extensive the view, the greater
the increment to the value of the property. If a view of Puget
Sound or Lake Washington is also included in the foreground,
the value of the property is even greater, (p. 62)
It is the fundamental assumption of evolutionary history that
certain kinds of environments were more conducive to survival than
others.

Clearly a source of water was a prerequisite for survival.

Perhaps the open savannah was a more promising environment than an
arid or treeless climate.

Possibly the risk of being attacked in a
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dense forest was greater than on the open savannah on which you could
observe approaching dangers for some distance.
The possibility exists that we possess generalized predisposi
tions favoring certain environmental conditions which increased the
chances of our survival in the past.

We are, as a result, aestheti

cally attracted to particular living conditions.

The existence of

predispositonal habitat preferences would be no more surprising than
the well-established cross-cultural similarities in color classifica
tion (Durham, 1991, pp. 211-223).
Given the necessary resources and geographical flexibility,
people tend to select certain environments and habitats over others.
In Michigan, for example, it is difficult to understand the pheno
menal growth of places like Traverse City without assuming some
differential attractions.
to others.

We prefer certain kinds of environments

I am not suggesting that we all have a need to go back

to nature or live in the woods like ersatz Thoreaus.

As Stephen Jay

Gould (1991) has written, however, "We really must make room for na
ture in our hearts" (p. 14).

Holmes Rolston's notion of a microrural

environment is useful in this regard.

He defines it as "an urban

garden, a city park, an avenue of trees with squirrels and rabbits, a
suburban fence row with cardinals and mockingbirds, a creekside path
to school" (Rolston, 1986, p. 42).

The kind of naturalistic integra

tion of human and habitat practiced by Frank Lloyd Wright in the de
signs of his homes Taliesin and Taliesin West may serve as an ideal type for an optimal human/environmental relationship.

If, as we say,
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money talks, it speaks in a loud voice with little variation about
our choice of living spaces.
in which to live.

We do not randomly seek environments

Not all campsites are equally attractive or

beneficial.
Biocritique proposes that sociologists expand the range of what
is considered relevant or significant data.

If our moral and

intellectual faculties are the result of our common evolutionary
history, it is clear that we need to improve our understanding of
that process.

We need to understand the causal relationships that

produced our current genotype.

We need to better understand how the

brain works and how it influences our perception and attitudes (Restak, 1984, 1991; Wills, 1993).

We need to understand the genetic

and behavioral similarities between other species and ourselves.

A

biocritical analysis should take into account what is being learned
in the area of human ecology.

Human beings are not blank slates able

to adjust to any environment with equal efficiency.
Biocritique suggests that it makes a great deal of difference
how we look at our fellow human beings.

A major change in perception

is warranted and should be based, ultimately, on the biological and
evolutionary considerations which we have been discussing.

A black

person and a white person looking at each other in the United States
cannot, of course, ignore their distinctive colors.

But they should

also be aware of their shared species-specific characteristics.
Biocritique recognizes the possibility, as Bill McKibben has
argued, that in spite of all the technological advances in
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communication, we also suffer from an age of missing information
(McKibben, 1992).

In the age of television soundbites, "vital

knowledge that humans have always possessed about who we are and
where we live seems beyond our reach" (p.9).
we know about or personally experience.

We can only want what

Much of the information what

indicates who we are has been ignored by contemporary sociology.
Awareness of who we are presupposes an understanding of our evolu
tionary history.

Awareness of human similarities requires exper

iential activities such as authentic cross-cultural communication
which are not a part of standard sociological instruction.

An aware

ness of the necessity and importance of the need for human companion
ship assumes that one belongs to groups in which it is possible to
socialize.

Biocritique takes for granted the desirability of in

creasing our cultural kin.

As Robert Richards (1989) has stated, we

may someday come to see that our kind "reaches to all individuals
having a common biological nature" (p. 341).
We are all the same species living in the same hotel, but some
of us begin life in the Penthouse.

A biocritical approach recognizes

that human needs are more likely to be met in First Class than in
steerage.

It is ludicrous to assume that all the differences in

volved between the two classifications are nonexistent, or that the
only important questions for sociology are why the different areas of
the hotel or the boat were constructed in the first place.
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CHAPTER VII

A RE-READING OF THE COMMUNITARIAN PERSPECTIVE:
A CASE STUDY IN THE USE OF BIOCRITIQUE
The Logic of Communitarianism
Since the publication of the bestselling Habits of the Heart by
Robert Bellah and his co-authors in 1985, the interest in what has
been termed the communitarian approach or communitarianism has stead
ily increased.

A recent White House conference on ways to rebuild

the American character emphasized the communitarian perspective.
Sociologist Amitai Etzioni (quoted in Powell, 1994), a leader of the
Communitarian Movement, said that national leaders can
act without fear that attempts
responsibilities, institutions
cause us to charge into a dark
authoritarianism that leads to
or right-wing world, (p. A7)

to shore up our values,
and communities will
tunnel of moralism and
a church-dominated state

Etzioni has outlined his position in detail in a recent volume
entitled The Spirit of Community (1993).

The book contains a "com

munitarian platform" (pp. 251-267) and a summary of communitarian
positions on the family, school, institutions, and politics.

Along

with Bellah's work, Etzioni's volume provides a clear and comprehen
sive summary of the communitarian approach.

While the social criti

cism of Bellah, Etzioni and other communitarians is a valuable con
tribution to political debate, I will demonstrate in this chapter
that its theoretical approach is fundamentally flawed by its lack

206
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of attention to our evolutionary past and biosocial present.

The

biocritical perspective allows for a re-reading or deconstruction of
communitarian discourse.

It opens the communitarian field to

alternative interpretations.

It accentuates the aporias or gaps in

communitarian narratives and suggests the re-presentation of alterna
tive narratives.
Alasdair MacIntyre, whose book After Virtue (1984) provides a
philosophical foundation for communitarianism, argues that "man [sic]
is in his actions and practice, as well as in his fictions, essen
tially a story-telling animal" (p. 216).
assumes the same.

A biocritical perspective

We need to take seriously and understand the ways

stories were told in the past (Pfeiffer, 1982).

We need to under

stand what John Pfeiffer has termed the "hidden images of our own
creative explosion" (Pfeiffer, 1982, pp. 1-18). Just as others have
done in the past, we need to today expand the range and type of the
stories we tell.

The interstices of communitarian space may be

successfully occupied by biocritical narratives.

My reading of the

communitarian approach is critical but not destructive.

In any re

reading or intervention29 one looks to preserve the strongest argu
ments encountered, not only to expose the weakest links.

As Dewey

believed, the objective should be enhanced co-existence, not mutual
extermination.

Conflicting narratives often have more in common

than appearances suggest.

Given a different perspective, supposed

dualisms often dissolve.
The communitarian perspective is fundamentally a critique of
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liberalism (MacIntyre, 1984).

Bellah (1988) and other communitar

ians believe that "it is precisely the persistence of nonliberal
practices that makes our society viable at all" (p. 271).

As they

argue in Habits of the Heart, "modem individualism seems to be
producing a way of life that is neither individually nor socially
viable" (p. 144).

According to Bellah, "it is only the presence of

practices rooted in older traditions [the older ’civic' and ’bib
lical' traditions] that makes our society possible at all" (p. 274).
Liberalism, according to these authors, valorizes only the pur
suit of egoistic self-interest.

There is no sense of "a common

allegiance to and a common pursuit" of shared activities (MacIntyre,
1984, p. 156).

In a legal system based on individualistic concep

tions of rights, "there seems to be no rational way of securing moral
agreement" (p. 6).

In a completely Hobbesian world of egoistic con

flict, the best we can hope for "is the construction of local forms
of community within which civility and the intellectual and moral
life can be sustained through the new dark ages which are already
upon us" (p. 263).

The rational self-interest of liberalism allows

for no common interest.

Individual rationality results in social

catastrophe.

We seem to have nothing in common.

We have no sense

of community.

The only people who seem happy are "a motley party of

defenders of liberal individualism--some of them utilitarians, some
Kantians" (p. 260).
According to Bellah, "a community is a group of people who
live in a common territory, have a common history and shared values,
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participate in various activities, and have a high degree of solid
arity" (Phillips, 1993, p. 14, emphasis in original).

Living to

gether creates much greater solidarity than joining voluntary or
ganizations and associations.

People who share a common tradition

and a shared conception of the public good will experience a better
life than those who do not (Bellah, et al., 1985, pp. 251-252).
Without social solidarity, "progress seems less compelling when it
appears that it may be progress into the abyss" (p. 277).
Bellah et al., (1985) criticizes what he terms Welfare Liber
als for their belief that "the purpose of government is to give in
dividuals the means to pursue their private ends" (p. 265).

Egoistic

self-interest does not provide adequate grounding for social solid
arity.

We need "a more explicit understanding of what we have in

common" (p. 287). Given such a self-understanding, "the differences
between us that remain would be less threatening" (p. 287).
Communitarians are critical of the procedural emphasis of lib
eralism, which they claim "cannot support a coherent and effective
political system" (Bellah, et al., 1985, p. 287).

Concentrating only

on individual rights and entitlements produces social chaos and free
riders who take advantage of the system but contribute nothing in
return. "Rights," as Etzioni (1993) argues, "presume responsibili
ties" (pp. 9-11).

Bellah et al. (1985) complain that defining free

dom as "freedom from the demands of others provides no vocabulary in
which Americans can address common conceptions of the ends of a good
life or ways to coordinate cooperative action with others" (p. 24).
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Habits of the Heart, as its authors state, "is, explicitly and
implicitly, a detailed reading of, and commentary on, Tocqueville,
the predecessor who has influenced us most profoundly" (Bellah, et
al., 1985, p. 306).

They argue that "Tocqueville's sense of American

society as a whole has never been equaled, nor has anyone ever better
pointed out the moral and political meaning of the American experi
ment" (p. 298).

Certainly Tocqueville's (1835/1969) comments on such

topics as "the three races that inhabit the United States are bril
liant and should be consulted in the original by anyone interested
in U.S. history" (pp. 316-407).

Bellah's own work is meant to be an

updated analysis on the moral and political meaning of contemporary
liberalism.
In Democracy in America. Tocqueville (1835/1969) referred to
"moeurs [mores] in the strict sense which might be called the habits
of the heart" (p. 287).30

He was particularly interested, as is

Bellah, in the social consequences of religion.

Tocqueville argued

that "men [sic] cannot do without dogmatic beliefs, and religious
dogmas seem to me the most desirable of all" (p. 442).

He called "a

passion for well-being" the "mother of all desires" in the United
States and believed the function of religion was to "purify, control
and restrain that excessive and exclusive taste for well-being which
men [sin] acquire in times of equality" (p. 464).

Bellah and other

communitarians believe that religion should still serve similar pur
poses (Bellah et al., 1985, pp. 219-249).
A reading of Tocqueville (1835/1969) suggests concerns very
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similar to what Bellah and other communitarians are critical of
today.

Remarkably, for the time, Tocqueville believed that the

"two great nations in the world" were the United States and Russia
(p. 412]).

His vision of the future United States suggests a kind

of communitarian ideal.
Therefore, the time must come when there will be in North
America one hundred and fifty million people all equal one
to the other, belonging to the same family, having the same
point of departure, the same civilization, language, religion,
habits, and mores, and among whom thought will circulate in
similar forms and with like nuances. All else is doubtful,
but that is sure. (p. 412)
While Bellah and Etzioni would argue that the communitarian
perspective does not imply that "thought will circulate in similar
forms," numerous references to "older civic and biblical traditions,"
as well as the positive valorization of Tocqueville, imply exactly
that (Bellah et al., 1985, p. 144).

In a response to his critics

Bellah chides Fredric Jameson (1988) for his use of a postmodernist/
Marxist discourse.

Bellah suggests that "intellectuals who cannot

speak an American tongue have small audiences" and that if Marxism is
ever "to be an effective public voice in America, it will have to
learn to sneak American" (Bellah, 1988, p. 282, emphasis added).
The unstated implication is My language--Love it or leave it.
But the point is that there is no single American languaee. There is
an English language which is always evolving and is vastly different
from what was spoken in, say, England in 1776.

There are American

citizens who have different linguistic experiences and backgrounds.
If my background is Latin American, there is a very real sense in
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which, even if my spoken English is perfect, I don't speak the same
language as Tocqueville's Anglo-Americans (Shorris, 1992).
is true if I am bilingual as opposed to monolingual.
one American.

The same

There is no

As Derek Phillips (1993) has observed, "the pursuit

of community often has very negative consequences for those who are
to be excluded from membership" (p. 163).
Vincent Harding (1988) finds Habits of the Heart "fundamentally
and sadly flawed" because of its exclusive "white, middle-class"
focus and his complaint is clearly justified (pp. 67-83).

One ob

tains a much different perspective from books like Walt Harrington's
journey into black America (Harrington, 1992).

As Harding observes,

"do my nonwhite students mistake the work when they say ’I just don't
see myself there'?" (Harding, 1988, p. 78).
simply not present.

I think not.

They are

Neither are any Latinos.

There are, nevertheless, many attractive features to the
communitarian critique.

People are justifiably concerned with many

of the critical issues raised by communitarian discourse.

As Bellah

accurately observes, "There is a widespread feeling that the promise
of the modern era is slipping away from us" (Bellah, et al., 1985,
p. 277).

Surveys find "a national mood of disillusionment and self-

absorption" (Lawrence, 1994, p. Al). It seems that we increasingly
have less and less in common.
omnipresent.

Crime and corruption are believed

Everyone is only out to make a buck.

The New York

Times notes that "Anger and Cynicism Well Up In Voters as Hope Gives
Way" (Berke, 1994, p. Al & A9).

People believe that the United
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States is "losing its moral roots" and, in a significant sense,
"the system is broken" (p. A9). The recent Republican electorial
landslide can be interpreted in these terms.
Perhaps MacIntyre's perception of a new dark ages is correct.
Certainly the condition of many cities suggests as much (Wilson,
1987).

It's blacks vs. whites, affluent vs. poor, suburbs vs.inner-

cities,

us vs. them.

There is no moral common ground and everyone

is locked into a "language of individual self-interest" (Bellah et
al., 1985, pp. 141, 175).

We no longer can control "the destructive

consequences of the pursuit of economic success" (p. 199).

Americans

are so preoccupied with their individual rights that they "are de
prived of a language genuinely able to mediate among self, society,
the natural world, and ultimate reality" (p. 237).

We are lost in

the land of Me, but need to think about Us.
In a key passage in Democracy in America. Tocqueville (1969/
1840) indicates the heart of the communitarian complaint against
the rights-based, procedural ethics of liberalism:
If the lights ever go out, they will fade little by
little, as if of their own accord. Confining our
selves to practice, we may lose sight of basic prin
ciples, and when these have been entirely forgotten,
we may apply the methods derived from them badly; we
might be left without the capacity to invent new methods,
and only able to make a clumsy and an unintelligent use
of wise procedures no longer understood, (p. 464)
Bellah, MacIntyre, Etzioni and other communitarians argue that
we have lost all knowledge of the virtues or any conception of the
good.

We are the bureaucrats in Max Weber's Zweckrational or ration

ally purposeful machines.

"We have no way to arrive at ends.

We can
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only rationally argue over the means to arrive at a given end"
(Ashley & Orenstein, 1990, pp. 271-274).

We have no communal methods

to agree on value-rational actions: "goals or ends that are defined
in terms of subjectively meaningful values" (p. 273).

As Bellah

observes, "we have put our own good, as individuals ahead of the
common good" (Bellah, et al, 1985, p. 285).
Our narcissistic language, "the language of individualism, the
primary American language of self-understanding, limits the ways in
which people think" (Bellah, et al.,

1985, p. 290).

We cannot con

ceive of a common good in the language of individual rights and ra
tional egoism.

According to the communitarians, "the language of

individualism" nullifies the possibility of communal projects.

One

way in which this occurs is by the individualistic obliteration of
the distinction between internal and external practices.
According to MacIntyre (1984), a "practice involves standards
of excellence and obedience to rules as well as the achievement of
goods" (p. 190). ' His more formal definition is
By a practice I am going to mean any coherent and complex
form of socially established cooperative human activity
through which goods internal to that form of activity are
realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards
of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially defi
nitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human
powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the
ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.
(p. 187).
One example that MacIntyre uses is the game of chess.

Certain

kinds of goods are specific to the game itself: analytical skill,
concentration, competitive intensity.

They can "only be identified
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and recognized by the experience of participating in the practice in
question" (pp. 188-189).

In order to achieve these standards of

excellence, one must learn to play the game.

One can easily extend

the notion of internal standards to other activities: writing,
physics, baseball, painting.

Each activity demands certain kinds of

skills specific to that activity.
There are also "goods externally and contingently attached to
chess-playing and other practices by the accidents of social circum
stances such goods as prestige, status and money" (MacIntyre, 1984,
p. 188).

These external goods "are always some individual's property

and possession characteristically they are such that the more some
one has of them, the less there is for other people" (p. 190).
External goods, as defined by MacIntyre, are a zero-sum game.
reward is vour loss.

Mv

In the case of internal goods, the opposite is

the case: The whole is greater than the sum of its parts.
Someone else learning how to play chess does not reduce the
intrinsic rewards which I have received in learning to play myself.
We are both better off for our efforts.

If I learn the skills that

are necessary to write a good book, my skills are not decreased by
the similar efforts of others.

It may be that other books sell more

copies, but, in Maclntryre's terms, total sales are extrinsic rewards
and have no necessary relationship to the skills necessary to produce
the book.

In a sense no longer familiar to many rational capitalists,

I am better off no matter how my book sells.

The quality of the book

has no relationship to its quantity of sales or profits.

What
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categorizes a book as good or bad are other kinds of standards inter
nal to the tradition in which the book was written.
MacIntyre's complaint, echoed by Bellah and others, is that
modern rights-based liberalism increasingly only recognizes extrinsic
standards and assumes that all practices are commensurable and sub
ject to an identical pecuniary calculus.

All that is important,

under this assumption, is necessarily part of a gigantic zero-sum
game.

Whatever I achieve lessens the chances of vour achievement.

Communitarians argue that this is not a particularly likely method
of building social solidarity.

They accurately note that this kind

of hedonistic calculus excludes by definition many activities that
human beings throughout history have considered particularly mean
ingful .
I spent several summers working as a camp counselor.

Whatever

good I did as an archery counselor--whatever proficiency I achieved-did not somehow detract from anyone else's work.

Increasing the

level of individual achievement improved the camp as a whole.

There

was no necessary conflict between individual excellence and group
goals:

Each presupposed and included the other.

The same was true

of the friendships which developed--and Maclntryre would certainly
include friendship under his notion of a practice.

Friendship, as

Ronald Sharp (1986) has argued, is a "gift exchange which increases
the wealth of both individuals" (pp. 82-117).

Both people gain.

To continue the logic used by Martha Nussbaum in her discussion
of human needs, it is difficult to imagine a human existence with no
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friends.

Contemporary liberalism, according to MacIntyre and Bellah,

reduces everything to market relationships and ignores the profound
differences between internal and external rewards.

The authors of

Habits of the Heart make a good case for their argument that much
contemporary cynicism and disillusionment are a result of the wide
spread belief that politicians and other leaders perceive no dis
tinctions whatsoever between these two kinds of rewards.
To summarize the communitarian arguments and criticisms:
1.

There is no way in our culture to secure moral agreement.

There is a fundamental conflict between an individualistic and a
communal orientation.
2.

This conflict is reflected in the liberal emphasis on

individual rights or entitlements and the communitarian emphasis on
the common good.
3.

The result of excessive individualism is a total lack of

concern with other people and sociaal necessities, whereas what is
desperately needed is a new emphasis on what we share and have in
common.
4.

Our individualistic philosophy and discourse does not allow

us to understand or adequately deal with what we have in common.
5.

This can only be accomplished by a new emphasis on the

classic biblical and republican traditions, or through a neoprogres
sive communitarian social movement.
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The Communitarian Loss of Memory
One of the concepts Bellah et al. (1985) develop in Habits of
the Heart is the idea of communities of memory.

Communities, in

their sense of the term, "have a history--in an important sense they
are constituted by their past" (p. 153).

A genuine community of

memory will tell and preserve stories to each other.

The common

stories "carry a context of meaning that can allow us to connect our
aspirations for ourselves and those closest to us with the aspira
tions of a larger whole" (p. 153).

When they ignore or forget their

history, communities degenerate into what Bellah terms a lifestyle
enclave, which "celebrates the narcissism of similarity instead of
the interdependence of public and private life" (p. 72).

Those who

have no historical memories have no authentic communities.
It is particularly off-putting and also ironic, given the
communitarian emphasis on memory and shared history, that Habits of
the Heart ignores the writings of the progressive communitarian cri
tics such as John Dewey, Randolph Bourne, Van Wyck Brooks, Waldo
Frank and Lewis Mumford.

They also ignore more recent commentaries

such as Robert Nisbet's well-known volume The Quest for Community
(1953) which advances many of the same communitarian themes.

There

are others in the communitarian tradition besides Tocqueville.

As

historian Christopher Lasch (1988) has written,
In the twentieth century, the communitarian tradition was
present as an undercurrent in prewar prorgressivism, as
interpreted by writers like Josiah Royce, Jane Addams,
Mary Parker Follet, and Randolph Bourne; and it was
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carried on in late years by John Collier, Waldo Frank, Lewis
Mumford, and Paul Goodman, (p. 175)
In his incisive volume Beloved Community, historian Casey Nelson
Blake (1990) suggests that
the need for a living tradition of critical thought be
comes especially evident in the light of the current cri
sis of American liberalism, which in the 1980s received
its most searching analysis in the works of philosopher
Alasdair MacIntyre and the group of social scientists
working under the direction of Robert Bellah. MacIn
tyre's After Virtue and the Bellah group's Habits of the
Heart reiterate themes that occupied thinkers like John
Dewey and the Young Americans [Bourne et al.] at the start
of this century, although neither book acknowledges the
existence of these precursors, (p. 298)
As Blake observes, a "viable usable past would free present-day
criticism from the endless rediscovery of past positions" (p. 298).
The similarity of concerns between Bourne, Mumford, Dewey, Brooks,
Frank and Bellah and MacIntyre is remarkable.

In one of his most

famous essays Bourne (1977) spoke of his "future social goals in
which all can participate, the good life of personality31 lived in
the environment of the Beloved Community.
America, on which all can unite" (p. 264).

It must be a future
In a passage that could

have been written by MacIntyre or Bellah, Bourne deplores the cheap
ness of American life and the "hordes of men and women without a
spiritual country, cultural outlaws without taste, without standards"
(p. 254).

Speaking of the American community, Bourne writes:

The influences at the fringe, however, are centrifugal,
anarchical. They make for detached fragments of peoples.
Those who come to find liberty achieve only license. They
become the flotsam and jetsam of American life, the down
ward undertow of our civilization with its leering cheapness
and falseness of taste and spiritual outlook, the absence of
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mind and sincere feeling which we see in our slovenly towns,
our vapid moving pictures, our popular novels, and the vac
uous faces of the crowds on the city streets, (p. 255)
Bourne (1977), in contrast to MacIntyre and Bellah, blamed a
conformist Anglo-Saxon mediocrity for the forced denationalization
of new immigrants and the resulting falseness of taste.

But his

conception of democracy could also have been taken from Etzioni's
1993 communitarian handbook:
If freedom means the right to do pretty much as one
pleases, so long as one does not interfere with others,
the immigrant has found freedom. But if freedom means
a democratic cooperation in determining the ideals and
purposes and industrial and social institutions of a
country, then the immigrant has not been free. (p. 252)
Maclntrye and Bellah would certainly agree with Bourne (1977)
that "the modern radical opposes the present social system not be
cause it does not give him his rights, but because it warps and
stunts the potentialities of society and human nature" (p. 246).
They would similarly agree with other progressive critics such as
Lewis Mumford's critique of "the eclipse of the notion of the common
good" (Blake, 1990, p. 211), or Van Wyck Brooks's desire to "reestab
lish the organic unity of preindustrial cultures on a modem, demo
cratic basis" (Blake, 1990, p. 99).

Brooks's (1915) famous distinc

tion between highbrow and lowbrow culture, which he published in
1915, is very similar to MacIntyre's and Bellah's critique:
In everything one finds this frank acceptance of twin
values which are not expected to have anything in common:
on the one hand a quite unclouded, quite urihypocritical
assumption of transcendent theory (high ideals); and on
the other a simultaneous acceptance of catchpenny realities.
Between university ethics and business ethics between good
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government and Tammany there is no community, no genial
middle ground, (p. 7)
The value of this kind of historical analysis is to avoid the
endless rediscovery of past positions.

Bourne, Brooks, and Mumford

were all engaged in a critique of the culture of individualism.

If

a contemporary author is trying to develop a communitarian community
of memory, why not also look at the results and problems of similar
positions taken in the past?

As Blake (1990) observes, "the current

discussion about culture and democratic renewal arrives at the same
critical impasse Mumford reached more than a half-century ago" (p.
301).

Mu m f ord

"never fully addressed the ways in which power re-

roduces itself through language" and neither do Bellah or MacIntyre
(p. 301).
Will the development of a new vocabulary in itself lead to the
development of a communitarian ethos?

Communitarianism requires

development of political alternatives to liberal capitalism.
we going to do that?

How are

Bourne, Brooks and Mumford were all somewhat

vague on the relationship between cultural criticism and political
and economic reform.

Bellah et al. (1985) write that "The question,

then, is whether the older civic and biblical traditions have the
capacity to reformulate themselves while simultaneously remaining
faithful to their deepest insights" (p. 144).

Even if they did,

however, have the capability to reformulate themselves, what would
that mean?

What are the social forms of communitarian integration

which are being proposed?

Is it enough to produce a communitarian

vocabulary as opposed to the language of utilitarian individualism?
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As John Patrick Diggins (1994) has argued:
Why does it follow that theories about human nature are
to be replaced by narratives about human life? Cannot
the turn toward narration be regarded as another tempor
ary product of history rather than a final description
of the human condition? The poststructuralist prides
himself on seeing history and contingency where others
supposedly see theory and necessity. And seeing all
language constructions as indeterminate productions,
the neo-pragmatist wants us to appreciate how things
can be changed by being redescribed. But the spectacle
of power and evil may not be contingent and instead defy
the philosopher who assumes that reality, known only as
interpreted, can be reinterpreted to suit political pur
poses. Experimenting with vocabularies can do little
to change determinate phenomena that exist independently
of language, (p. 481)
It is, of course, possible to argue that no phenomena exist
independently of language.

On the other hand, Blake in his critique

of Bourne, Brooks and Mumford suggests that no language exists
independently of political power. Language is not independent of
determinate phenomena and cannot be adequately understood apart from
that phenomena.

The relationships are reciprocal.

Diggins' argument at least raises the possibility that Mac
Intyre and Bellah "invoke a new civic language that lacks any poliical content" (Blake, 1990, p. 300).

Sections of Habits of the

Heart do sound like apolitical banalities delivered by a team of
Mannheim's free-floating intellectuals in communitarian drag.

Hab

its of the Heart was based on a series of extended, or what Bellah
et al. (1985) term "active, interviews" (p. 305).

The problem, as

Joseph Gusfield (1986) notes, is that "cases are held up through
the book almost as abstract models of such types as utilitarian
individualism and republican tradition" (p. 9).

The lack of any
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detailed sense of concrete political and economic realities is ex
actly the same problem which plagued the earlier communitarian writ
ers.

Surely their works deserve attention from contemporary commu

nitarians stressing communities of memory.32
A Biocritical Re-reading of the Communitarian Perspective
Communitarians believe that there is a fundamental conflict
between an individualistic and a communal perspective.
individualism causes us to devalue the common good.

Our rugged

As political

theorist Michael Walzer (1990) has written,
we cannot sit together and tell comprehensible stories,
and we recognize yourselves in the stories we read only
when these are fragmented narratives, without plots, the
literary equivalent of atonal music and nonrepresentational art. (p. 9)
Our fragmented, liberal, individualistic, rights-oriented
society means that we lack any concern for other people or knowledge
of what we have in common.

Our individualistic vocabularies do not

provide the necessary prerequisites for a discussion of the public
good.

They are lacking in what might be termed communal enabling

mechanisms.
dual is all.

In the solitary world of Hobbes and Locke, the indivi
For the authors of Habits of the Heart, the only way

forward is through a remaking and reestablishment of the more
communalistic republican and biblical traditions in American life.
As Bellah writes, "with a more explicit understanding of what we
have in common the differences between us that remain would be
less threatening" (Bellah et al., 1985, p. 287).
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A biocritical approach to communitarianism suggests that Bel
lah, MacIntyre and other communitarians are mistaken in their anal
yses in several important respects.

They present a series of false

alternatives: the individual vs. society; rights ys. the common good;
the present dark ages vs. a communitarian past.

As Jeffrey Stout

(1988b) has argued, "The problem with most communitarian criticism of
liberal society....is its implicitly utopian character" (p. 137).
Bellah et al. provide perceptive social criticism and intimations of
a communitarian alternative, but "if imagined utopias are to generate
more than terminal wistfulness, we will need also to imagine how to
achieve them by acceptable means" (Stout, 1988b, p. 137, emphasis
added). It is not merely a question of rights against the community
good. Consider what Walzer (1990, pp. 11-12) terms the Four Mobil
ities :
1.

Geographic mobility. Americans change their residences
more than any other people in history.

2.

Social mobility. Children find themselves in different
locations and tell different stories than their parents
did.

3.

Marital mobility. Rates of separation and divorce are
higher than they have ever been.

4.

Political mobility. Independent voters stand outside
all political organizations. They make for a volatile
electorate where party loyalty means less and less.

It is clear that excessive movement in these areas affects
communities in various ways.

Bellah and MacIntyre are right to point

out the negative effects of what might be called our hypertrophic
migratory patterns.

Families are split apart.

Children sometimes
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never see their parents.

Etzioni (1993) notes that "14.4% of those

65 and older lived alone in 1950.
120-121).

In 1990 the figure was 31%" (pp.

Older people, as well as everyone else, suffer the ef

fects of social isolation.

Why bother to make real friendships when

the next move is only a year away?
The problem for the communitarians is to provide acceptable
alternatives to the four mobilities.

Hardly anyone in the United

States is going to tolerate any restrictions on geographic, social,
or marital freedom of choice. In spite of the current totally nega
tive view of politics, most people don't want abolish to Congress or
eliminate the possibility of representative institutions.

One

could, of course, add other mobilities to Walzer's list: the freedom
to attend a particular school, the freedom to travel to other coun
tries, the freedom to read a particular book.

The liberal rights

that communitarians devalue allow for the possibility of numerous
freedoms that Americans consider essential. How, then, are more
communitarian objectives going to be promoted?
Part of the reason the communitarians' discourse often seems so
vapid and unrealistic is due to the unavoidable conclusion that their
objectives require such fundamental and politically unacceptable
changes.

At times we all want to tell the boss to go to hell, leave

town, and start over somewhere else.

Communitarians in general ig

nore an entire tradition in American literature, exemplified by such
works as Catch-22 or Tropic of Cancer, which brilliantly analyze the
conflicts between authentic personal autonomy and excess social
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integration.

Communitarians would be helped by a sense of humor.

Communitarians would also be helped by more flexibility and
willingness to consider alternative perspectives.

Assuming, for the

moment, the accuracy of the communitarian critique and the desir
ability of communitarian reforms, one can still seriously doubt the
effectiveness of the proposed remedies.

Bellah et al. (1985) suggest

that "Indeed it may be only in terms of those older traditions [bib
lical and republican] that the deeper meaning of our individualism
and the aspirations it embodies can be salvaged at all" (p. 141).
Frederic Jameson (1988), in a commentary on Habits of the Heart,
argues that this particular phrase "rings like an admission of fail
ure if not an anticipation of defeat" (p. 107).

His reading of a

kind of defeatist tone in Habbits of the Heart is both perceptive and
accurate.
We have ample historical evidence--certainly from our own
history--that a religious orientation does not advance the communi
tarian objectives proposed by Bellah and MacIntyre.
tried and found wanting.

It has been

As Bellah et al. (1985) note,

The ideas Americans have traditionally used to give shape
and direction to their most generous impulses no longer
suffice to give guidance in controlling the destructive
consequences of the pursuit of economic success, (p. 199,
emphasis added)
If, in fact, the ideas Americans have traditionally used--in
the form of religious or republican themes--do not now give guidance
to our actions, perhaps it is time to look for different ideas,
perspectives, and approaches.
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In The Mode of Information (1990), Mark Poster effectively
demonstrates that every new method of transmitting information
profoundly affects our social networks.

Computer technology, data

bases, T.V., global communications, the information superhighway all
have an impact on our lives.

The entire emphasis on the postmodern

is a recognition of the differences between our current forms of
social organization and what existed earlier in our history.

The

problems we face today are not the same as those faced by our colon
ial politicians and theologians, or somewhat later by Abraham Lin
coln.

If the sociology of knowledge has any validity, it demon

strates that one cannot artificially graft a 17th or 18th century
Weltanschauung onto completely changed material and intellectual
landscapes.

Our communities of memory include science and intel

lectual history.

Knowledge, as Dewey argued, is a process of social

change which produces social consequences--like the information
superhighway.
to the status

It is not easy to travel newly-constructed roads back
quo

ante.

A biocritical perspective proposes that communitarians are
looking at the wrong kinds of information.

Contemporary communi

tarians face the same difficulties which earlier writers like Bourne
and Brooks were unable to overcome in their discourse.

This indi

cates the necessity for new information, new approaches and new
stories.

One place to begin is with the most contemporary and war

ranted information on our own bioevolutionary past.
Communitarians argue that there is no way in our culture to
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secure moral agreement and that there is a fundamental conflict be
tween an individualistic and a communal perspective.

Biocritique

suggests that they are mistaken in both these claims.

The social

consequences of our language of individualism33 depend on what is
being said.

Suppose we seriously took into account our biological

similarities and transcultural human needs.

A biocritical discourse

notes individual differences, but also foregrounds what we have in
common.

It is true that each of us has individual needs, but these

needs are remarkably similar.

The language [sic] of individualism

is transformed by a recognition of how similar each individual is
with respect to course-of-life needs.

The work of Alan Gewirth, for

example (1978), clearly demonstrates that an individualistic perpective may develop communitarian aims.
In After Virtue. MacIntyre (1984) completely rejects the moral
claims of Gewirth.

Gewirth, as indicated in the previous chapter,

argues that every human being requires a certain amount of freedom
and well-being to carry out any project.

I must logically insist

that I require that basic minimum if I am to accomplish anything at
all.

As MacIntyre observes, it also necessary follows that "if I

claim a right in virtue of my possession of certain characteristics,
then I am logically committed to holding that anyone else with the
same characteristics also possesses that right" (p. 67).

Therefore,

claims Gewirth, we all have the same generic right to freedom and
well-being.
MacIntyre (1984) holds, however, that Gewirth's discussion of
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rights depends on a specific historical context and that "such types
of social institution or practice have not existed universally in
human societies" (p. 67).

That is, certain cultures exist or have

existed in which the modem conception of rights simply wasn't or
isn't present.

Practices and sets of rules regarding rights "are in

no way universal features of the human condition and always have a
highly specific and socially local character" (p. 67).

It is incor

rect to assume that everyone else shares the same characteristic of
having rights in the sense that the term is used in the United
States.

Gewirth's argument is therefore invalid because his discus

sion of rights lacks universality.

We are not logically committed to

holding that everyone should possess a minimum standard of freedom
and well-being because not everyone possesses rights.
MacIntyre is, of course, correct in his historicist interpre
tation of the concept of rights.

But he is mistaken in his assump

tion that rights are the only relevant and universal features of the
human condition which should be considered.

MacIntyre's entire argu

ment and critique of Gewirth depends on this point.

Logically, he

must concede that other universal features of our particular species
would validate Gewirth's approach.
A biocritical approach which emphasizes transcultural human
similarities and shared needs furnishes the universal criteria that
Maclntrye says are lacking in Gewirth's analysis.

It follows that

all members of Homo sapiens are entitled to the freedom and well
being that Gewrith advocates.
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Assuming the above reasoning is correct, it follows that
communitarian complaints about the presumed moral dark ages which
must result from anv individualistic orientation are misplaced.

It

makes a great deal of difference how we frame and contexualize our
individualistic perspectives and understandings.

Sociologists and

anthropologists have developed what might be termed a difference
optic which filters out transcultural human characteristics.

They

have implicitly accepted MacIntyre's notion that there are no impor
tant universal characteristics.

The transcultural theory of human

needs outlined in Chapter Four suggests that the elimination of
cross-cultural similarities and needs from social science discourse
results in a profound disciplinary myopia.

Positioning indivi

dualism within the framework of transcultural human needs allows for
the potential development of more social options than communitarian
critiques of utilitarian individualism recognize.

There is no log

ical conflict between individual human needs and the public good.
Bellah and his co-authors (1985) view an individualistic and a
communal orientation as inevitably conflicting:
The extent to which many Americans can understand the
workings of our economic and social organization is
limited by the capacity of their chief moral language
to make sense of human interaction. The limit set by
individualism is clear: events that escape the control
of individual choice and will cannot coherently be en
compassed in a moral calculation, (p. 204).
It is simply untrue, however, that a perspective which begins
with the individual does not allow us to understand what we have in
common.

A biocritical emphasis on what we share as individuals is
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more likely to lead to a renewed emphasis on the construction of
public goods than is a nostalgic longing for an idealized communi
tarian past.34 Biocritique begins with the individual as a living,
breathing member of a particular species.

It does not reduce social

behavior to individual psychology, but maintains that individual
psychology needs to be taken into account in the explanation of
social behavior.

One begins with the biologically concrete.

Taking

that level of analysis into account, we can then move outward and
look at group dynamics, institutions, and cultural configurations.
The individual per se seems to vanish in much sociological analysis,
but people are always present in any social situation.
theories make implicit psychological assumptions.

All social

Social scientists,

therefore, need to understand and utilize information from other
disciplines which relates to those assumptions.

The limits set by

individualism depend entirely on the nature of the individualism
which is being proposed.
The kinds of information which we should take into account in
any description of human similarities have only been available for a
brief period of time.

This has considerable significance for what

sociologists may now view as urresovable disciplinary conflicts.

Our

images of what constitutes humankind are likely to change in the fu
ture as rapidly as they have in the past.

Assuming that no further

changes in perspective will occur is an egotistical absurdity.

Sup

pose that each grade school in the United States emphasized the
potential cultural equality and biological similarities of every
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member of Homo sapiens. Even in a period of conservative ascend
ancy, this would seem to be a politically feasible goal.

Suppose

we actually taught students about the latest developments in evolu
tionary psychology, sociobiology, genetics, and paleontology.

Sup

pose, as Laurel Richardson advocates, "that social scientists act
ually became effective teacher-facilitators as opposed to pontifi

cating philosopher-kings" (Richardson, 1991, p. 177).
Imagine what might happen if people actually believed that
cultural diversity depends on species commonalities.

If we were

another species none of us would have the ability to interpret cul
ture in any human fashion.

It is more important that humans as a

species paint, than it is what we paint. It is more significant, in
terms of species characteristics, that human beings live in families
--as opposed to the specific type of family.

It has been of more

consequence for human evolution that most human beings seek relig
ious experiences than it is what kind of religion they seek.

It is

more significant in terms of human commonalities that human beings
need shelter to survive as opposed to the particular kind of shelter.
It is far more significant for a biosocial perspective that people
need other people, as opposed to which specific people are believed
important.
If we tell our children only that they are essentially differ
ent from children in other human groups, it is no surprise that they
come to accept their putative differences as self-evident truths.
Almost no one is presenting the kinds of interdisciplinary
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information now available which accentuate common evolutionary his
tory and biological similarities.

In the social sciences, what Tooby

and Cosmides (1992) call "intellectual isolationism has only become
more extreme with time" (p. 22).

We need to look at the other and

realize that we are looking at ourselves.
Changes in what Mark Poster (1990) terms the mode of informa
tion and what other writers have referred to as globalization
(Robertson, 1992) have helped to extend our consciousness of kind.
Our communication networks and data banks have become more extensive
and universal.

As media critics such as Neil Postman (1992) suggest,

the information received may be incredibly distorted and biased.

The

fact that global information is available at all, however, is a new
factor which influences our perceptions.

For example, the recent

Palestinian-Israeli peace agreement clearly humanized the Palestinian
representatives such as Kanan Ashrawi in a way that had not occurred
in the United States in the past.

Given the opportunity for media

dialogue and representation, the demonized other becomes the
comprehensible and rational diplomat.
In his examination of sociobiology, philosopher Peter Singer
(1981) argues that "Our feelings of benevolence and sympathy are more
easily aroused by specific human beings than by a large group in
which no individuals stand out" (p. 157).

Once the Palestinians

stand out as individual people similar to ourselves, our percep
tions drastically change.

Part of the difficulty with the communi

tarian perspective is that individuals simply disappear.

This also
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suggests that an individualistic orientation which emphasizes indivi
dual similarities, contrary to Bellah et al., is likely to produce a
more effective political response to social problems than a more
communitarian discourse.
What Giddings called consciousness of kind increases in emer
gency situations.
victims.

We are willing to make sacrifices for earthquake

We are willing to send money to fight starvation in Africa.

We are prepared to make sacrifices in wartime and help the other even
if it results in increased risk to ourselves.
into a lake to rescue a swimmer in trouble.

We unthinkingly jump
We willingly send relief

supplies to people in Florida whose houses have been destroyed by
hurricanes. In crisis situations, the degree of similarity to the
victims is increasingly recognized.
similar course-of-life needs.

We see them as people who share

We understand that disasters are

capricious and could affect us all.
A biocritical perspective proposes that, as we come to under
stand our human commonalities, we should increasingly view many of
the problems described by communitarians as emergency situations for
similar members of a common species.

Given our common human needs,

what is increasingly viewed as normal is glaringly and undeniably
harmful and unacceptable.

Given a determinate description of human

needs, it is clear that the kinds of conditions writers like Jonathan
Kozol have described in great detail are utter emergencies.

In

Savage Inequalities (1991) Kozol presents overwhelming evidence of
the everyday crises of urban life.

The series of personal narratives
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he presents are exceptionally persuasive in increasing readers'
consciousness of kind.

The voices of individual children are

overwhelmingly present

or re-presented and allowed to speak for

themselves.

Reading Savage Inequalities is an effective way to

identify what is lacking in much communitarian discourse.
tarian problems are often abstract generalities.
sis begins with concrete particulars.

Communi

Biocritical analy

A recent special report in

The Washington Post which investigates poverty in Washington, D.C.
by examining its effects on three generations of one family is an
example of this type of analysis (Dash, 1994).

We see that normal

experiences of specific individuals result in everyday emergencies.
Needs are specific, concretized, identifiable and unmet. We are
able to recognize human commonalities.
In The Truly Disadvantaged. William Julius Wilson (1987) argues
that effective programs for social reform require "the support and
commitment of a broad consistency" (p. 120).

His orientation is

communitarian in that he wants programs "in which the more advantaged
groups of all races can positively relate" (p. 120).

He notes that

"the question of reform is a political one and believes that people
increasingly resent programs targeted at particular groups" (p. 124).
Wilson argues that the possibilities for reform are greater with
programs believed to be directed towards the general welfare, as
compared to those seen as only benefiting a particular group.35
On the other hand, writers like Harold Cruse (1987) have co
gently maintained that blacks in American society will improve their
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opportunities only by emphasizing race-specific policies.

A biocri

tical perspective notes that this communitarian/separatist argument
is another false dichotomy.

It presupposes the kinds of subjective

distinctions between individuals which our common evolutionary past
and biosocial present suggest are arbitrary and unwarranted.

To the

extent that we recognize species commonalities, the inevitable dual
ism disappears or is marginalized.

The more we recognize what we

have in common, the easier we are able to imagine ourselves in the
other's position.
The commonalities we share are the result of our biological and
evolutionary history.
Africans.

We are all ultimately

We share similar neural-biological characteristics and

stages of development.
culture.

We share common needs.

We can learn any language.

We can share any

We have a great deal of genetic commonalities.

We are all

Homo sapiens. We need to develop new stories to tell these things to
each other.
We cannot, contrary to Bellah and MacIntyre, share the same
religion.

We never will.

As Jeffrey Stout (1988a) maintains, the

liberal institutions disliked by communitarians were in part the
result of "the manifest failure of religious groups to establish
rational agreement on their competing detailed visions of the good"
(p. 212).

We cannot, as communitarians suggest, renew 19th century

republican traditions in what is to some extent a postmodern society.
(See Endnote 34.)

The relations of production, the new modes of

information, the globalization of communications, the changing ethnic
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and linguistic relationships, and an appreciation of MacIntyre's own
historicism all point in the same direction: One cannot base new
social forms on what took place in ancient Greece or colonial
America.

The new narratives we will develop will be based on a

constantly evolving understanding of our own past evolution and
biosocial commonalities.
In his critique of sociobiology, Peter Singer (1981) argues
that human reason plays an independent role in the theories and
practices we develop.
sionist.

Reason, he suggests, "is inherently expan

It seeks universal application" (p. 99).

what Singer terms an expanding circle.

This leads toward

The use of reason results in

a bias toward the equal treatment of equals, or what he terms "the
principle of impartial consideration of interests" (p. 109).

This

is in some ways similar to the argument concerning freedom and well
being of Gewirth.

If something is appropriate for me, it is reason

able to suppose that it is proper for a similar being in a similar
situation.
Gradually those in the expanding circle perceived that Native
Americans, blacks, women, Latinos, and Africans were similarly human.
In spite of the racism, sexism, and xenophobia of American society,
it is increasingly difficult to argue that anyone in principle should
be excluded from the opportunities that are available to anyone else.
This has been a major achievement of the movement toward individual
rights which so exercises communitarians.

Contrary to their anal

yses, an individualistic perspective--an expanding circle--has been
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responsible for the increase in individual life chances which
communitarians in the United States often take for granted. It will
also take a renewed emphasis on individual commonalities to expand
that circle in the future.

Only in its expansion will we move to

wards the kinds of human relationships which communitarians from
Bourne to Bellah have proposed.
Equal and Together:

A Biocritical Reverie

Looking out from the observation deck of the starship Biocommunitv at the rapidly receding image of Earth, Education Specialist
Julie Humana was lost in thought.

Because this was her twenty-third

flight for the United Federation of Planets, she was used to the
changes in perspective which came from terrestrial decentering.
thought of all the other species she had encountered.

She

She knew, of

course, that her own species was the result of uniquely shared
experiences and a common evolutionary past.

Like all humans nowa

days, she knew this in a sense that was constitutive of her entire
being.

Beginning at her primary school, she had gradually come to

understand and appreciate the shared needs and characteristics of
Homo sapiens. She could still remember Madame Diderot in Kinder
garten saying--"We are all human beings.
humains. Remember that.

Nous sommes tous les etres

Remember to remember."

Sehor Marquez had

said the same thing the next year--in Spanish naturally--"Todos somos
seres humanos."

By her third year, Julie Humana knew three lan

guages.
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Her teachers had carefully explained the evolutionary history
of humankind.

They pointed out to her that a realistic comprehension

of genetics had not developed until the 1950s.

It had taken much

longer to absorb the conceptual and philosophical implications of the
new knowledge.
one factor.

The early experiments in DNA hybridization had been

People gradually realized how similar they were to

different species, and, by comparison, to each other.

Cultural

ethnocentrism decreased as people recognized and removed their selfcentered blinders.

People reacted as Thomas Huxley had so long ago

when he read Darwin's On the Origin of Species: "How stupid of me
not to have thought of that.n
Thinking back on her family's long association with space
exploration, she was astounded by the magnitude of the changes in her
lifetime. Alterations in self-images had occurred almost as swiftly
as the transformations in technology which made possible her career.
Peoples' ideas had changed as rapidly as computer technology had
changed everyday activities.

Just as everyone recognized changes in

information processing, people everywhere began to take into account
the new information which was being processed.

The differences were

as great as before and after the time of Copernicus, Galileo and
Newton.

Warranted knowledge altered what we saw when we looked at

each other.

What had been called the end of history was now under

stood as a total chimera.
Today people applied the same consciousness of kind to other
species as well as our own.

It was increasingly difficult to
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imagine the time before the veil of ignorance had been at least part
ially lifted.
removed.

Julie knew that the curtain would never be completely

The length of the stage always seemed to increase just as

the curtain was nearing the end.
sight.

In fact, there was never any end in

While she knew some things her grandmother had not been aware

of, her own grandchildren would be in a similar position years from
now.
Some of the pre-Federation thinkers and philosophers had
understood the changed circumstances and new ways of thinking.

In

her own area of education, one of her favorites had been Johnny Do.
His importance was increasingly recognized.

He had seen and under

stood many of the new possibilities and had tried his best to share
that knowledge with others.

He knew there was no going back.

Others of the pre-spacers--as those between the post-modernists
and the Federationists are labeled today--had not been so prescient.
Bob Bella and Al MacTire were two of the communalists who had advo
cated the return of the status

quo

ante. They looked to ancient

Greece and the Middle Ages as exemplars for contemporary societies.
A-s Johnny Do recognized, however, it was impossible to re-create old
ideologies in totally changed circumstances.

One had to look in

directions which took into account new information.

Knowledge and

the evaluation of knowledge are connected in a complex web of
interrelationships.

The evaluations we make depend on what we know.

Julie had several hours before her shift began.

Gradually the

daydreams became dreams and the dreams became her reality.

She saw
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her classrooms and the people she had taught.

Even Afari Olduvai,

the Commander of Biocommunitv. had been one of her students.
was proud of her work.

Julie

She knew she had made a difference in how

her students came to understand their common history.

She knew that

her teaching partner Stephen, as well as all the other members of
the crew, shared a living tradition of exploration.

They also

shared--as equal members of the same species--a variety of common
characteristics which were ultimately the accidental result of our
African origins.

But what an astonishing result!
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CHAPTER VIII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Adults have children; humans have a species-typical body
form; humans have characteristic emotions; humans move
through a life history cued by observable body changes;
humans come in two sexes; they eat food and are motivated
to seek it when they lack it; humans are b o m and eventu
ally die; they are related through sexual reproduction and
chains of descent; they turn their eyes towards events that
tend to be informative about adaptively consequential issues
they desire, plan, deceive, love, gaze, envy, get ill, have
sex, play, can be injured, are satiated; and on and on.
(John Tooby and Leda Cosmides, 1992, p. 37)36
Durkheim's exclusion of biology and psychology from a sociology
sui generis should be repudiated.

Human evolution has resulted in

certain species-specific characteristics which enable us to interact
with each other.

As Tooby and Cosmides (1992) observe, we could not

connect with other people or with the environment at all "without the
presence of mechanisms designed to create the connection" (p. 38).
Every human social interaction is the result of both individual
mechanisms and differing environmental contexts.

Sociologists who

claims individual behavior is merely the result of cultural social
ization presuppose the existence of unidentified mechanisms which
allow the socialization to occur in the first place.
A sociologist developing a biosocial perspective may feel like
the apocryphal student who suddenly realizes she has been writing
prose all her life.

The significance of our bioevolutionary history

should have been obvious long ago, but the most difficult things to
reflexively understand are what we take for granted.

All

242
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reflexively understand are what we take for granted. All sociologi
cal discussions of behavior inevitably contain implicit and often
underdeveloped psychological assumptions.

The mere possibility

of a common discourse presupposes various psychologcal and indivi
dualistic capabilities.
I have argued throughout this dissertation that any information
which helps in the explanation and interpretation of human behavior
should be utilized by sociologists.

Some of the principal shortcom

ings of sociology today are the result of the fact that our major
conceptual schemata were formulated in the 19th century by Weber,
Durkheim and Marx.

Sociology as a discipline developed long before

the avalanche of new information now being provided by work in pale
oanthropology, genetics, sociobiology, ethology, linguistics, and
evolutionary psychology.

Each of these areas has data which impacts

on the understanding and interpretation of human actions.

There are

no good reasons to ignore these kinds of data. The result of our
sociological isolationism is a kind of disciplinary hermitage: the
sociologist as Robinson Crusoe on an uninhabited and barren island-intellectually pure but alone and forgotten.
Durkheim's claim that sociology should by definition eliminate
the consideration of all biological and psychological information is
intellectually absurd.

On the most elementary level, it is clear

that the possible identification of a gene responsible for dyslexia
or a gene which'may help to unclog arteries would have massive
social consequences.37 The kinds of information which lead to these
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claims were simply not available until recently.

Why should socio

logy be content with an explanation for human behavior which is ana
logous to previously learned commentaries on phlogiston?

We need to

make use of whatever data are available, no matter the source.
I have shown that there are two principal reasons behind much
of the sociological rejection of biosocial arguments:

Many sociolo

gists believe that any consideration of biological data inevitably
produces conservative or reactionary political positions.

Secondly,

sociologists often exclude analysis of specific individuals by dis
ciplinary fiat.

In the communitarian analysis of Bellah, MacIntyre

and Etzioni, the two positions intersect and overlap.

Communitarians

advance the notion that any concentration on the individual inevit
ably results in the acceptance or promotion of a rapacious, selfcentered, Hobbesian ideology. A preoccupation with individual rights
leads straight to cut-throat consumerism or socially irresponsible
careerism. Wall-Mart and insider trading are unavoidable outcomes.
Neither of these assumptions has any validity.

There is no

relationship between the use of evolutionary or biological data and a
specific political position.

The contrary sociological assumption

that biology - predetermination - political conservatism/elitism/
prejudice/racism has done much to limit our understanding of human
actions.

Any perspective which stresses the significance of species-

specific characteristics and transcultural similarities ipso facto
decreases invidious distinctions made between peoples.
likely to discriminate against a mirror image.

One is less

The other gradually
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becomes one of us.

There are no valid political reasons why socio

logists should reject the use of biological or evolutionary data.
This is my most important conclusion for sociology as a discipline:
We should feel free to utilize any data we believe significant.
Current ethological and genetic information suggests that hu
man beings are more closely related to other species than was pre
viously assumed.

Why should sociologists presuppose that the kinds

of explanations available for all other species have absolutely no
importance for Homo sapiens? Behaviors are the result of inter
actions between species-specific architectures and fluctuating
environmental conditions.

The common sociological assumption that

any mention of genes assures an unchangeable social situation is
fundamentally mistaken.

Like all other animals, we are influenced

by traits and characteristics which are the result of our evolution
ary past.

The fact that we ignore their effects unnecessarily dis

torts sociological analyses.

It doesn't make a great deal of sense,

for example, to write about the vanishing adolescent and ignore sex.
The political implications of an evolutionary perspective need
not provide troglodytic succor for politicians like Oliver North.
Ardent

conservatives, for example, often maintain that capitalism

and the accumulation of personal wealth are justified and natural
due to the violent competition evident throughout our evolutionary
history.

Any attempt to temper capitalistic competition presumably

goes against human nature.

The selfish gene produces embryonic

capitalists.
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The problem for this kind pseudo-sophisticated blather is a
massive inconsistency in time frames.

As Donald Symons (1992) has

argued, a "human activity is only an evolutionary adaptation if it
resulted in greater reproductive success for ancestral populations"
(Symons, 1992, pp. 146-148).

Evolution takes time.

For example,

the discordance hypothesis which I discussed in Chapter Four assumes
that there are contradictions between the nutritional requirements of
our Paleolithic ancestors and our contemporary diets.

That is, cer

tain nutritional practices in the Paleolithic resulted in improved
chances of reproductive success for the populations which used them.
Our current high-fat, fast-food, sugar-loaded diet is not appropriate
for the human genotype which evolved throughout prehistory.
Capitalism is a relatively recent human activity.

Whatever the

significance of evolutionary competition, it is clear that capitalism
is not a natural adaptation of our genetic inheritance because the
conditions of capitalism did not obtain during our evolutionary
development. The human needs which I previously examined are natural
in the sense of having helped at some point to increase our evolu
tionary survival.

One cannot claim that the market is the natural

result of our evolutionary heritage when it has only been active for
about two hundred years.

The kinds of skills necessary to survive in

the African savannah do not easily translate to an age of computer
technology.

A commodities trader is not simply a high-tech version

of Homo habilis. There was no stock exchange at Olduvai.

Bioevolu-

tionary reasoning does not inevitably result in ideological
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justification of the status quo.

A biocritical perspective reaches

the opposite conclusion: Biological analysis is less likely to result
in a reification of the status quo than is cultural ethnocentrism.
To summarize my findings and conclusions:
1.

Contemporary work in ethology and other disciplines points

to the close relationships between Homo sapiens and other forms of
life.
0

2.

It is unreasonable to assume that evolutionary processes

have affected all species other than humans, but not Homo sapiens.
3.

It is therefore logical to conclude that genetic inheri

tance plays some part in human actions and behavior--that behavior
is always the result of combining genotypical and environmental
factors.
4.

Sociologists attempt to meaningfully interpret behavior.

5.

When interpreting behavior, we should make vise of all

available knowledge.
6.

Sociologists who exclude evolutionary or biological data

are not making use of all available knowledge.
The results of work in other disciplines affects sociology and
should not be excluded from sociological analyses.

This is as true

for sociology as it is for all other academic disciplines.

For ex

ample, the famous experiments of Harry Harlow with cloth mothers for
rhesus monkeys (Haraway, 1989, pp. 231-243) conclusively demonstrated
that behaviorist assumptions about mothering were incorrect.

The

attraction between mother and child is not simply a matter of
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reinforcement due to feeding schedules.

A baby monkey is not merely

a blank slate subject to the laws of operant conditioning.

What hap

pens in one discipline does and should impact on theories and re
search in others.

Sociology is not exempt from the general processes

of intellectual history.
7.

The evolutionary history of all other species has resulted

in species-specific characteristics and needs.
8.

It is reasonable to assume that human beings have certain

shared transcultural human needs which are a result of our common
evolutionary history and species characteristics.
9.

Particular societies do a better than others in meeting

specific human needs.

This can be determined empirically in the same

manner as any other social science research.
10.
needs.

Social problems are the result of failures to meet human

The society that best meets human needs has, by definition,

the least serious social problems.
11.

Due ultimately to our species-specific characteristics,

any normal human infant can learn any existing language and culture.
A child b o m in the poorest country is as capable of learning the
culture of the richest country as a child b o m in that country.
12.

People who share common characteristics and needs should

be treated in a similar fashion.
13.

Every child deserves at least as many opportunities or

life-chances as an affluent child in the richest country.
A poor child from Haiti brought to the United States as an
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infant becomes an American.

If she is raised in a wealthy family,

she potentiallly encounters the same opportunities as any other mem
ber of that family.

Her needs are met to the same extent.38 Thus

the standards available in the most adequate country provide an
empirical warrant for comparing the opportunities available for any
specific individual in his or her own society.

Biocritique avoids a

utopian conception of human potential and suggests that we look at
what we have already accomplished.

A critical sociology is warranted

to the extent that social conditions limit the life-chances of any
individual in any specific situation.

Different local groups are

better than others in meeting particular human needs.

They can be

meaningfully compared and evaluated.
It is precisely the emphasis on the individual which allows for
valid cross-cultural comparisons.

Contrary to the entire communi

tarian approach, it is our transcultural commonalities as individuals
which point to the possibility of effectively reducing the domain of
the other.

We reject out of hand the possibility of social equality.

Of course different societies can't all be equal. This seems a com
pletely utopian position.

It is much easier to understand and accept

the fact that a starving child anywhere in the world would have very
different life-chances in an affluent environment.

The child would

be capable of takine advantage of a changed situation due to the com
mon characteristics she shares with anv other child--characteristics
which cannot be understood or appreciated without taking evolutionary
and biological information into account.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

250
14.

An emphasis on an individualistic level of analysis need

not result in the new dark ages proposed by communitarians.
15.

We are more likely to recognize our commonalities when we

understand what we share as individuals.
16.

An emphasis on shared transcultural human characteristics

is likely to reduce cultural ethnocentrism, prejudice and racism.
17.

The use of biosocial and evolutionary data has no intrin

sic connection to conservatism or satisfaction with the status quo.
18.

The evolutionary process does not, in itself, provide a

justification for an evolutionary ethics.
19.

It is necessary, contra Richards, to add a determinate

conception of human needs to evolutionary accounts in order to pro
vide reasonable grounds for a critical sociology.
20.

Assuming the satisfaction of human needs as a desideratum,

it is possible to make provisionally-warranted value judgments con
cerning which social and institutional arrangements best meet those
needs.
21.

Therefore, a complete reliance on local standards is

unnecessary and counter-productive when analyzing social problems.
Sociology is not in the hopeless situation suggested by con
temporary prophets of doom.

The kinds of information which should

lead to a more integrated social science are beginning to be absorbed
and taken into account by various disciplines.

Evolutionary psycho

logy, genetics, physiology, ecology, and paleoanthropology are all
moving toward a new understanding of Homo sapiens. It is

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

251
self-deluding in the extreme to assume that the kinds of information
available to 19th-century sociologists are entirely adequate for
understanding contemporary human behavior.

It is also self-deluding

to assume that the perspectives of Durkheim, Marx and Weber are the
best we will ever have.
As Dewey believed, knowledge is a process.

We see that easily

enough with other peoples and historical periods, but simply can't
accept the same limitations on our own perspectives.

The fact that

our knowledge is, at best, provisional should supply a necessary de
gree of modesty.

The fact that others will in different times and

places understand more than we do also supplies a modest degree of
hope.

A sociology which deals only with cultural differences

unnecessarily limits our vision.

In an era of ethnic cleansing and

rising xenophobic nationalism, it is useful to emphasize what we all
share: our common biosocial characteristics and evolutionary history
as members of Homo sapiens. The ethnocentrism decried by sociolo
gists is cultural: Our common traits are the biological and evolu
tionary result of our membership in a single species.

A biocritical

sociology begins with that understanding.
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ENDNOTES
1Dewey's argument in 1920 suggests that many contemporary
postmodernist positions do not represent quite the decisive break
with modernity that their adherents assume (Berman, 1982; Jameson,
1991; Rosenau, 1992).

Randolph Bourne (1964) used the term post

modernism in his brilliant essay Trans-National America first pub
lished in 1916

(p. 110).

2Irving Louis Horowitz, for example, has somehow convinced him
self that Regis Debray, the 1960s French revolutionary theorist, and
Lynden laRouche (!) provide good ideal types for what is happening
in all of academia, especially in sociology (Horowitz, 1993, pp. 5273).

He argues that in the very fine work of Stephen Pfohl "the

Bohemian ideology takes on the hard edge of totalitarian adventures,"
whatever that means (p. 48).

With a similar degree of ad hominem

attacks, Michael Faia (1993) argues that the me generation is "mere
ly the latest manifestation of the counterculture" (p. 11), which of
course, proves its complete venality.

Horowitz and Faia no longer

seem to believe that sociology is about anything, at least as cur
rently practiced.
Disciplinary pessimism is unnecessary and is ultimately a selffulfilling prophecy.

Diatribes such as the works of Horowitz and

Faia assume a generational and disciplinary Cartesian split:

Only

mv generation and my perspective have any chance of discovering the
truth.

Anyone familiar with the works of John Dewey should
252
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recognize the shortcomings of such self-serving polemics.

One

thinks of Schopenhauer preaching pessimism, asceticism, and resigna
tion, but always being sure to eat in the best restaurants (Russell,
1945, p. 758).

Strangely enough, philosophy did not end with the

publication of his The World as Will and Idea in 1818.

It is the

ultimate conceit to assume that other people will not experience new
things and develop new ideas.

We pay lip service to the idea that

the acquisition of knowledge is never complete, but we don't ser
iously consider its implications.
Variables measured included anthropometric variables such
as height and weight, electroencephalographic or brainwave measures,
psycho-physiologic variables including blood pressure and heart
rate, tests of information processing ability, various tests of men
tal ability, personality tests, psychological interest exams and so
cial attitudes (Bouchard et al., 1990, p. 226).

Note the range of

responses tested and the kinds of data gathered which are ignored by
most sociologists.

One of the principal arguments of this disserta

tion is that a biosocial approach allows sociologists to see the
utility of these kinds of data.
^Wilson, for example, claimed in 1977 that the "critical re
sponse to human sociobiology took me by surprise" and that the re
actions "of many social scientists were also initially stronger than
some of my

colleagues and I had expected" (p. xiii).

Given the

title and contents of his concluding chapter--"Man: From Sociobiol
ogy to Sociology"--these comments seem somewhat disingenuous or at
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least naive. Wilson also writes that "income in a society is distri
buted to the benefit of the class that controls the government.

In

the United States, this is of course the middle class" (p. 169,
emphasis added).

On the contrary, as Philip Mattera argues in

Prosperitv Lost, the idea of an all-encompassing middle class
is an ideological construction which has little relationship to
family incomes (Mattera, 1990, pp. 9-12).

Wilson's comment in

this case does seem to reflect a certain political and economic
naivete.
5Part of the problem is simple ignorance.

For example, a con

tent analysis by Richard Means of sociological textbooks published
since 1930 showed that only eight texts out of 112 "suggested in any
sense that biological factors are important data for sociologists"
(Means, 1967, p. 202).
fuses to examine.

One can't adequately criticize what one re

It is interesting, for example, that the first

edition of George Ritzer's influential text on sociological theory
(1983) contains a detailed discussion of sociobiology and biographi
cal notes on E. 0. Wilson (Ritzer, 1983, pp. 401-406), but a more
recent volume on contemporary theory (1988) omits the subject en
tirely.

Presumably Ritzer believes the topic is no longer of any

interest to sociologists or that we are all adequately informed on
the topic.
On the other hand, even anthropologists, all of whom receive,
one would presume, some training in physical anthropology, are sharp
ly devided on the relevance of sociobiology for their discipline.
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Looking at the key concepts of sociobiology as presented by Wilson
and others, a recent survey by Leonard Lieberman showed that animal
behaviorists and biological anthropologists are much more receptive
to sociobiological reasoning than cultural anthropologists (Lieber
man, 1989).

For example, 82% of the animal behaviorists agreed that

kin selection is a useful topic for future research.
the cultural anthropologists was 35%.

The figure for

A similar comparison for

reciprocal altruism was 77% vs. 29% and for gene-culture coevolution
70% vs. 46% (Lieberman, 1989, p. 678).
Wilson, of course, uses the signifier man to refer to human
kind in general.

While this was standard practice during the time

he was writing Sociobiologv. it indicates a certain lack of concern
and awareness with respect to feminist issues--whether or not it was
intended as such by Wilson.

See the discussion in Lemer, 1992,

pp. 127-139.
7Brent Berlin and Paul Kay are anthropologists who have carried
out a number of cross-cultural experiments on the perception and
classification of colors.

They originally expected to find each

culture distinguishing colors in a unique manner.

They ultimately

found a number of cross-cultural similarities in the way different
cultures produced color schemes.

They argued that "there appears

to be a fixed sequence of evolutionary stages through which a lan
guage must pass as its basic color vocabulary increases" (Durham,
1991, p. 218).

That is, as the color scheme increases in complexity,

the development of color schemes show cross-cultural similarities.
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See the discussion in Durham, 1991, pp. 213-223.
®There are a number of authors who have offered specific stud
ies of the influence of what Wilson terms epigenetic rules.

Two of

the best volumes are The Tangled Wing (1982) by Melvin Konner and
Coevolution (1991) by William Durham.

Durham, for example, demon

strates that it is impossible to adequately understand the epidem
iology of sickle-cell anemia in West Africa without taking into ac
count both genetic and cultural factors (Durham, 1991, pp. 102-153).
9A great deal of controversy was generated by the publication

of Sociobiology when Wilson declared that altruism was "the central
theoretical problem of sociobiology" (Wilson, 1975, p. 3).

That is,

how can something which by (sociobiological) definition "reduces
personal fitness" evolve by natural selection?

By the time Wilson

and Lumsden wrote Promethean Fire, they declared that the concepts
and empirical studies of kin selection and reciprocal altruism
have largely solved the altruism problem and that "the central
problem was now the relation between genetic evolution and cultural
evolution" (Lumsden & Wilson, 1983, p. 49).

This is an important

difference in emphasis which, I believe, has gone unrecognized in
many critiques of Wilson.
10On the other hand, it would appear that Wilson's understand
ing of philosophy at the time he wrote Sociobiology was not complete
ly first-rate.

Looking at Wilson's brief discussion of Rawls and

Kant in that work, philosopher Mary Midgley writes:

"A certain

numbness strikes me when 1 find that Wilson seems to think Kant
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was an Intuitionist (which is roughly equivalent to calling
Darwin a champion of the Genesis creation story) and also to
equate Intuitionism with Social Contract ethics" (Midgley, 1978,
p. 175).

What is even more significant, I think, is that Wilson's

discussion is simply not serious.

He ignores the relevant

literature and the analysis is entirely too brief.
11Wilson is faced with the same problems as Skinnerian beha
viorists.

If one eliminates the concept of mind, how does one ex

plain the actions of the experimenters?

The philosopher of science

David Hull suggests that a sociobiological analysis of the socio
biologists themselves might prove not only instructive but also
entertaining.

How did Wilson become the head honcho?

What sorts

of submissive behavior do others lower in the sociobiological
dominance hierarchy exhibit to deflect his aggressive behavior?
Do others in Wilson's research group behave like juveniles, or
like females in estrus? (Hull, 1980, p. 81).

Donna Haraway nicely

suggests the same thing when she refers to "the field primatologists'
niches and money-foraging behaviors" (Haraway, 1989, p. 121).

For

an excellent analysis of what is lacking in Wilson's early works,
see the discussion of reason and reason and genes by Peter Singer
(Singer, 1981, pp. 87-147).
12In a 1990 article on Biology and the Social Sciences Wilson,
although describing sociology as the social science he finds "the
most alien and least interesting," says that "sociology is truly the
subject most remote from the fundamental principles of individual
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behavior."

Its subjects "probably have the greatest discrepancies

between genetic and cultural fitness and hence are most likely to
display emergent properties not predicable from a knowledge of
individual psychology alone" (Wilson, 1990, p. 259).
meets Clifford Geertz (1973).

Edward Wilson

One could hardly fathom why the

controversy over sociobiology occurred at all.

If, however, a sub

ject matter is alien to one's perspective, it is, by definition, not
taken into account.
13Darwin's world, by way of contrast, is a very friendly place.
Although this is counter to the common sense perception of the sur
vival of the fittest image of Darwinism, a reading of Darwin's
discussion of the origins of morality in The Descent of Man shows
otherwise.

"Looking to future generations" says Darwin, "there is

no cause to fear that the social instincts will grow weaker" (Dar
win, 1871/1981, p. 104.

For Darwin there was no conflict between

the social instincts (i.e., our human biogram) and morality.

He

believed that our moral sense was ultimately a result of our biolog
ical history.

Humans can't avoid reflection.

Our morality is "ab

originally derived from the social instincts" (Darwin, 1871/1981, p.
97).

I also find it interesting that Darwin clearly stated the

principles of reciprocal altruism exactly one hundred years before
Robert Trivers' wellknown discussion (1971).

Darwin wrote in 1871

that "each man would soon learn from experience that if he aided his
fellow-men, he would commonly receive aid in return" (Darwin, 1871,
p. 169).

See also the interesting discussion of Darwin's moral
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theory by Richards (1987, pp. 110-126).
14Although Eiseley's use of man as a generic marker for human
kind is typical of the time when he was writing, his holistic style
of analysis is certainly less androcentric than was that of most of
his anthropological contemporaries.
15In his autobiographical work Bionhilia (1984), Wilson refers
to "my own taxonomist's eye" (Wilson, 1984, p.4).

He also states

that "I feel most at home with a jumble of glittering data and the
feeling they might be fitted together for the first time in some
new pattern" (Wilson, 1984, p. 65).

To be fair to Wilson, however,

Biophilia also refers to humanity as the poetic species and contains
many passages which demonstrate that Wilson's personal views of na
ture are actually similar to Eiseleys' lyricism.

One simply wouldn't

know that from a reading of Sociobiology.
Wilson also makes a statement in Biophilia concerning species
analogies which would seem to devalue much of his earlier work:
"Although the rules of sexual choice, diet selection, and social
behavior are to some extent shared with a few other species, the
overall pattern is particular to Homo sapiens. Not only symboliza
tion and language, but also most of the basic cognitive specializa
tions are unique" (Wilson, 1984, p. 114, emphasis added).

Cultural

anthropologists and sociologists would certainly agree, but where
does this leave the myriad interspecies comparisons suggested
throughout Sociobiology?

As I have previously argued, it seems clear

that a concentration on other primates is warranted.

Wilson does
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make the suggestion in Biophilia that research on the pygmy chimp
anzee among all the species on earth "deserves the highest priority"
(Wilson, 1984, p. 128).
16Huxley did present a clearer argument which is similar to the
position which I will outline in Chapters IV and V.

He wrote that

"social organization does canalize and concentrate the psychological
forces of human nature in different ways, so that society can act
either as an organ of frustration or an organ of fulfillment.

Once

we have grasped that fact, it is up to us to make the attempt to im
prove its design" (Huxley, 1957, p. 196). This is a very different
and more coherent position than assuming the natural progress of
evolution.
17A s I will argue in Chapter IV, it makes a considerable dif
ference whether one is analyzing wants or needs.

One cannot equate

the two as is often the case in Midgley's writings.

The assumption

of equality leads to much unnecessary confusion.
18It is clear that a similar phenomenon of appealing to the
proper authority plays a large part in sociology, as the countless
quotations from Marx and Weber indicate.
authority figures limits creative thought.

An exclusive reliance on
Of course one has to

start somewhere and Marx and Weber are incredibly significant
sources.

The logical alternative is the absurdity of August Comte's

cerebral hygiene: one avoids all contamination from the thoughts of
others by simply not reading them (Ritzer, 1988, p. 15).
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19Richards, for example, is particularly critical of Stephen
Gould and argues in his new book The Meaning of Evolution that
Gould's Darwinism is an example of "the ideological uses of history"
(Richards, 1992, pp. 167-180).
20For an excellent discussion of the similarities and differ
ences

between Spencer and Darwin, as well as their relationships to

both Thomas and Julian Huxley, see John C. Greene (1981) Science.
Ideology and World View. Berkeley: University of California Press.
21The kinds of attitudes which qualitative distinctions gener
ate is exemplified by a recent story in The New York Times on Haiti's
elite.

The article quotes a Mr. Denis who states that "if a man

works for me, and I lift something heavy from my car instead of al
lowing him to lift it for me and bring it in the house, then I insult
him.

Because he feels it is his duty" (Bragg, 1994, p. 8a).
22The Psychological Foundations of Culture. 1992, p. 110.
^As is the case with the skeptical postmodernists, one might

ask the social constructionist why his or her own writings should be
taken seriously?

Logically, why shouldn't we only look at how the

social constructionist came to write about the particular question he
or she is concerned with?

In other words, the validity of the

sociological analysis is not the important issue.

Of course someone

else might then do the same for the second analysis with no end in
sight for this reductio ad absurdum.
24Stout argues that truth is warranted assertability is "re
futed by familiar cases in which we are warranted in asserting a
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proposition at a given time but later discover the proposition to
have been false" (Stout, 1988a, p. 298).

Surely, however, Dewey's

owns works suggested, indeed were predicated on. the same idea.
Stout, for example, thinks pragmatism is "never having to say you
are certain" (Stout, 1988a, p. 297.

Dewey in The Quest for Cer

tainty wrote that validity is "tested by results and not by
correspondence with antecedent properties of existence" (Dewey,
1929. p. 147).

He also argued that "there are as many kinds of va

lid knowledge as there are conclusions wherein distinctive opera
tions have been employed to solve the problems set by antecedently
experienced situations" (Dewey, 1929, p. 197).

Dewey would have no

problem in accepting the fact that what is true at one point--given
the best available information--would be falsified at a later date.
His whole philosophy assumed as much.
25The public response to the research of Eaton, Shostak and
Konner demonstrates the gap in understanding which exists even among
well-known and respected journalists.

For example, Ellen Goodman

wrote in The Boston Globe that "I am convinced that the average
Paleolithic person was the very role model of good health when he
died at the ripe old age of 32" (Konner, 1990, p. 43).

Other

newspaper headlines were "Check Ads for Specials on Saber-toothed
Tigers" and "Cave Man Takes a Healthy Bite Out of Today's ’Civilized'
Diet."

Even The Washington Post ridiculed the findings (Konner,

1990, p. 43).
As the authors pointed out in great detail, the major finding
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of their research was that the kinds of diseases which people died
from in Paleolithic times--infectious diseases, as well as trauma-were different than the degenerative diseases evident today.

Accord

ing to Vital Statistics, of the fifteen leading causes of death in
the United States, heart disease produces the leading share of the
total (34.1%), cancer is second (23.1%), and cerebrovascular diseases
are third (6.8%) (United States Department of Health and Public
Services, 1993, p. 11). While we have generally eliminated the in
fectious diseases, trauma, and accidents which killed our ancestors,
Eaton, Shostak and Konner argue with much justification that a more
natural diet similar to practices in the Paleolithic would greatly
reduce our leading causes of death.

Perhaps our sophisticated per

spective cannot accept the possibility that primitive humans could
possibly teach us anything.

Living among the !Kung in the Kalahari

Desert for his dissertation research convinced Konner that this
particular conceit was fundamentally mistaken (Konner,

1990,

pp. 19-28, 39-46, 99-111, 209-222).
26It is interesting how rapidly the skeptical postmodernist
necessarily abandons theoretical assumptions in what Dewey called
"the meaning of the daily detail" (Dewey, 1920, p. 212).

That is,

if all narratives have equal validity and performativity is not an
acceptable criterion, why take one's car to a mechanic when it
doesn't start?

Presumably anyone else could do as well since all

privileged information is equally suspect.

From past experience,

however, we know that the mechanic is more likely to get the car
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running again, as opposed to, say, our neighbor who is willing to
take a look.

Our neighbor, unfortunately, does not have the sane

experience and background as the mechanic.

With respect to fixing

our car, the knowledge and experience of the mechanic are more
instrumentally warranted.
270ne can argue, of course, that action occurs because it is
forced. By eliminating any concern with shared human needs and bas
ing his his theories on exclusively rational considerations, Gewirth
is open to the criticism that his rationalistic approach ignores
problems of social control and coercion.
28The theoretical approach of biocriticism is similar in this
regard to the institutional economics of Clarence Ayres (1961) and
Marc Tool (1985).

Tool, for example, argues that GNP and marginal

utility are theoretically deficient concepts for economic analysis
because they provide no way of distinguishing between, say, the eco
nomic contributions of the tobacco industry and that of HMOs.
assumes the qualitative equality of all fiscal activities.

GNP

Tool, in

contrast, argues that "direction is forward which provides for the
continuity of human life and noninvidious re-creation of community
through the instrumental use of knowledge" (Tool, 1985, p. 293,
emphasis in original).

Biocritique extends this analysis by detail

ing a theory of human needs which need to be met in order for the
qualities of life which Tool values to exist in the first place.
For further analysis, see Wendell Gordon and John Adams (1989)
Economics as Social Science: An Evolutionary Approach.
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^In their use of the term intervention, postmodernists have
appropriated a term which would seem to be contrary to their ex
pressed reliance on local standards and de-centering critiques.

One

intervenes given overwhelming force or military superiority--a typic
ally androcentric activity.

Intervention has masculine connotations

of force--a strangely traditionalistic notion for postmodernists
critical of all logocentric narratives.
30^

is interesting to note that in Tocqueville's original

formulation he distinguished between mores in the strict sense and
different notions and "various opinions, the whole moral and intel
lectual state of a people" (Tocqueville, 1835/1969, p. 287).

He was

more interested in the original Roman use "for customs in the broad
est and richest sense of the word, including the notion that customs
served welfare, and had traditional and mystic sanction" as opposed
to "the French moeurs which is trivial compared with mores" (Sumner,
1906/1960, p. 48).

Tocqueville, in other words, was contrasting

habits of the heart with a broader and more inclusive concept which
he wished to use in his own work.

Although habits of heart seems an

especially felicitous characterization of mores, it appears that
its use by Bellah et al. does not follow Tocqueville's usage.
as well as Tocqueville,

They,

are interested in "the whole moral and

intellectual state of a people" as opposed to "mores in the strict
sense" (i.e., habits of the heart).
31By the good life of personality Bourne meant exactly the same
kind of internal virtues and friendships which MacIntyre and Bellah
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advocate.

As he wrote of friendship in Youth and Life: "One ach

ieves a sort of transfiguration of personality in those moments.
In the midst of the high and genial flow of intimate talk, a pang
may seize one at the thought of the next day's drudgery, when life
will be lived alone again; but nothing can dispel ease and fullness
with which it is being lived at the moment" (Bourne, 1977, p. 112).
32To be fair to Bellah and his co-authors, their recent volume

The Good Society (1991) does contain a more political orientation and
does make use of the work of John Dewey and Walter Lippmann, but
their analysis still has a somewhat ethereal quality.

For example:

"In this book we have repeatedly suggested the need for a new para
digm, which we can now call the pattern of cultivation.

This pattern

would not mean a return to the settlement forms of the early nine
teenth century, but it would be the attempt to find, in today's cir
cumstances, a social and environmental balance, a recovery of meaning
and purpose in our lives together, giving attention to the natural
and cultural endowment we want to hand down to our children and
grandchildren, and avoiding the distractions which have confused us
in the past" (Bellah, et al., 1991, p. 271).

The obvious question

is how do we go about pursuing these lofty goals?
Mumford proposed the same kinds of
the procedural details.

Writers like Lewis

goals but were very sketchy on

The Good Society is eloquent in its des

cription of the good life but deficient in information on getting
there.

Bellah and his co-authors offer a great many generalities:

"In a society as obsessively concerned with money as ours, money is
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a major form of distraction" (Bellah, et al., 1991, p. 264).
The contrast is evident when comparing Bellah's observations to
Etzioni's.

Etzioni offers some specific suggestions for implement

ing communitarian reforms.

For example, he suggests that parents'

social security numbers should be printed on their childrens' birth
certificates "so that it would be possible to find either parent if
he or she left the child" (Etzioni, 1993, p. 83).
^As I have previously argued, there is no single language of
individualism.

In the United States today there are a multiplicity

of different languages.

Similarly, there is no single republican

tradition or community of memory.
but all have our own variations.

We talk about the same themes,
What I am proposing with biocri

tique is that we recognize our commonalities. as well as the differ
ences .
^In Looking Backward (1993) Derek Phillips persuasively argues
that the presumably communitarian features of 19th century American
life have been greatly exaggerated and idealized in the communitarian
discourse (pp. 24-80).

Thus, for example, "fewer than 10 percent of

the inhabitants of old Virginia had the right to vote" (Phillips,
1993, p. 73).

The public good was rather narrowly defined and it was

a singularly picayune public.
35In this regard, as I argued in Chapter I, his use of the
term underclass is particularly unfortunate.

His own terminology

leads to the kinds of particularistic and negative categorizing
which he believes effective efforts at social reform need to avoid.
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^The Psychological Foundations of Culture. 1992, p. 89.
370n a possible dyslexia gene, see Newsweek. October 24, 1994,
p. 66. On the possibility of a gene which may help to unclog arter
ies, see Levy, 1994).
38This ignores, of course, the likelihood of contemporary
racism negatively affecting any child from Haiti.

For the purposes

of this example, I am assuming that the child appears enough like a
U.S. citizen that this will not be a factor.

As any traveler to

Latin America discovers, this is certainly an empirical possibility.
One of the benefits of travel to Latin America for North Americans
is the likelihood of experiencing vastly different and unexpected ra
cial situations and categories.
I am likewise assuming in this example that gender is not a
significant discriminatory factor.

In spite of these unrealisitc

assumptions, it is easy to accept a thought experiment which suggests
that the socialization and opportunities later available to a baby
brought from Haiti could possibly be the same as a any other child
raised in the same family in the United States.
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